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FASHIONING CHANGE: THE CULTURAL ECONOMY OF CLOTHING IN 
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 
Jianhua (Andrew) Zhao, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2008
 
This dissertation is based on fifteen months of field research in Shanghai and Beijing conducted 
in 2002 and 2004.  The central question with which this dissertation is concerned is how clothing 
and the clothing industry is constituted by and constitutive of the phenomenal changes that have 
taken place in contemporary China, especially in the post-1978 reform period.  Specifically, this 
dissertation addresses two major questions: 1) Are the changes in Chinese clothing and the 
clothing industry merely a part of China’s economic development or modernization? And 2) 
does China’s integration with the global economy translate into a Westernization of China?   
The development of China’s textile and apparel industries is a process of liberalization in 
which the socialist state cultivates and encourages market competition in China’s economy.  The 
development of China’s textile and clothing industries is thus a part of the state’s agenda to 
modernize China’s economy.  The economic modernization in China, however, is not intended to 
be an imitation of the West, but a means to an end.  Similarly, the Chinese notion of modernity, 
which is reflected in the official narratives of the evolution of clothing styles, is not modeled 
after the West; instead, it is a story the Chinese tell themselves about themselves in relation to 
their own past.  Therefore, modernization and modernity as reflected by the changes in Chinese 
clothing and clothing industry are vested with Chinese meanings.    
Intertwined with the issues of modernization and modernity, this dissertation also 
examines the ways in which Western styles of clothing, design techniques, business models, 
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fashion shows and fashion weeks become localized in China.  Thus, this dissertation challenges 
the Westernization thesis in the study of globalization.  In addition, the dissertation also explores 
the integration of China’s clothing industry with the global clothing industry through the 
examination of the exportation of Chinese made garments to the United States that is predicated 
on the global political economy.   
All in all, this dissertation argues that clothing is not just a business, but one that involves 
cultural logics, and that it is not just economics, but also is endowed with meanings.   
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION 
I was riding a taxi to a department store on a sultry summer day in Beijing in 2002.  The store 
sold traditional Chinese style clothing, which I wanted to explore as part of my preliminary 
research on Chinese clothing styles.  Suddenly, the taxi-driver, a man in his 40s, started yelling, 
“Ji (hooker)! Ji! [That] must be a ji.”  Guided by his angry finger, I saw a tall slender young 
Chinese woman wore a glaringly red silk halter-top, backless, with only two strings tied in the 
back, marching confidently down the street. 
The style of clothing that she was wearing is called the “dudou” (literally meaning 
stomach cover) in Chinese, and it was traditionally only an undergarment.  It is typically made of 
a piece of red cloth, and it is said by the older people to have the power to ward off evil spirits.  
As an undergarment, of course, it also has the function to protect the chest and the navel from 
cold.  But wearing the dudou as outerwear outdoors was unheard of and even unthinkable either 
in imperial China (before 1912) or during the Maoist period (1949-76).  As a matter of fact, only 
a little over two decades ago, the fashion scene in China was largely dominated by the nearly 
ubiquitous unisex Mao style zhongshanzhuang (also known as the Mao suit).   
Following the taxi-driver’s finger, I couldn’t help but be “wowed” by the young woman 
wearing the dudou, although I did not have the same kind of reaction that the taxi-driver had 
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which suggested that this fashion style was a reflection of the wearer’s moral degradation.  As a 
native-born Chinese, I was taken aback to personally witness the bold appearance of a dudou on 
the streets of urban China.  Before that encounter, I had only learned, somewhat doubtfully, from 
fashion magazines and news reports that wearing the dudou as an outer-garment had recently 
become the fashion. 
Like most returning Chinese with extended stays overseas, each time I went back to 
China, I was surprised by the extent of the changes I saw in China’s urban centers.  But that time, 
I was astonished not by the new infrastructures being put up in “lightning” speed or by the 
equally fast disappearance of old neighborhoods, but by the new and dazzling fashions such as 
the dudou that had recently emerged.  It was not that long ago that China was still in a scarce 
economy—I still remember when I was little my parents had new clothes made for me every 
year, but they had to first use the government issued coupons (bupiao) to buy the cloth with 
which my new clothes would then be made by a tailor.  In fact, rationed cloth coupons were only 
abandoned since December 1983.  Back then, ready-made clothing was not widely available, and 
clothing styles were rather limited and largely represented by the Mao style zhongshanzhuang.  
By contrast, China today is not only home to one of the largest clothing markets in the world, it 
also provides about a quarter to a third of the all the garments sold worldwide.  Clothing styles 
become increasingly diverse in China, even vanguard styles such as the dudou are readily seen 
on the streets of urban China. 
The central question with which this dissertation is concerned is what Chinese clothing 
and the clothing industry can tell us about the phenomenal changes that have taken place in 
contemporary China, especially in the post-1978 reform period.  In discussing the enormous 
changes China has witnessed in the past a few decades, this dissertation engages two broad but 
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related issues—one has to do with economic development and modernization, and the other 
globalization. 
The dramatic changes taking place in China in the post-Mao period are frequently 
attributed to a watershed event in modern Chinese history: the Third Plenum of the Eleventh 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that was held in December 1978.  At 
that meeting, the CCP has decided to initiate economic reforms.  The economic policies adopted 
by the Chinese government since 1978, disregarding the specifics, were summarized and 
popularized by the state and the media as two broad measures (as well as slogans): implementing 
economic reforms domestically (duinei gaige) and opening China up to the world (duiwei 
kaifang).  These measures were designed to take China to a different course from the centrally-
controlled planned economy (jihua jingji, also called command economy) of the radical socialist 
period (also called the Maoist period) that was secluded from Western economies (except limited 
and indirect connections through Hong Kong) and shift it to a market based one that participates 
in the global economy.  The boom China has witnessed in the past three decades proves that 
those reform policies have been largely successful.   
In the context of the Chinese government’s focus on economic development and the 
boom China is experiencing, the questions this dissertation aims to address include: How are the 
changes in Chinese clothing and the clothing industry related to China’s economic development 
and modernization projects?  Are the changes in Chinese clothing and the clothing industry 
merely a part of the state initiated economic development or modernization?  Moreover, related 
to the issue of modernization, is China trying to modernize itself in the image of the West?  And 
what are the impacts of globalization on China, especially with regard to clothing and the 
clothing industry?  While those questions will be answered specifically in other chapters of this 
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dissertation, in this chapter I will foreground some of the theoretical issues central to this 
dissertation, particularly in connection with modernization and globalization. 
1.2 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION 
Modernization, as a theory, was advocated by Western scholars, especially American scholars to 
deal with “the problems of economic development, political stability, and social and cultural 
change” in the Third World societies in the post-World War II era (Tipps 1973: 200).  Although 
the term of modernization has been taken to be many different things, ranging from 
industrialization, economic development, rationalization, to secularization, various “theories of 
modernization are fundamentally theories of the transformation of national states” (ibid: 202).  
More importantly, these theories of modernization are largely influenced by evolutionary theory.  
For example, Rostow (1960) argues that Europe and the United States have gone through a series 
of stages of economic growth to get where they are today and that the underdeveloped countries 
have to learn from the West and follow its path to achieve economic development.  The 
postulation of modernization theories of a unilinear evolution of human societies with the West 
at the apex has subjected modernization theories to a wide range of ideological, empirical, and 
methodological criticism. 1   The ideological critique of modernization theories is especially 
potent in pointing out that modernization theories are Western-centric and unwarranted in their 
implicit or explicit justification of European colonialism of the Third World countries.   
                                                 
1 For a summary of the criticism of modernization theories, see Tipps, 1973. 
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However, modernization is not a negative but very positive and popular term in China.  
The popularity of the term is in large part due to China’s goal to realize “four modernizations” 
(sige xiandaihua) in agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology, which 
was first proposed by China’s Communist leaders such as Premier Zhou Enlai and Chairman 
Mao Zedong in the 1950s and 1960s.  While Western modernization theories have been widely 
repudiated by Western academics because of their entailment of a unilinear evolutionary scheme, 
it resonates with the Marxist theory of the evolution of human societies, which is also unilinear 
and to which the Chinese Communist Party still subscribes today, though it claims an eventual 
ending of all human societies in communism.  Therefore, for the Chinese, it is not a problem, at 
least ideologically, that they have to learn from the West for the purpose of modernizing China.  
But modernization is not equated with Westernization in China; it would be hard to imagine that 
the Chinese Communist leaders like Mao would envision a Westernized China by learning 
Western science and technology, or more generally by promoting modernization.  Modernization 
is regarded by the Chinese as a practical means to reach “modernity,” which should be entirely 
Chinese, but not Western.   
Chinese modernity, according to Lisa Rofel who borrows Clifford Geertz’s phrase (1973: 
448), is “a story people [the Chinese] tell themselves about themselves in relation to [Western] 
others” (1999: 130).  In this relationship between China and the West, Rofel clearly sees a 
difference, in fact a perpetuating of the “East-West divide” (xii).  Although Rofel does not 
pinpoint what exactly the differences are between China and the West, but the perpetuating of 
difference between China and the West seems to be the story of Chinese modernity.  In a sense, 
she suggests that China would always have to play catch-up with the West, despite China’s 
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efforts of modernization.  Thus, the perpetuating of difference between China and the West does 
not seem to indicate a form of “other modernity” in China, but rather a lack thereof.   
In this dissertation, I try to engage both modernization (in Chapter 2) and modernity (in 
Chapter 3) through clothing and the clothing industry in China.  I argue that while the 
development of China’s textile and apparel industries may have been led by the state initiated 
economic reforms and is thus a part of the state’s efforts to modernize China, the changes in 
clothing styles in contemporary China have been narrated in such a way that it constructs a 
version of Chinese modernity that is contrasted to China’s past instead of the West.   
1.3 GLOBABLIZATION THEORIES 
In general usage, globalization is used to describe “the increasing flow of trade, finance, culture, 
ideas, and people [across the borders of nation-states] brought about by the sophisticated 
technology of communications and travel and by the worldwide spread of neoliberal capitalism” 
(Lewellen 2002).  As a consequence of these seemingly unfettered and ever-increasing 
transnational flows, the world appears to be rapidly shrinking, or caught up in a mode of “time-
space compression” (Harvey 1989).  From a different angle, Anthony Giddens uses the notion of 
“time-space distanciation” to describe the effect that world is increasingly interconnected and 
that events taking place in one locale can now stretch out their effects to an increasingly greater 
distance (1990: 14).  However, the image of a global village is frequently thought to be 
headquartered in the West, in the sense that global cultural flows are seen as emanating from the 
West, especially with respect to popular culture, including clothing styles, foods, and the like.  
Western scholars have described this particular dimension of globalization as Westernization or 
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global homogenization, as represented by the all too familiar Western, frequently American 
icons, such as McDonald’s and Coca-Cola.  Subsequently, scholars summarize this dimension of 
globalization as “McDonaldization” (Ritzer 2000) or “Coca-Colonization” of the world (see 
Hannerz 1992b: 217; Howes 1996: 1-16).   
Anthropologists, however, generally do not agree with the global homogenization thesis, 
which in effect means Westernization or Western cultural imperialism (Tomlinson 1991, 1997).  
Through ethnographic research, they argue that Western goods or broadly Western culture are 
appropriated by people in non-Western societies in their local forms of consumption.  Thus, they 
challenge the validity of the global homogenization thesis and emphasize the localization of 
global goods and/or culture.  James Watson and his colleagues’ research on the local forms of 
consumption of McDonald’s in five East Asian societies provides an excellent example of the 
localization of a global product and its associated meanings (Watson 1997).  The localization of 
the global, or more precisely the hybridization of the global and the local, is a strong 
anthropological argument because it is consistent with what anthropologists have done for a long 
time (and are arguably best at)—understanding how meanings are constructed in local settings.  
In fact, part of the argument I am trying to make in this dissertation with regard to Western styles 
of clothing and Western format of fashion shows is that they have to be understood in the context 
of China, thus my study of Chinese clothing and clothing industry supports the localization or 
hybridization thesis.  That being said, focusing on one particular locale does limit 
anthropologists’ scope of investigation of the global cultural flows. 
The challenge that the global cultural flows poses on anthropology is that culture can no 
longer be treated a geographically bounded entity, but is indeed “deterritorialized” (Appadurai 
1996; Inda and Rosaldo 2002; Kearney 1995).  Of course, anthropologists are also quick to point 
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out that just like McDonald’s in East Asia the “deterritorialized” culture has to be 
“reterritorialized” in specific locations (Inda and Rosaldo 2002).  However, this re-
conceptualization of culture does not address the issue of how anthropologists can study the 
global or transnational cultural flows methodologically.  Taking the “deterritorialization” of 
culture a step further, Appadurai thinks that the global cultural economy is in “a complex, 
overlapping, [and] disjunctive order” (1996: 32).  To describe such an order, he coins a series of 
new terms to explore the global cultural flows of people, images, technology, capital, and 
information, which he calls “ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, financescapes, and 
ideoscapes,” underscoring the fluid and irregular nature of such “landscapes” (Appadurai 1996: 
33).  While the imaginary of landscapes raises interesting questions about the fluidity of culture, 
the concept does not offer any answer to how such “landscapes” are put in place in the first place 
and how the global cultural flows and landscapes are related to the “imagined worlds” people 
construct on different parts of these landscapes. 
In more straightforward language, George Marcus lays out a method he calls “multi-sited 
research” that “is designed around chains, paths, threads, conjunctions, or juxtapositions of 
locations in which the ethnographer establishes some form of literal or physical presence, with 
an explicit, posited logic of association or connection among sites that in fact defines the 
argument of the ethnography” (1995: 105). Thus, Marcus suggests that the way to study global 
or transnational cultural flows is to follow the people, the thing, or whatever the subject may be.  
For reasons unknown, the best ethnographies on transnational cultural flows seem to be the ones 
on the subject of the transnational movements of people (e.g. Constable 2003; Ong 1999; Rouse 
2002).  Perhaps, as Ong suggests, the transnational movement of people involves “both moving 
through space or across lines, as well as changing the nature of something” (1999: 4), and hence 
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following the people who move from one site to another, such as the Asian “mail order brides” 
moving to the United States (Constable 2003), cannot only yield insights to the movement as 
well as the connection between the different sites, but also the nuanced changes in people’s 
identities that have resulted from the movement.   
Less seen, however, are fine and detailed ethnographies on the transnational flow of 
goods that engage both the chains or paths through which the goods move and the changes of 
meanings associated with the goods following their movements.  Sidney Mintz’s (1986) classic 
study of sugar that links the production of sugar in the Caribbean to its consumption in Europe, 
though as ethnographic as it is historical, clearly shows the possibilities of an ethnographic 
approach to “follow the thing.” 
Although there are parallels between the transnational movements of things and people, 
the reasons why things move may or may not be the same as the reasons why people migrate.  In 
Mintz’s (1986) case, there is a pattern for the global movement of sugar, which is that raw sugar 
had to be shipped to the West and processed sugar shipped back to the Caribbean.  This pattern is 
explained by Wallerstein as a part of the world system, which is composed of three major areas: 
the core, the periphery and the semi-periphery (Wallerstein 1974: 135). The core refers to the 
West, the periphery includes those regions where people are subordinated within the world 
system, and the semi-periphery indicates those areas that fall in-between the core and the 
periphery.  While the core specializes in banking, finance, and highly skilled industrial 
production, the periphery produces goods and raw materials to support industries in the core.   
Although the global economy today may not constitute a “world system,” the general 
pattern of the global movements of goods still holds.  For example, China is selling goods with 
low technology content such as clothes and shoes to the United States, and the United States is 
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selling goods with advanced technology such as Boeing airplanes to China.  Therefore, there 
may seem to be a great deal of fluidity in terms of global movement of goods, or as some call it, 
the global “commodityscape” (Foster 2002), but beneath the surface of the free movements there 
is also some patterning of the particular kinds of goods that move from one area to another, and 
from one country to the next, which clearly has to do with the global political economy, at the 
core of which lies the inequality between the West and the rest.  Moreover, while goods with 
Western origin, such as McDonald’s and Coca-Cola, are often assumed as signs of 
Westernization or Americanization of the rest, the importation of China-made garments to the 
United States, if anything, is not seen as “peripheralization” or “Sinification” of the core.  
Therefore, the anthropological study of the global flow of goods, in this case clothing, has to 
engage with not just how these goods are “reterritorialized” in local contexts, but also the global 
political economy that shapes the global flow of goods and the ways in which the patterns of the 
global flows of goods perpetuate. 
In this dissertation, my study of Chinese clothing and clothing industry engages 
globalization on various levels and from various perspectives.  On the one hand, I will examine 
how Western styles of clothing and fashion shows become “localized” in China.  On the other 
hand, I will also examine the ways in which Chinese clothing industry and the U.S. clothing 
industry are connected via the exportation of Chinese made garments to the United States and the 
ways through which power unevenly impacts persons and groups involved in the industry in the 
two countries.  
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1.4 CLOTHING AND MATERIAL CULTURE MATTER 
Why do things such as clothing matter?  Daniel Miller (1998a) eloquently summarizes the two 
stages in answering the question in Western academia.  The first stage was developed in the 
1980s which “demonstrated that social worlds were as much constituted by materiality as the 
other way around.”  The second stage, as represented by his edited volume, argues “that things 
matter can now be argued to have been made” (Miller 1998a: 3).  Differently put, according to 
Miller, there are two different approaches to argue why things matter.   
The first approach is represented by Appadurai’s “The Social Life of Things” (1986) and 
Igor Kopytoff’s “The Cultural Biography of Things” (1986).  According to this approach, things 
matter because through the “social life” or “cultural biography” of things one can learn about the 
society and culture that the things encounter in their “life course.”  Kopytoff explains, 
[I]n situations of culture contact, [the biography of things] can show what 
anthropologists have so often stressed: that what is significant about the adoption 
of alien objects—as of alien ideas—is not the fact that they are adopted, but the 
way they are culturally defined and put to use (1986: 67). 
Differently put, Kopytoff points out that things or objects may be thought about and used 
differently in different cultural settings.  He proposes a method of a “culturally informed 
economic biography” in which an object would be examined as a “culturally constructed entity, 
endowed with culturally specific meanings, and classified into culturally constituted categories” 
(1986: 68).   
Although not all anthropologists would take a “social life” or “cultural biography” 
approach to the study of clothing or material culture in general, most of them agree that material 
objects and culture are mutually constitutive in any given society.  Many scholars believe that 
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clothing is both an indicator and producer of identity (e.g. Crane 2000; Davis 1992; Haye and 
Wilson 1999; Kuper 1973; McVeigh 2000), be it class identity (Nag 1991), ethnicity (Eicher 
1999), gender (Barnes and Eicher 1997), or national identity (Tarlo 1996).  For example, Emma 
Tarlo (1996) argues that because the swadeshi (or homespun) movement in India was initiated by 
Gandhi to resist British textiles and to fight for national independence from the Great Britain, 
homespun textiles came to symbolize national identity.  As another example, in his study of 
Japanese high school students’ uniforms, Brian McVeigh (2000) finds that the school uniforms 
serve as preparation and transition to suits and ties, a type of disciplining of workers and citizens 
demanded by the state.  In this way, he argues that an ideology of discipline is woven into 
Japanese students’ uniforms. 
Daniel Miller (1998a) acknowledges the contribution of what he calls the first stage of 
material culture studies in highlighting the interconnection between material culture and social 
identity, but he also critiques those works for their mapping already important social identities, 
such as class and gender, onto material objects thus “privileg[ing] something called society” 
while overlooking the materiality of things (1998a: 10).  Hence, he calls for a new direction in 
material culture studies (he calls “the second stage”) and proposes “that things matter can now be 
argued to have been made” (1998a: 3). What he means by that is two things.  For one, material 
culture studies can return to the materiality of things, more specifically he refers to the “material 
context” of the objects under study, to explain why such things matter.  For another, material 
culture studies ought to tell us more about those being studied than about those doing the 
studying.  That is to say, how and why some things matter should be learned through 
ethnographic inquiry, but not imposed from outside by the researcher’s preconceived notions 
(Miller 1998a: 13).   
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For example, in his study of Coca-Cola in Trinidad, coke matters not because it 
automatically symbolizes Americana, but because it is a “sweet drink,” which has to be 
examined along with other “sweet drinks” on the island, which includes some products that are 
considered “local” and others that are considered “foreign.”  Miller argues that Trinidadian ideas 
about what is “local” or “foreign” with regard to drinks are not self-evident; instead, they are 
entangled with issues such as ethnic and racial politics, and developed out of negotiations 
between the competing goals and intensions of local company representatives and executives in 
overseas corporate headquarters (Miller 1998b). 
Although I think Miller’s classification of the two stages in material culture studies is 
arbitrary and problematic—it is hard to pinpoint which works belong to the first stage and which 
works belong to the second stage based on his criteria because even he himself links material 
objects such as coke to social categories—his points that material culture studies ought to focus 
on the materiality of the specific objects under study and that the criteria of mattering should be 
based in the local society rather than from outside are well taken.  In this dissertation, it is 
precisely because I recognize the importance of the specificity of the objects under study that I 
focus on the internal dynamics of China’s clothing and fashion industry and situate them within 
the specific context of contemporary Chinese society, and by so doing, I challenge the simplistic 
view of Westernization or the global homogenization thesis.  
In the spirit of paying closer attention to the material objects themselves rather than the 
social categories, I have to explain what I mean by “clothing.”  In fact, a number of terms are 
used to refer to clothing in various contexts in this dissertation: clothing, garment, apparel, 
fashion, clothing style, and dress.  These terms are used differently by professionals in the 
clothing and fashion industry and academics in the humanities and social sciences.  The 
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professionals in the industry generally use clothing and/or fashion as the most comprehensive 
term whose connotation includes “dress,” which is usually used to refer to a type of formal wear, 
especially the skirts for women.  Whereas many scholars in social sciences and the humanities 
(perhaps except economists) use “dress” as the most comprehensive term, as in “dress studies” 
and “dress historians.”   
Eicher and Roach-Higgins are particularly explicit with what they mean by “dress”: 
[W]e have been intentionally supporting use of the word ‘dress’ as a 
comprehensive term to identify both direct body changes and items added to the 
body…we define dress as an assemblage of body modifications and/or 
supplements displayed by a person in communicating with other human beings.  
Defined in this general way, the word dress is gender-neutral.  This general usage 
does not rule out that, in specific contexts or with specific inflections, the word 
may be used to convey socially constructed, gendered meanings (Eicher and 
Roach-Higgins 1997: 15).   
Thus, according to Eicher and Roach-Higgins’s definition, dress not only includes clothing, but 
also ornaments, and bodily modification, such as tattoos, scarification, and so on.   
In this dissertation, however, I adopt the industry professionals’ usage of the term and use 
dress in a much narrower sense that only refers to a particular type of clothing.  In general, I use 
the terms clothing, garment, and apparel interchangeably, but I recognize the differences 
between “clothing” and “fashion.”  According to sociologist Yuniya Kawamura, “fashion as a 
concept means something more than [clothing] because it signifies additional and alluring values 
attached to clothing, which are enticing to consumers of ‘fashion’” (2005: 4).  In addition to the 
extra value of “fashion,” the term also has the connotation of change, as Kawamura notes: 
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No matter which time period in history one is talking about, the definite essence 
of fashion is change.  The fashion process explains the diversity and changes of 
styles…In some societies, where the dominant ideology is antipathetic to social 
change and progress, fashion cannot exist (2005: 5). 
In this dissertation, I agree with Kawamura’s usage of “fashion” and recognize the 
distinction between “fashion” and “clothing.”  I use “fashion” as a marked term and in the 
narrower sense noted by Kawamura, and “clothing” as an unmarked term which in a broad sense 
includes “fashion.”  In cases that I want to highlight the specific connotations of “fashion,” I use 
the phrase “clothing and fashion.”  However, even in the most comprehensive sense, my use of 
“clothing and fashion” in this dissertation is relatively narrow and does not include ornaments 
and bodily modification, which by no means suggest that ornaments or bodily modification 
should not be part of the study of “clothing” or “dress.”  
The connotation of change in “fashion” noted by Kawamura also distinguishes “fashion” 
from “clothing styles.”  In any given time period in Chinese history, there are clothing styles, but 
if those styles do not change, I do not call them as “fashions” (instead, they may be called 
costumes).  For the same reason, I recognize the Mao suit in the Maoist era, which was 
ubiquitous and very stable, as a style rather than a fashion, which is also part of the reason why I 
believe China’s fashion industry did not emerge until the post-Mao reform period when clothing 
styles become more diverse and changeable.   
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1.5 WHY THE CULTURAL ECONOMY OF CLOTHING? 
From a disciplinary standpoint, “culture” and “economy” are generally considered as belonging 
to two separate and autonomous fields.2  According to Paul du Gay (1997), the contrast between 
“culture” and “economy” could not be sharper.  He writes: 
Certainly there is a powerful tradition of thought which holds that ‘culture’—and 
this normally means ‘high’ culture—is an autonomous realm of existence 
dedicated to the pursuit of particular values—‘art,’ ‘beauty,’ ‘authenticity’ and 
‘truth’—which are the very antithesis of those assumed to hold sway in the banal 
world of the economy—the pursuit of profit, unbounded ‘instrumentalism’ and so 
on (du Gay 1997: 1).  
The contrast between “culture” and “economy” is also evident in the Chinese institutions 
of higher education.  Take Donghua University in Shanghai (formerly known as China Textile 
University) for example, it has two separate schools that are relevant to my research (there are 
other schools and departments in the university, but many of them deal with the technical aspects 
of textile and clothing): the School of Garments (Fuzhuang Xueyuan) and the School of 
Management (Guanli Xueyuan).  The former focuses on the “cultural” aspects of clothing, such 
as art history, fashion design, and modeling, and the latter contains majors that specialize in the 
business aspects of clothing, including management and marketing.   
The two schools have separate faculty and separate library collections.  From my 
interviews and interactions with the faculty from both schools, I could see a clear difference in 
their views and approaches to clothing.  While in the School of Management, clothing is seen as 
                                                 
2 Here, I adopt Bourdieu’s notion of a “field” (1996), which is fully explained in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.  
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a product and sometimes an image which is part of the product, in the School of Garments, 
clothing is viewed as an artifact, a sign, or a representation, in consistence with the tradition of 
art history, design history, and ethno-history (e.g., Shen 1997; Huang & Chen 1995; Yuan 1994; 
Lin et al. 2000; Yang 1999; Zhou & Gao 1984).3  The reason why I was interested in both 
schools was that they contain knowledge and information critical to my research subjects—the 
practitioners in China’s clothing and fashion industry.  
While university professors tend to maintain disciplinary boundaries, practitioners in the 
industry need to have knowledge of both the cultural and business aspects of clothing.  Fashion 
designers are cases in point.  During my field research, I accompanied many designers on their 
“market research” trips to various types of department stores or shopping malls, the stores of 
world leading name brands, and trade fairs, and I shadowed them in their negotiations with sales 
representatives from fabric companies, in their meetings with personnel of other departments in 
their own company, and in their efforts to train their sales teams and to showcase their seasonal 
collections to potential buyers.  From these experiences, I learned that in order to score a market 
success with his or her designs a fashion designer not only needs to have the know-how of 
design and a good sense about the future trends of color schemes, fabrics, and styles, but also his 
or her target consumers, the production capacity of his or her company, the appropriate sales 
channels, and the right marketing strategies.   
For a fashion designer, the perfect products are the ones that are not just made with the 
best designs and right fabrics, but also made in the right factories and sold in the right market 
place.  Making perfect products like those clearly requires interdisciplinary knowledge and skills.  
                                                 
3 Similarly, Christopher Breward (1998) also sees divisions in the British academia, especially in the different 
approaches to clothing or dress in art history and cultural studies.  
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To understand the way in which fashion designers and other practitioners in the industry work, I 
had to take an interdisciplinary approach that takes into consideration both the “cultural” and 
“business” aspects of clothing and the clothing industry.   
Moreover, the adoption of a cultural economic approach has also grown out of my 
theoretical concerns in anthropology.  Culture, as a concept in anthropology, had since 
Malinowski been taken to refer to the life ways of a small-scale and relatively bounded society.  
Although the “interpretive turn” since the 1960s shifted the emphasis of anthropology from 
behavior and social structure to symbols, meanings, and mentality, anthropological fieldwork 
remains “locally” focused.  In fact, one of the champions of interpretive anthropology, Clifford 
Geertz, called for “thick description” of the local contexts (“the web of signification”) in order to 
gain a deeper “local knowledge” (1973: 3-30; 1983).   
However, in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, interpretive anthropology faced rigorous 
challenge and questioning from postmodernism (Marcus & Fischer 1986). Among the questions 
postmodernists raised are: How can anthropology, a discipline that was established based on 
studies of small-scale and relatively bounded societies, retain its legitimacy in an increasingly 
globalized and interdependent world?  And how can anthropologists reconcile the “local” 
cultural meanings learned through cultural interpretations with the external and frequently global 
political and economic forces that have shaped and even penetrated the life-worlds of practically 
any local communities in the world?  As Marcus and Fischer point out, in responding to the 
postmodernist critique, a growing number of anthropologists are trying to bring together the two 
afore-plowed separate furrows of interpretive anthropology and historical political economy to 
inform their research (1986: 44).   
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For example, Jean Comaroff (1997) notes that the devastating impact of imports of 
Western clothing and other goods into South Africa in the nineteenth century only made the local 
mode of consumption, the emergence of “folk dress” even more powerful at expressing ethnic 
identities.  Jane Schneider (1994) also provides a superb example, explaining that the change in 
popularity of polyester in the United States was not merely a matter of consumers’ preference or 
interpretations of the fabric but also linked deeply to global fiber manufacturers’ fierce 
competition.  My use of the “cultural economy” is a deliberate attempt to fuse interpretive 
anthropology and historical political economy in this study of Chinese clothing and clothing 
industry.    
1.6 FIELD RESEARCH 
This dissertation is based on fifteen months of field research mainly in Shanghai and Beijing, but 
also in Zhejiang and Jiangsu areas near Shanghai, which I conducted from May to July in 2002 
and from January to December in 2004.  I chose Shanghai as the main field site because 
Shanghai is the largest and presumably the most fashionable city in China.  It is also the 
birthplace of China’s textile industry, and it enjoys a high concentration of fashion companies, 
fashion media, and colleges and universities that offer programs in textile and clothing (such as 
Donghua University).  I visited Beijing a few times because it is the host city of China Fashion 
Week, the most important fashion event in China.  It is also the home of China Fashion 
Association, China National Textile Industry Council, and major national fashion media.  I also 
took several field trips to visit factories in Zhejiang and Jiangsu areas that manufacture garments 
both for domestic and international markets. 
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During my field research, I employed a number of research techniques.  First, utilizing 
contacts established in 2002, I conducted a month of participant observation at one private 
designer fashion company in Shanghai in 2004, during which I was given office space at the 
company as a researcher.  I had the opportunity to observe the entire design process for a 
seasonal collection from sketching to finished sample garments.  I shadowed the chief designer 
to shopping malls, trade fairs, meetings with sellers of fabrics, and various departments within 
the company to ensure the design and production of the “perfect” products.  During the process, I 
also interviewed representatives from each department in the company.  After the month of 
participant observation, I followed up with periodic visits to the company throughout the year.   
Second, I attended over 100 fashion shows of various sorts and in different venues, 
including shows on college campuses, internal shows within fashion companies for their 
wholesale buyers, fashion shows in shopping malls and at trade fairs, and most importantly 
shows during Shanghai Fashion Week and China Fashion Week in Beijing.  Those fashion 
shows not only allowed me to see fashion designs and trends, but also provided me the best 
opportunities to meet and interview fashion designers and other professionals in the industry, 
which leads to the third method—interviews.   
By interviews, I mean semi-structured interviews that were pre-arranged and for which I 
prepared an interview guide.  The host designers of the fashion shows typically had time for 
interviews with the media after the show.  During Shanghai Fashion Week in 2004, I was granted 
a media pass by the organizer of the event and was able to meet and interview many designers 
like a fashion reporter.  The Fashion Weeks were particularly helpful also because I was able to 
meet many more fashion designers who attended the events even though they were not hosting 
the shows.  Besides at the fashion shows, I also interviewed fashion designers at their places of 
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work as well as outside work over tea or coffee.  I was able to schedule interviews with fashion 
designers outside the venues of fashion shows through friends and acquaintances.  These 
interviews snowballed into more introductions and opportunities for interviews.  In addition to 
fashion designers, I also interviewed other professionals in the industry, including models, 
journalists, executives, trade agents, and university professors.  In total, I interviewed about 120 
professionals in this manner in China’s fashion and clothing industry, but I met and talked 
informally with a much larger number of Chinese professionals in the industry.  While 
participant observation allowed me to see firsthand how fashion was designed and produced, the 
semi-structured interviews with fashion designers and other professionals in the industry 
provided me with opportunities to gain deeper insights into their views and approaches toward 
their work and businesses. 
Through personal friends, I got to know a few trade agents working in the export business 
in Shanghai.  I shadowed several trade agents on field trips to visit factories in Zhejiang and 
Jiangsu provinces to inspect the facilities, monitor the production of the garments, and audit the 
factories in order to ensure the factories’ compliance with local labor laws and the foreign 
importers’ codes of conduct.  During those visits, we were given tours of the entire assembly 
lines of the factories as well as the cafeterias and the dormitories of the workers, who were 
predominantly migrants from China’s rural areas.  I also accompanied Professor Gu Qingliang4 
at Donghua University and his team to Ningbo city, Zhejiang province and visited a few factories 
for his research on the competitiveness of the garment industry of Ningbo city.  Field trips like 
                                                 
4 I use Chinese names in this dissertation as they are called in China, i.e., surname first followed by first name.  In 
cases they are called by their English names, I follow the English convention and put their first names before their 
surnames, such as Mark Cheung.  
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those provided me a good sense of how various groups of people and segments of the industry 
are connected. 
In addition to the field research, I also did some archival research on the development of 
China’s textile and clothing industries, changes in national organizations of the industries, and 
the evolution of clothing styles in contemporary China.  I use the term “archive” in a broad 
sense, which includes internal documents I obtained from China National Textile Industry 
Council and China Fashion Association, the Textile Industry Almanacs, statistical yearbooks, 
academic works and other textual documents including fashion magazines and newspapers.  The 
archival research allowed me to gain a good sense of how China’s textile and apparel industries 
evolved to what they are today and to sort through the changes of clothing styles in 
contemporary China, which I discuss in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively as I outline them below. 
1.7 ORGANIZATION OF THE TEXT 
Chapter 2 examines the development of China’s textile and apparel industries.  In Chapter 2, I 
outline the major stages through which China’s textile and apparel industries developed to its 
current scale.  The goal of the chapter is two-fold: 1) to provide the general background to this 
dissertation, and 2) to address the question of how the phenomenal changes in China’s textile and 
apparel industries took place.  In answering these questions, I focus on the dynamic relationship 
between the Chinese state and market forces.  I argue that both the state and the market have 
played significant roles in the development of the industries.  While the overall Chinese 
economy has shifted from a state controlled planned economy to a market economy, the 
extraordinary development of China’s textile and apparel industries would not have been 
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possible without the state’s policies to reform the economy and its direct initiatives to diversify 
products, boost market demands, upgrade the industries, and eventually fuel economic growth. 
Chapter 3 turns to the other side of the changes, namely the changes of clothing styles in 
contemporary China.  From the late Qing to Republican China (1912-1949), to the radical 
socialist period (1949-76), and to the reform era (1978-present), clothing styles have undergone 
dramatic changes in contemporary China.  In each of the four historical periods in contemporary 
China, there are different clothing styles or characteristics.  The linear progression of the changes 
in Chinese clothing styles suggests that these changes are not the result of fashion cycles, nor 
merely the outcome of economic development; instead it indicates an association with the 
politics in each of the historical periods.   
The correlation between changes in clothing styles and time paves the ground for the 
Chinese to construct a uniquely Chinese sense of progress and modernity through the official 
narratives of the sartorial evolution in contemporary China.  According to this Chinese notion of 
modernity, China becomes modern not because of the adoption of Western styles of clothing 
(hence becoming more Westernized), but because clothing styles now are considered better than 
the ones in the past.  It is in this sense that I argue that Chinese modernity is a story the Chinese 
tell themselves about themselves in relation to their own past rather than others (borrowing the 
phrase from Clifford Geertz and Lisa Rofel).  I point out in this chapter that in making sense out 
of the dramatic changes in clothing styles, the Chinese have mapped their own meanings onto 
clothing.   
Chapter 4 looks at the choices and strategies of Chinese fashion designers, specifically 
the choice of whether to design for the sake of art or for the market.  In dealing with the 
divergent objectives of originality and marketability, fashion designers come up with three major 
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approaches, and subsequently three business models: haute couture (high fashion), prêt-à-porter 
(ready-to-wear clothing), and fast fashion.  The hierarchy of haute couture, prêt-à-porter, and 
fast fashion, as will be explained in detail in Chapter 4, hinges on the level of originality and 
exclusivity of the designs.  In the global fashion industry, hierarchy of fashion is mapped onto 
the geography of the world.  According to popular stereotypes, Paris is the capital of haute 
couture, Italy is known for its high quality prêt-à-porter, and China is assumed to be kingdom of 
fast fashion.  By extension, Chinese fashion designers are assumed to be “copycats” of their 
Western colleagues. 
By examining the cases of two prominent fashion designers, Ms. Ye and Mr. Yuan, who 
favor art and the market respectively, I argue that not all Chinese fashion designers are copycats 
and that Chinese fashions are not a uniform fast fashion system.  Despite the economic 
imperatives of their business, Chinese designers explicitly (as in the case of Ms. Ye) and 
implicitly (as in the case of Mr. Yuan) resort to art and originality.  That is to say, they also 
include the logic of art in their business, which has to be understood in the context of China’s 
fashion industry.  Because of that, I argue that the choices and strategies of Chinese fashion 
designers give insights to what it means to be a fashion designer in China. 
In understanding the complexity of the choices of Chinese fashion designers, I also 
challenge the conventional conceptualization of fashion design as belonging to either the two 
autonomous and separate fields of art and economy (per Bourdieu 1993) or one single domain 
composed of art, artifact, and commodity (per Phillips and Steiner 1999).  I argue that fashion 
design locates at the intersection of the two fields of art and economy and thus belongs to the two 
fields at the same time.  Because of this particular nature of fashion design, I argue that a cultural 
economic approach is needed to study the logics of fashion design in China. 
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Chapter 5 extends the cultural economic approach to examine fashion shows in China, 
particularly fashion shows during China Fashion Week (CFW).  As a means to promote trends, 
brands, and designers, fashion shows and fashion weeks are institutions imported from the West.  
As such, fashion shows during the CFW bear great similarities to those during London Fashion 
Week (LFW) as described by Entwistle and Rocamora (2006).  Like the LFW, the CFW brings 
together key players in the Chinese field of fashion and the distinctions between these key 
players are manifested spatially and temporally during the CFW.  Thus, I follow Entwistle and 
Rocamora (2006) and argue that the CFW is the objectification of the Chinese field of fashion. 
However, based on my field research of the CFW in 2004, I also observed major 
differences between the CFW and the LFW studied by Entwistle and Rocamora.  This chapter 
outlines and analyzes the ways in which the imported institution of fashion week is “localized” 
in China.  Because of those uniquely Chinese characteristics of fashion shows during the CFW, I 
propose an ethnographic approach to study the cultural economy of the CFW and the wider 
Chinese field of fashion. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the global connections of the Chinese clothing industry by 
examining issues associated with trade, specifically, the exportation of garments made in China 
to the United States.  While other chapters have looked at the flow of clothing styles, fashion 
designs, fashion shows, fashion week from the West to China, this chapter looks at the reverse 
flow of Chinese made garments to the West.  Just as Western clothing styles, fashion designs, 
fashion shows and fashion week have to be understood in the local context of China, I find that 
the meanings attached to the garments at the site of production in China are filtered out when the 
garments enter the Untied States.  New and sometimes conflicting meanings are mapped onto 
them on the consumption end by various parties in the United States, as became evident during 
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the U.S.-China textile and apparel trade dispute in 2005.  Therefore, I argue that my study of the 
transnational movement of Chinese made garments joins the anthropological critique of the 
global homogenization thesis in the study of globalization. 
Furthermore, I argue that the different meanings of the Chinese made garments 
constructed by various persons and groups at different sites are in fact connected, because all are 
linked to a common network constituted by the movement of the garments.  The common 
connection of the variously interested persons and groups to the global network of the Chinese 
made garments are important in two ways.  First, it creates a network effect, in the sense that it 
perpetuates the differences among the differently interested or positioned persons and groups in 
the network, because they act by reacting to other different interests or positions.  Second, the 
network provides a channel through which power unevenly impacts the variously positioned 
persons and groups that are connected to the network.  Because power is unevenly distributed in 
the network, it is not surprising that the Chinese made garments do not have same kind of valor 
of Western origin products such as Coca-Cola or McDonald’s.  Chapter 6 thus aims to move 
beyond the broad anthropological critique of the global homogenization thesis and providing a 
clothing perspective on globalization that emphasizes both meanings and power that are vested 




2.0  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TEXTILE AND APPAREL INDUSTRIES IN 
THE PRC 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Although the textile and apparel industries are often regarded as “sunset industries” in developed 
countries such as the United States, they have vital importance in the Chinese economy.  They 
provide fabric and clothing to meet the basic needs of a population of 1.3 billion people, employ 
about 19 million workers, 5  and earn much needed hard currencies to finance the nation’s 
modernization projects.  In the year of 2003, for example, China exported US$80.5 billion worth 
of textiles and apparel products and generated a trade surplus of US$64.9 billion, which 
accounted for over 18 percent of China’s total export, and was 2.54 times of China’s total trade 
surplus (China Textile Industry Development Report 2003/04, hereinafter CTIDR).  That is to 
say, without the trade surplus in textile and apparel products, China would have had a trade 
deficit in 2003.  In fact, this pattern in China’s import and export has persisted since 1999.6   
                                                 
5 The number is reportedly over one hundred million if those employed in supporting industries, such as the cotton 
growers, are counted.  These numbers are estimates by the China National Textile and Apparel Council.  The actual 
numbers could be higher or lower than in these reports, since there is no census statistics on the textile and apparel 
industry.  
6 China’s textile and apparel trade surplus exceeded the national total for the first time in 1999, which was 106 
percent of the latter (ACTI 2000).  Trade surplus has long been seen positively in China; it is only recently that 
China’s huge trade surplus has become publicly recognized as a major cause of trade disputes and pressure to its 
currency revaluation.  
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The importance of the textile and apparel industries is matched with their scales.  China 
has the world’s largest scale of textile and apparel industries.  Not only is China home to one of 
the largest clothing markets in the world, it also exports more textile and apparel products than 
any single country both in terms of volume and value.  In 2003, China’s textile and apparel 
exports accounted for 15.9 percent and 23 percent of the world’s total exports respectively 
(WTO 2004).  In a recent report, the U.S. International Trade commission has the following 
assessment of China’s textile and apparel industries: “China is expected to become the ‘supplier 
of choice’ for most U.S. importers [the large apparel companies and retailers] because of its 
ability to make almost any type of textile and apparel product at any quality level at a 
competitive price” (USITC 2004: xi).  With the liberalization of international trade in textiles 
and clothing, particularly the phase-out of the quota system and the phase-in of the Agreement 
on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) within the framework of the WTO in January 2005, China’s 
textile and apparel industries are poised to expand even more and to capture greater shares in the 
world market.7  However, such enormous scales of China’s textile and apparel industries have 
primarily been built in a relatively short period of time.  In fact, before 1984 cloth was still 
rationed in China and the Chinese had to use government issued coupons (bupiao) to buy cloth 
or clothes.  Perhaps due to their recent nature, scholarly works on the history of China’s textile 
and apparel industries are very scanty, with the notable exception to Prof. Gu Qingliang and his 
team’s report, which mainly outlines statistically the changes of the industries (1999).  
Regrettably, the report is dated and contains many statistics but little analysis.  In this chapter, I 
will present an updated account of the development of China’s textile and apparel industries, 
with the goal of providing the general background to this dissertation.  In the course of 
                                                 
7 A trade dispute broke out between China and the United States in 2005 because a surge of Chinese textile and 
apparel imports occurred after the elimination of the quotas, see Chapter 6 for details.  
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presenting the developments of the textile and apparel industries, I highlight the role of the state 
and the market in bringing about the phenomenal changes of these industries.  The central 
question this chapter addresses is how China’s textile and apparel industries have become what 
they are today. 
My primary sources of data for this chapter include the Almanacs of China Textile 
Industry (ACTI 1982-1999) and China Textile Industry Development Report (CTIDR 1999-
2004), 8  which are both official yearbooks of the industries, and World Trade Organization 
(WTO) statistics.  This chapter also benefited from my interviews with national level officials of 
the textile ministry and industry council and associations.  Before I move to the historical 
developments of the industries, some explanation is needed with regard to my use of the term of 
“textile and apparel industries” in this dissertation. 
2.2 TERMINOLOGY 
While this dissertation is mainly concerned about Chinese clothing and the clothing industry, this 
chapter deals with both the textile and apparel industries in China.  This is because the two 
industries are closely connected, as the textile industry provides input for the apparel industry.  
More importantly, it is because the parameters of “the textile industry” are somewhat unique in 
China.  The English term “industry” is loosely used by the government, professionals in the 
trade, and academics alike on several different levels, such as the “men’s wear industry,” the 
“garment/apparel/clothing industry,” the “textile industry,” and the “fashion industry.”  In 
                                                 
8 CTIDR is an annual publication issued by the China National Textile and Apparel Industry Council, which has 
replaced the official Almanac of Chinese Textile Industry since 2000.   
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Chinese, however, the “industry” of a particular category of clothing, such as the men’s wear 
industry, is called a “hangye,” and the “industry” as in the “garment industry” or the “textile 
industry” is called “gongye” or “chanye.”  To complicate the matter even more, the “textile 
industry” (fangzhi gongye) in China is broader in the sense that it officially includes the 
“clothing/garment/apparel industry” (fuzhuang gongye).  For example, the current national 
umbrella organization of the textile and apparel industries is named the China National Textile 
Industry Council (CNTIC), or zhongguo fangzhi gongye xiehui,9 which evolved from the former 
Chinese Ministry of the Textile Industry and includes the national garment industry association 
and associations of specific product categories as member organizations.  Therefore, it is difficult 
to discuss China’s apparel industry without talking about its textile industry, even though 
internationally the two are generally treated as distinct but related industries.  However, the 
scope of this chapter does not cover all textiles, which consists of three sectors based on the end 
use of the products: garment textiles, home textiles (home furnishing), and industrial textiles.  
Instead, I primarily focus on apparel and its upstream industry of garment textiles, which is also 
the largest among the three sectors, accounting for over 52 percent of all textiles in China in 
2003 (Xu 2004: 174).   
Within these narrower parameters of the Chinese textile and apparel industries discussed 
in this dissertation, I have to further concede that not all Chinese garment manufacturing 
enterprises are included in the official statistics of the Chinese apparel industry that are cited in 
this chapter.  For historical and bureaucratic reasons, Chinese garment manufacturers are 
fragmented and fall under the administration of three relevant governmental or semi-
                                                 
9 Since 2004, the Council’s English name changed into China National Textile and Apparel Council, but there was 
no change in its Chinese name. 
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governmental industry organizations: the China National Textile Industry Council (formerly the 
Ministry of Chinese Textile Industry), the China National Light Industry Council (formerly the 
Ministry of Chinese Light Industries), and Ministry of Commerce (formerly Ministry of 
Domestic Commerce).  Consequently, statistics of the Textile Ministry and later the Textile 
Industry Council, though they include the majority of Chinese garment firms, typically do not 
include garment manufacturers under the administration of the other two ministries.  Moreover, 
frequently only firms with annual revenue of over 5 million yuan (guimo yishang qiye, or 
enterprises above scale) are included in the national statistics, and hence those enterprises are 
called Statistically Worthy Enterprises (SWEs).  Thus, the statistics cited in this chapter are in 
fact official estimates rather than actual numbers.  Yet they are the best available estimates, and 
because they are fairly consistent in their scope of measurement I also find them useful to 
illustrate historical trends in China.   
In the following sections, I will outline the major developments in China’s textile and 
apparel industries.  I divide the course of their development into three stages: infancy, 
development, and take-off, which roughly correspond to three major historical periods in 
contemporary China: the late Qing and Republican era (pre-1949), the radical socialist period in 
the PRC (1949-1978), and the reform era in the PRC (post-1978).   
2.3 INFANCY: CHINESE TEXTILE AND APPAREL INDUSTRY BEFORE 1949 
Modern Chinese textile industry emerged when nationalist entrepreneurs and foreign capitalists 
set up textile mills in Shanghai and other coastal cities at the end of the 19th century.  However, 
the late Qing (1644-1911) and Republican era (1912-1949) were ridden with wars (including 
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civil wars and wars with European imperial powers and Japan), and consequently the Chinese 
textile industry did not have a stable political and social environment in which it could quickly 
develop during those periods.  When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 
1949, there were only 179,000 textile firms with a workforce of 745,000, and 5 million cotton 
spindles and a small number of wool, bast fiber, 10  and silk spindles (China State Textile 
Industrial Bureau 2000), and Shanghai represented about half of the national production capacity 
(ACTI 1983: 7).  The product mix was limited to natural fibers, primarily cotton yarn and fabric, 
and the industry relied heavily on imports of Western equipments and raw materials.  For 
example, in Shanghai, all the textile equipment and 80 percent of the cotton were imported 
before 1949 (ibid).   
Compared to the textile sector, the industrialization of the apparel sector emerged even 
later in China.  Before 1949, clothing was mostly hand-made either by housewives at home, or 
by tailors (caifeng) who visited their neighborhood or village from time to time and peddled their 
wares, or by tailors in tailor shops in the cities.  Most tailor shops were composed of a master 
tailor with a few apprentices who made clothes primarily to the orders of customers and 
occasionally sold some ready-made clothing on the side (similar operations still exist in urban 
China today but have diminished to a minimum presence).11  Garment factories appeared in the 
Republican era; however, they were small in scale and manufactured only basic items, such as 
shirts and undergarments.  According to some sources, there were 18 shirt factories in Shanghai 
before the anti-Japanese war (1937-1945), hiring about 200 workers, with a monthly output of 
just over 9,000 shirts (Huang 1994: 249).   
                                                 
10 Bast fiber refers to any of several strong, ligneous fibers, as flax, hemp, ramie, or jute, obtained from phloem 
tissue and used in the manufacture of woven goods and cordage. 
11 Vera Fennel’s (2001) dissertation studies the struggle faced by some small tailor shops in Beijing.  
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2.4 DEVELOPMENT: CHINESE TEXTILE AND APPAREL INDUSTRIES IN THE 
PRE-1978 PRC 
When the Communists came to power and founded the People’s Republic of China in 1949, they 
started a nationalization campaign, which was accomplished in three steps.  First, they took over 
the Guomindang (or KMT) and foreign owned textile mills and turned them into state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). Then, they transformed privately-owned mills into state-run enterprises and 
the private owners into shareholders, which was dubbed as “gong si he ying” (literally meaning 
public-private co-operation).  This was accomplished through the government’s propaganda and 
by the enterprise owners on a purportedly volunteer basis.  As a matter of fact, the private textile 
mills had few options but to cooperate with the government not just because of the political 
pressure, but also because the state took complete control of the distribution of raw materials and 
final products, which meant that textile mills could only buy cotton from and sell finished yarn 
and fabric to the government.  As a result, they had to cooperate with the state.  As a part of the 
state controlled distribution system, the state instituted cloth rationing in the form of “cloth 
coupons” (bupiao) on a per capita basis in 1954.  This measure was deemed necessary in a 
shortage economy at the time, and was kept in place for the following three decades.  By January 
1956, all private textile firms had adopted the mode of “gong si he ying” in Shanghai (ACTI 
1983: 8).  Nationwide, the second step of nationalization was completed by the end of 1956.  The 
third step was to organize independent workers into co-ops (hezuoshe) and then to turn the co-
ops into state-owned enterprises.  This final step was completed in Shanghai in 1958 (ibid), and 
at roughly the same timeline nationally.  By the end of 1958, the entire textile and apparel 
industries (and the overall economy) became state-owned and state-run and was integrated into a 
socialist system of planned economy.   
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In the planned economic system, the state was the ultimate owner and manager of the 
economy.  Take a textile mill for example.  It would receive directives from the government as to 
what and how much to produce in each year, which was derived from the central government’s 
“five year plans” (wunian jihua), and then it would buy the required amount of raw materials 
from another state-owned organization at a state regulated price, and finally it would sell its 
products to designated state-owned organizations at a regulated price.  The workers and 
managers or cadres of the mill were all employed by the state, and were all paid equally by the 
type of work they performed (“tong gong tong chou,” or equal work with equal pay), with only 
slight variations in pay due to such factors as the rank or title (zhicheng) and the number of years 
of work experience (gongling).  The textile mill was only responsible for production, and the 
state ultimately pocketed the profits or underwrote the losses, which had little impact on the pay 
of the employees of the mill.   
The planned economy, or command economy, although it defied market rules, had the 
advantage of rapidly achieving economy of scale and of concentrating scarce resources on the 
pressing needs, which were essential to the war-torn PRC.  Despite the disruptions of the natural 
disasters between 1958 and 1961 and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), the growth of the textile 
industry in China was still impressive.  In 1970, China’s annual yield of cotton yarn and fabric 
reached 11.31 million bales and 9.15 billion meters respectively, a five-time increase from the 
amounts in 1949.  In the same year, Premier Zhou Enlai announced that China’s cotton yarn and 
fabric output had taken the 1st place in the world during a reception of the American journalist 
Edgar Snow (ACTI 1990: 2).  In addition to natural fibers, China started vigorously to develop 
chemical fibers since the early 1970s.  By mid-1980s, China’s production capacity of chemical 
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fibers already exceeded 1 million tons, and became one of the world’s largest producers (ACTI 
1987: 1).   
Compared to the textile sector, the development of the garment sector was not nearly as 
impressive.  Clothing continued to be made at home or by tailors, and ready-to-wear clothing 
(chengyi) was still a rarity in the late 1970s.  In 1978, a total of 673 million pieces of chengyi 
were made (China State Textile Industrial Bureau 2000), which came down to less than one 
piece per person, not to mention a portion of those was exported.  In Shanghai in 1984, for 
example, about 81 million pieces of cotton-made garments were exported, which was equivalent 
to only 17.9 percent of the total amount of cotton fabric exported in the year.  For the domestic 
market in the same year, only about 23.5 percent of the cotton fabric was made into ready-to-
wear clothing, about 80 million pieces (ACTI 1985: 252).  That is to say, both the export and 
domestic sectors relied heavily on fibers and fabrics rather than finished garments in Shanghai in 
1984.  Overall, the Chinese garment industry only started to take off in late 1980s and the early 
1990s, as seen Chart 1 below,12 which was reasonable because its development was bottlenecked 
by, among other things, the development in the upstream textile sector.  The fact that textile 
products (including clothing) were only purchasable with rationed cloth coupons between 1954 
and 1983 indicates a scarce or shortage economy during that period.  Under those circumstances, 
production—rather than consumption—of fabrics rather than finished garments was prioritized.  
The centrally controlled planned economic system in socialist China achieved those priorities 
effectively and rapidly.    
 
 
                                                 
12 The data are from Almanacs of Chinese Textile Industry (2000), p. 135. 
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2.5 TAKE-OFF: CHINESE TEXTILE AND APPAREL INDUSTRIES IN THE POST-
1978 REFORM ERA 
The planned economic system began to change when the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central 
Committee was held in December 1978.  This watershed meeting orchestrated economic reforms 
and “open-door” policies (duinei gaige, duiwai kaifang), which ushered China into a new era.  
The reform policies adopted at the meeting dramatically transformed the Chinese economy.  
Even though the specifics of China’s economic policies have varied since then, they are largely a 
continuation and deepening process in the same direction as the initial policies set forth at the 
meeting in 1978.  With respect to the Chinese textile and apparel industries and the Chinese 
economy in general, the meeting marked a gradual structural shift away from a state-controlled 
planned economy towards a market-based economy, and from a largely closed economy to one 
with increased participation in the global economy, culminating in China’s accession to the 
World Trade Organization in 2001.  In the post-1978 period, the Chinese textile and apparel 
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industries have seen continued processes of state deregulation, market-oriented reforms, and 
industrial upgrading.   
Although the planned economic system worked reasonably well in the post-war 
environment of a shortage economy, it had some intrinsic problems.  First of all, it separated 
distribution from production, and pay from productivity. Hence, there was a lack of incentives 
and accountability for both the workers and management, which eventually led to low 
productivity and inefficiency especially after the waning of revolutionary enthusiasm following 
the radical socialist period.  Second, the absolute monopoly of state-owned enterprises excluded 
competition, which resulted in further inefficiency.  Last but not the least, the state’s emphasis on 
production and its adoption of a rationing system consequently depressed consumption demands.  
These problems became more severe when the shortage problem was solved and the socialist 
ideology of “devoted spirit” (fengxian jingshen) was losing its grip on people especially 
following Mao’s death in 1976.  Top government officials in the textile and apparel industries 
began to recognize those problems in the early 1980s.   
At the 1982 annual National Textile Industry planning meeting, Hao Jianxiu, the model 
worker turned Minister said, “In the new situation, a new predicament has emerged: the 
[problem] of scarce commodities in the past has been solved, whereas previously popular 
products became surplus inventory” (ACTI 1983: 178).  She thought that there should be a shift 
in focus from “quantity” to “quality,” and she called for enterprises to study the changes in 
consumer demands rather than to merely produce according to the orders from the commerce 
departments (ACTI 1983: 177-182).  After a few years of fast growth in the early 1980s, the 
problem of overcapacity coupled with weak consumption became more acute.  In December 
1983, the state decided to abandon the rationing system of cloth coupon once and for all.  This 
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measure temporarily mitigated the problem of overcapacity by releasing the depressed demand.  
More importantly, it marked the end of the production-driven era, and the entry of the Chinese 
textile and apparel industries into a market-driven period, during which product diversification 
becomes more important. 
In the early 1980s, all economic and political factors pointed to reforms to rectify the 
problems in the old planned economic system.  In one speech in 1983, Wu Wenying, the new 
Minister of the textile industry, emphasized the terms of “shifting tracks” (zhuangui) and 
“changing models” (bianxing).  She reiterated the principle of “three shifts” (sange zhuanyi) her 
predecessor Hao Jianxiu brought about, “to shift the focus from speed, production, and capacity 
to product diversification and quality, technological innovation, and profitability; and to change 
from a pure production model to a production and commerce model” (ACTI 1985: 175).  This 
speech might still sound like a typical Chinese political speech, more about principles and 
slogans (typically dotted with numbers) than practices.  But in actuality pilot reform programs 
were being tested in some state-owned enterprises.   
In 1984, four successful measures were concluded from those pilot programs: 1) 
reforming the management system at the firm level and adopting of a “general manager 
responsibility system” (changzhang fuzezhi); 2) transforming of the firm management from an 
administrative unit to a business unit, and allowing the management to make independent 
decisions as to diversifying their products according to market demand and forming alliances 
with other regions, firms, and commerce departments; 3) breaking down the “lifetime 
employment system” or the “iron bowl system” (tiefanwan) of cadres and workers, and partly 
adopting contract-based employment system; and 4) reforming the old egalitarian salary system 
by tying bonus and compensation to work performance (ACTI 1985: 188-190).   
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These four measures brought about two significant changes in the SOEs under reform.  
For one, those reformed firms were granted more authority by the state and were able to function 
as relatively independent businesses rather than as de facto administrative units (danwei) that 
were an extension of the huge state apparatus.  For the first time, the reformed SOEs were 
allowed to decide what to produce and to cross the rigid boundary between industry and 
commerce known as “gong bu jing shang,” which meant that industrial units ought not to 
conduct commercial activities, as they derived their mandates from two separate power 
organizations (two different ministries).  Consequently, the reformed firms were able to sell their 
products directly rather than through the commerce department.  For the other, incentives were 
introduced into the system as the salary and bonuses became more flexible and were tied to job 
performances.  As a result, the overall performance of those SOEs also improved, as the report 
concluded, “Practice (shijian) proves that the reform measures bring about profits, and they are 
beneficial to the country, to the enterprises, and to the workers” (ibid: 189). 
Indeed, the pilot reform programs were so successful that the central government decided 
to implement structural reforms at the enterprise level across the country.  It issued a strong order 
that unless authorized by the central government, all enterprises had to adopt the reform 
measures by June 1987, and that unreformed enterprises by the deadline would be dismantled 
(ACTI 1988: 178).  The tough initiatives from the central government ensured that China’s SOEs 
shifted from administrative units to relatively independent business units, a first step to diverge 
from the tracks of a planned economy.  However, the fact that the firm-level reform measures 
were carried out under the direct order of the state still pointed to the nature of a “command 
economy” in the 1980s, a point that will be further discussed later in this chapter.   
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In addition to implementing structural reforms in the SOEs, the state also started to 
introduce competition to the economy by allowing the establishment of enterprises with other 
types of ownership, primarily township and village enterprises (TVEs) and foreign-funded 
enterprises (FFEs).  Since 1978, township and village enterprises took off quickly, absorbing the 
first wave of excessive agricultural labor freed by the “household production responsibility 
system” (jiating lianchan chengbao zerenzhi) in the agricultural sector.  Township and village 
textile enterprises produced a revenue of 43.8 billion yuan in 1987, a six-time increase from that 
of 1983 and about 30 times of the 1978 level.  The growth in the apparel sector was even more 
remarkable.  In 1987, township and village garment factories produced 1.94 billion pieces of 
garment, accounting for more than half of the national total output (ACTI 1990: 33).  In 1990, 
79.1 percent of all ready-to-wear garments were manufactured by the TVEs (ACTI 1991).  The 
TVEs’ market share in China’s garment industry peaked in 1993, totaling 5.8 billion pieces, 
which constituted over 90 percent of the national output of all ready-to-wear garments in the year 
(ACTI 1994: 11-2).  These numbers indicate that the Chinese garment industry has been 
predominantly led by the market, i.e., the non-state-owned sector, since the 1990s.   
The boom of the TVEs in the garment industry also gradually expanded to the more 
capital intensive textile industry.  In 1995, there were a total of 61,783 TVEs in the textile and 
apparel industries, hiring 5.7 million people, creating aggregate revenue of 518.6 billion yuan 
(ACTI 1996: 221-222).  The miraculous growth of the TVEs was partly because they started up 
as relatively independent business entities rather than administrative units like the SOEs that 
were directly and inefficiently managed by the state.  The TVEs’ relationship with the local 
township governments was much less rigid than the SOEs with the central government.  In the 
late 1980s and the early 1990s, most of the TVEs were contracted out, or privatized by means of 
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“management buy-out,” or turned into joint ventures by absorbing foreign capital, or merged 
with other domestic firms, or formed through a combination of the above-mentioned 
arrangements.   
Some TVEs went public in the stock market in the late 1990s.  For example, The 
Youngor Group (Yage’r Jituan), the largest garment manufacturer in China, with a revenue of 
10.12 billion yuan in 2003, was a small township enterprise established in 1979 by a few 
returned “educated youth” (zhiqing) from the countryside, who then turned it into a private 
business (Ren 1998), which later went public in the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 1998.  Like the 
Youngor Group, many TVEs as well as SOEs became public owned corporations in the late 
1990s, which made ownership types of the firms more complex statistically.  In fact, the TVEs 
were no longer listed in the statistics of the national textile industry almanacs since 1997, which 
suggests that by then most of the TVEs have transformed their identities just like the Youngor 
Group.  Nevertheless, the TVEs were one of the most dynamic players in China’s textile and 
apparel industries, who contributed significantly to the growth and competitiveness of the 
industries.   
Meanwhile, another type of firm also entered the competition: the foreign funded 
enterprises (FFEs), including joint ventures and wholly foreign owned firms.  The growth of 
foreign direct investments (FDI) in China’s textile and apparel industries was equally impressive 
as the TVEs, but with a relatively later surge.  In the end of 1982, there were only two joint 
ventures in China’s textile and apparel industries, the number increased to 150 in 1986, with 46 
of them in apparel (ACTI 1988: 26).  By 1990, there were a total of 2,192 FFEs in China’s textile 
and apparel sectors, with a cumulative investment of about US$ 2 billion.  FDI in China picked 
up even greater speed in the 1990s.  In 1991 alone, 972 new FFEs invested in China’s textile and 
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apparel industries, representing an annual increase of 44 percent (ACTI 1992: 14).  By 1999, a 
cumulative total of 5,156 foreign funded textile and apparel firms had established in China, 
accounting for 28.7 percent of the national output of the entire industries in the same year, 
second only to the state owned enterprises, which accounted for 29.7 percent (ACTI 2000: 2).13  
However, while the state-owned sector had a loss of 3.73 billion yuan in 1999, the FFEs made a 
total profit of 55.53 billion yuan (ibid).  Clearly, the state sector lost out to the non-state-owned 
sectors in the market competition even after the initial reforms in the 1980s.  
The fact that the SOEs lagged behind the TVEs and the FFEs in profitability and 
efficiency after the initial reforms in the 1980s suggested that the SOEs were still not as well 
equipped as the TVEs and FFEs for a market economy.  This was mainly because after initial 
reforms the SOEs were still operating under a primarily planned economic system, entitled 
“planned economy as the basis and market adjustments as the supplement” (jihua jingji weizhu, 
shichang tiaojie weifu).  In a national textile industry planning meeting in 1982, Minister Hao 
Jianxiu talked about the ways to execute the State Council’s reform plans within the primarily 
planned economic system.  She quoted Chen Yun, the then Vice Premier, “‘Our country has to 
stick to the principle of the planned economy as the basis and market adjustment as the 
supplement,’ …we have to realize that the planned economy is an essential characteristic of the 
socialist economy…the primary and supplementary positions [of planning and the market] 
should not be subverted, nor should [the two] be equally treated” (ACTI 1983: 181).  The 
establishment of an intrinsic and ideological link between socialism and the planned economy is 
derived from an orthodox Marxist belief that the economic base determines the superstructure.  
As the Chinese Communist Party has long subscribed to Marxism, for many of the party 
                                                 
13 There are more SOEs in the textile sector than in the garment sector, and they are typically very large in scale 
because the textile sector is much more capital intensive than the garment sector.   
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members reforming the base of the planned economy, i.e., the SOEs and collective enterprises, 
would entail endangering the superstructure of socialism, which proved to be a tough obstacle 
for further reforms of the SOEs through the 1980s and early 1990s.   
 It was not until Deng Xiaoping, the retired “core leader” of the Communist Party and the 
architect of the 1978 reform, made his famous commentaries on the market reforms during his 
visits to Shanghai and the special economic zones (SEZs) in southern China in 1992, that the 
market mechanism (the shichang) graduated into an “essential characteristic” of socialism.  He 
stated that planning and the market were not markers of socialism or capitalism, and that there 
was planning in capitalist economy just as there was market in socialist economy.  He clearly felt 
that the speed of reform was not fast enough (due to conservatism over concerns of the socialist 
ideology) and remarked that “the courage [to reform] should be greater, and the steps [of reform] 
should be faster.”  Deng’s statements essentially settled the ideological debate over where the 
market reform should be headed.  His remarks on the association between the market and 
socialism, officially dubbed “Deng Xiaoping’s South Tour Remarks” (nanxun jianghua), were 
widely studied by the Communist Party and broadly circulated in the state-controlled media, and 
later incorporated into the report of the 14th Party Congress in the same year.  The Party 
Congress monumentally declared that the goal for further economic reform was to fully construct 
the socialist market economy, which heralded the miraculous growth of Shanghai in the 1990s, 
much like the phenomenal growth of the Special Economic Zones in the 1980s.   
To laud Deng’s contribution to the monumental economic reforms and the astounding 
growth of the Special Economic Zones in South China,14 a popular song by the name of “Stories 
                                                 
14 The SEZs include Shenzhen, Zhuhai in Guangdong Province, which are adjacent to Hong Kong and Macau, and 
Shantou and Xiamen in Fujian Province, which are close to Taiwan.  Hainan Province was added to the list of SEZs 
later.   
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of the Spring” begins like this: “Year 1979 was a spring, there was an old man who stood by the 
South Sea of our motherland and drew a circle…Year 1992 was another spring, there was an old 
man who stood by the South Sea of our motherland and wrote down poems…” (emphases mine).  
Even though the lyrics of the song were supposed to be taken figuratively, they did have direct 
references in real life: the “circle” referred to the establishment of Shenzhen as the first SEZ, and 
the “poems” alluded to Deng’s remarks on market mechanisms as a part of socialism.  As the 
song words suggest, a giant (Deng) made history in 1979 and 1992.  Directly benefiting from the 
change of policy in 1992 was the development of Shanghai, particularly the Pudong district.  The 
miracle of Pudong, changing from barren rural lands into the “Manhattan of China” in less than a 
decade, was indeed the direct result of China’s effort to “construct the socialist market 
economy.”  The growth of Pudong, Shanghai was just as sudden and mysterious as Shenzhen, so 
much so that a Chinese professor and friend of mine jokingly expressed to me that the second 
part of the song should be changed like this: “…Year 1992 was another spring, there was an old 
man who stood by the East Sea of our motherland and drew another circle” (emphases added to 
indicate the changes he made).  Incidentally, Pudong is a major financial district in Shanghai and 
in China, home to the Shanghai Stock Exchange and hundreds of domestic and foreign banks, 
which in itself embodies the spirit of a market economy.  Yet paradoxically, the “market” did not 
emerge according to the law of supply and demand; instead it was brought about by the powerful 
state, and in some ways single-handedly by a historical giant as the song suggests.   
China’s agenda in the 1990s to thoroughly build a market economy, albeit a socialist one, 
could be called “the second wave of economic reforms,” which differed from the first wave of 
reforms following the 1978 meeting in allowing the market to play a fundamental rather than a 
supplemental role in allocating resources.  Although the “second wave” may be not as historic as 
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the initial reforms in the 1980s, it was very important and necessary to the continued growth of 
China’s textile and apparel industries and the overall economy.  This was particularly true when 
top government officials conservatively tied economy to the socialist ideology, which became an 
obstacle to further market reform.  Internationally, the “second wave” was a much needed 
assurance that China would not go back and close its door again especially after the state 
suppressed the democratic movements in 1989.15  FDI reacted favorably to China’s “second 
wave,” as evidenced by the boom of the FFEs in the 1990s described previously.  The boom of 
FFEs and the continued expansion of the TVEs further increased the market forces in the 
Chinese economy.  Following the shift to a market-based economy, the Chinese government 
disbanded the Ministry of the Textile Industry, which was the administrative organ that served 
the planned economy, and formed a “voluntary organization”—though with strong governmental 
ties—of the General Textile Council (fangzhi zhonghui) in 1993.  The organizational change 
suggested that the government was clearly loosening its control on the textile and apparel 
industries.  
However, a market-based economy is not free from problems.  The participation of the 
TVEs and the FFEs, and the increased productivity of the SOEs resulting from the market 
reforms led to dramatic rises in production capacity in the textile and apparel industries.  In the 
cotton textile industry, for example, there were a total of 18.9 million spindles in 1981.  Ten 
years later, the capacity had more than doubled to 41.9 million spindles (ACTI 1999: 174).  
Consequently, creating demand became an urgent issue.  As the increase in domestic demand 
was much slower than the increase of the production capacity, the state and the industries turned 
                                                 
15 The democratic movements in late 1980s were led by college students, who protested in large scale on the 
Tian’anmen Square against government corruption.  On June 4th, 1989, the Chinese government used the army and 
forcefully suppressed the student movements.  For details of this incident, see Brook, 1992.  
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their eager eyes to overseas markets.  In 1986, at two major economic meetings, the central 
government decided that the strategic goal of the textile and apparel industries in the 20th century 
was to expand exports.  They thus designed a host of favorable policies for the exportation textile 
and apparel products, including tax deduction and tax rebates (ACTI 1988: 2).  To further 
facilitate the export business, the garment and silk industries were transferred from under the 
administration of the Ministry of Light Industries (Qing gong bu) to the Ministry of Textile 
Industry (Fangzhi gongye bu) in 1987.  The textile and apparel industries have since become 
export oriented industries and major hard currency earners for China.  As Charts 2 and 3 
illustrate below, Chinese apparel exports have seen dramatic growth since 1980, and China has 
become the world leader since the mid-1990s, capturing about a quarter of the world’s total 
clothing export market in 2004.16   
 

















                                                 
16 The data are from the WTO statistics database, available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/statis_e.htm, 
accessed numerous times, last time accessed on March 25, 2008. 
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Even though exports created more demand for Chinese textiles and clothing, which 
temporarily eased the problem of overcapacity, it did not eliminate the problem, especially when 
there was uneven efficiency and productivity in China’s textile and apparel firms. In a market 
based environment, there is a tendency for the winners to take all.  This was generally true in 
China in the 1980s and 1990s, during which the growth in export of textiles and clothing 
correlated to the growth of the TVEs and the FFEs. The SOEs, on the other hand, were losing 
market shares to the FFEs and TVEs.  When the number of the SOEs that suffered from losses 
grew rapidly, the excess production capacity was concentrated in the SOEs.  In 1990, 37.9 
percent of all state-owned textile firms and collective enterprises, which were regarded by the 
government as “within the socialist system” (xitongnei),17 were running at a loss (ACTI 1991: 
                                                 
17 Collective enterprises (jiti qiye) in theory should include rural township collectives.  However, the Chinese 
government regarded the TVEs (xiangzhen qiye) as outside the system (xitongwei) (e.g., ACTI 94: 3, & 5).  The 
TVEs are different from the SOEs and urban collectives in that they do not receive funds from the state budgets and 
their workers typically do not enjoy pensions after retirement, which are typical of the socialist system.  
Nevertheless, the SOEs are the predominant component of the socialist sector or xitongnei firms. 
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7).  In 1991, the loss widened to 41.9 percent of “the socialist sector” (ACTI 1992: 8).  In 1993, 
the number of SOEs and collectives at a loss further widened to 44.9 percent, and for the first 
time the entire state-own sector ran a negative aggregate after-tax profit of 616 million yuan 
(ACTI 1994: 1).18  This trend continued in 1995, and peaked in 1996, when over 54 percent of 
all SOEs in textiles suffered losses and the entire SOE sector ran a negative aggregate after-tax 
profit of 10.58 billion yuan, (ACTI 1999: 346-7).  This pattern of system-wide losses continued 
through 1999.  The underwhelming performance of the socialist sector or the xitongnei firms, 
primarily the SOEs, was partly because of the overcapacity built up over the years and partly 
because the SOEs were less well equipped for the market competitions than the TVEs and the 
FFEs, particularly in their rigid employment and pension system.  Worse yet, an SOE could not 
discontinue a money-losing operation or declare bankruptcy by itself, which lay ultimately in the 
hands of its owner, the state.   
After five consecutive years of system-wide losses, the central government decided to do 
something about the SOEs in the textile industry in 1997.  The time to address the problem also 
had something to do with China’s prospect of joining the WTO, which entailed more severe 
market competition as well as greater opportunities for Chinese textile and apparel firms.  
China’s membership in the WTO became a reality in 2001.  To increase the competitiveness of 
the SOEs was essential for them to meet the challenges and opportunities of China’s accession to 
the WTO.  The then Premier Zhu Rongji and his deputy Wu Bangguo outlined an aggressive 
plan to dismantle ten million outdated cotton spindles, to lay off 1.2 million textile workers, and 
to return the textile SOEs to profitability by 2000, one year before China’s scheduled admission 
to the WTO (ACTI 1999: 173-8).   
                                                 
18 Another place stated the aggregate loss as 780 million yuan (ACTI 1995: 78).  
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In 1998, the Chinese state launched a three-year campaign of “depressing spindles” 
(yading), which began in the cotton textile sector.  The problem of loss plagued SOEs in the 
cotton textile sector as well as those in other sectors and industries.  But because the cotton 
textile sector suffered the worst loss and was one of the largest employers, it was chosen as the 
first group to shed production capacity, which would then serve as a model for other sectors to 
follow.  Hence, the campaign to dismantle excess spindles in the cotton textile sector was dubbed 
“Project Breaking Point” (tupokou gongzuo).  As the ultimate owner of the SOEs, the central 
government took the initiative in the campaign.  To better execute its policies, the central 
government restated the “voluntarily-based” China Textile General Council as a governmental 
organization and renamed it as China State Textile Industrial Bureau in March 1998, one specific 
responsibility of whose was to oversee “Project Breaking Point.”  In addition, the central 
government set aside several hundreds of million yuan in special funds to compensate those 
SOEs that had dismantled spindles and laid off workers or gone bankrupt altogether.  It also 
worked closely with local governments and required them to share the cost of compensation and 
subsidy, and tied the project to local officials’ work performance.  By the end of 1999, a total of 
9.06 million outdated cotton spindles had been dismantled and 1.16 million textile workers had 
been laid off (ACTI 2000: 47).19  In 2000, an additional 300,000 some cotton spindles were 
dismantled.  Following the cotton textile sector, about 280,000 wool spindles and 1 million silk 
spindles were dismantled in 2000.  Three hundred SOEs were forced to go bankrupt, more than 
400 SOEs were acquired by or merged with other firms, and 45 billion yuan of bad loans of the 
SOEs were written off (CTIDR 2000/01: 14).   
                                                 
19 Generally, these laid-off workers from the SOEs would receive some unemployment benefits from the 
government, which were typically not sufficient to sustain a living thus those laid-off workers would have to 
temporarily rely on their savings and/or support from family members.  Most of those workers ended up in a 
different job either through the government or their own personal networks.   
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The final results of “Project Breaking Point” exceeded the original plan, and the SOEs in 
the textile sector as a whole returned to profitability in 2000, though still not as competitive as 
the non-state-owned sectors.  Premier Zhou Rongji remarked on the final report of the “Project 
Breaking Point” by the Textile Bureau, “In order to face the opportunities and challenges of the 
accession to the WTO, the textile industry’s tasks to readjust and upgrade are still very 
heavy...”(ACTI 2000: 47).  Nevertheless, the overall technological level in the SOEs have 
improved tremendously as a consequence of over 10 million outdated spindles being destroyed 
during the campaign, and the SOEs have become leaner and meaner by laying off about 1.5 
million workers and severing huge sums of bad loans—shedding the baggage carried over from 
the socialist planned economy (the unemployment and reemployment of those workers was a 
related but different kind of painful adjustments).  Following the completion of the campaign, the 
SOEs have become much more independent and better positioned than ever before to compete 
with non-state-owned textile firms and international competitors, poised to cash in on market 
opportunities to be offered by China’s pending accession to the WTO.   
As the three-year yading campaign was completed, the China State Textile Industrial 
Bureau was disbanded by the central government in 2001.  Replacing its role, the China National 
Textile Industry Council was formed on a purportedly voluntary basis, which has since been 
chaired by Mr. Du Yuzhou, the former Minister of the Textile Industry and former Director of 
the disbanded China State Textile Industrial Bureau.  The industry yearbook or almanacs 
published under the former government Ministry or Bureau were also replaced by the China 
Textile Industry Development Report (CTIDR), which was published by the newly founded 
CNTIC.  Unlike the almanacs, the new CTIDR contains no state directives or speeches by 
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government officials—the emblem of the “command economy” was apparently gone along with 
the governmental agency.   
In summary, modern Chinese textile and apparel industries have undergone three stages: 
infancy, development, and take-off.  In the course of these developments, two major political 
events in the history of the PRC have caused structural shifts in China’s textile and apparel 
industries and the overall economy.  One was the founding of the PRC and ascension of the 
Chinese Communist Party to power in 1949, which resulted in the nationalization of the Chinese 
economy, the textile and apparel industries included, into a centrally controlled planned 
economic system.  The other was the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee held in 
1978, which charted a path of economic reforms toward a market-based economy.  During the 
post-1978 reform era, there were three phases of structural adjustments for the textile and apparel 
industries.  In the first phase, the initial reform measures transformed the SOEs from largely 
administrative units to relatively autonomous business units in the early 1980s, which also led to 
the boom of the TVEs.  In the second phase, a new wave of market reforms were implemented in 
the early 1990s, which further opened up the Chinese economy, facilitated a boom of the FFEs in 
the textile and apparel industries, and encouraged further growth of the TVEs.  The FFEs and the 
TVEs constituted the non-state-owned sectors, which have since dominated China’s textile and 
apparel industries.  In the third phase, market forces further consolidated their dominance in 
China’s textile and apparel industries in the late 1990s and the early 2000s.  In the meantime, the 
SOEs were forced to downsize, sever more ties to the abating planned economic system, and 
further shape themselves in the image of non-state-owned enterprises.  As an overall trend of 
these developments, it appeared that the state was retreating while the market forces were 
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ascending.  This begs the question: who is the agent of change in the development of China’s 
textile and apparel industries, the state or the market? 
2.6 THE INTRICATE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE 
MARKET 
To understand the phenomenal changes in China’s textile and apparel industries, we have to 
understand the role of the state and the market in this process.  The overall shift from a 
“command economy” to a market economy suggests that the market is playing more pivotal role 
than the state in the development of China’s textile and apparel industries, which seems to be 
supported by the current state of the textile and apparel industries.  In 2000, state capital only 
accounted for 18.7 percent of the aggregate capital of all statistical worthy enterprises in the 
textile and apparel industries, and the collective capital 9.94 percent of the total capital of the 
SWEs (Du 2004: v).  Taking into account those non-state-owned firms with revenue below 5 
million yuan, who hired half of the workforce in the entire industries, the percentage of state 
capital would account for only less than 10 percent (ibid).   
The subtext to the broad structural shift in China’s textile and apparel industries is that 
the market and state control are fundamentally contradictory forces, so much so that one has to 
give way to the other for the economy to work.  In many ways this is true in China, and there are 
plenty of examples in the development of China’s textile and apparel industries.  In the course of 
nationalizing the economy after the founding the PRC, the state took over all the distribution 
channels of the economy and effectively “forced” the non-state owned sectors to cooperate and 
quickly turned the entire economy into a state controlled planned economy.  In the post-1978 
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reform era, facing the challenges from both the domestic and international markets (in 
anticipation of China’s access to the WTO), the state was forced to initiate “Project Breaking 
Point” that aimed at reducing production capacity and ended up closing down, selling, or 
merging many state owned enterprises.   
The tension between the state and the market was so high in the process of implementing 
“Project Breaking Point” that the media compared the dismantling of textile spindles in Shanghai 
to “a warrior cutting off his wounded arm.”20  Although the state controlled media intended to 
use the metaphor to invoke a heroic image of the SOEs and their workers who were willing to 
take the sacrifices, the metaphor also alluded to the state’s desperation and lack of recourses.  By 
introducing market mechanisms to the economy in the post-1978 reform era, the state exposed 
the SOEs in the textile and apparel industries to market competitions and consequently worsened 
the internal problems of the SOEs; and to prevent the “wound” from infecting the entire “body” 
of the economy, the best defense the state came up with was to “cut off the wounded arm.”  As a 
result, hundreds of factories were closed, over one million workers lost their jobs, and billions of 
yuan were spent on bad loans and compensation.  This metaphor is a good illustration of the 
painful adjustments that China’s textile and apparel industries have gone through on the one 
hand and the tension between the state and the market on the other.   
However, the tension between the state and the market and the shift from a controlled 
economy to a market economy should not be taken to mean that the role of the state was or is 
insignificant in China.  On the contrary, market mechanisms were not part of the Chinese 
economy until they were introduced and cultivated by the state in the reform era.  In each of the 
three phases of the market reforms in the textile and apparel industries, the state played a crucial 
                                                 
20 See Zhongguofangzhibao (Chinese Textile News) January 26, 1998. 
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role in allowing, inducing, and facilitating the growth of the market.  Attesting to the role of the 
state, the non-state owned sectors emerged in leaps (as surges or booms) rather than developing 
gradually.  That is to say, the Chinese state did not always passively react to the market forces, 
but actively brought about market competition.  In the course of the transition from a planned 
economy to a market economy, the market relied on the support of the state.  Even in the market 
based economy today, the state is not completely out of the picture.  In fact, the Chinese state 
still intends to maintain some form of control over the market, not so much in the specific taxes, 
laws, and regulations, etc., but an ideological control, as it calls the economic system the 
“socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics.”   
To what extent that the ideological label matters is a question that remains to be 
answered.  As discussed previously, the state was reluctant to fully allow the market to replace 
the fundamental role of state planning in the 1980s.  It was Deng’s remarks in 1992 that seemed 
to have temporarily settled the ideological debate between socialist planned economy and 
capitalist market economy.  But the fundamental contradiction between the socialist ideology 
and economic base still exists in China.  In the case of the textile and apparel industries, about 90 
percent of the industries are non-state owned, which are by no means “socialist.”  Yet, the 
Chinese Communist Party openly insists on a socialist ideology and the Marxist doctrine that the 
economic base determines the superstructure (including ideology).  Therefore, it is hard to 
determine whether the state intends to use the label of its economic system as a compromise—
it’s not really a socialist economy, but market economy with Chinese characteristics, or a 
promise—the market economy is but a practical means to eventually realize socialism in China.  
One thing is clear: as long as the Chinese Communist Party remains in power in China, the 
relationship between the state and the market will remain quite complicated.  Differently put, the 
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state and the market both have played and will continue to play important roles in the 
development of China’s textile and apparel industries.    
2.7 CONCLUSION 
From a shortage economy in which cloth was rationed for the three decades in the early years of 
the PRC’s existence, to being the world’s largest manufacturer of clothing today, the 
development of China’s textile and apparel industries is nothing but a story of miraculous 
growth.  The process, however, was not always a smooth upward curve, but punctuated with 
structural shifts and adjustments.  The founding of the PRC led to the nationalization of China’s 
economy, which resulted in a state controlled planned economic system, which in turn 
expeditiously created an economy of scale in the textile industry.  The clothing industry started 
to take off after the state and the Communist Party adopted economic reform policies in favor of 
the market in 1978.  In the post-1978 reform period, the textile and apparel industries as well as 
the Chinese economy as a whole gradually shifted from a centrally controlled planned economy 
to a market based economy.  In the process of this shift, the Chinese state played a key role in 
cultivating, facilitating, and encouraging the growth of the market.  Yet, once the ball of the 
market mechanism started rolling, its momentum demanded from the state further reforms in 
favor of the market.  Although the market appeared to “get its way” in the course of China’s 
economic reform, it did so not without hesitancy or even resistance from elements of the state.  
The Chinese Communist Party’s insistence on the socialist ideology was and will be a source of 
tension between market forces and the state (as well as between their agents).  There is no way to 
know how exactly the tension will unfold in the future, but in the course of the development of 
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the textile and apparel industries to this day, we can conclude that the state and market forces 
constitute two major axes that have charted the course of change of the industries.   
The dynamic and sometimes contentious relationship between market forces and the state 
(sometimes represented by different elements of the state apparatus that advocate for the interests 
of the market and the state) suggests that the development of China’s textile and apparel 
industries is not a natural economic growth, but an economic growth that reflects the will and 
wishes of the Chinese state and the Communist Party.  In other words, the development of the 
textile and apparel industries is a part of the Chinese state’s overall project of economic 
development and modernization.  The state and the market are two major forces that shape the 
broad changes in Chinese clothing and the clothing industry that I discuss throughout this 
dissertation.  In some cases, they are not just broad forces that are lurking in the background.  In 
the next chapter, for example, the Chinese state (through its agents) is also involved in the 
changes of clothing styles and in making sense out of the stylistic changes in contemporary 
China.   
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3.0  EVOLUTION OF CLOTHING STYLES IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA: A TALE 
OF MODERNITY? 
We are modern not only because we have achieved this status historically, but 
because we have developed consciousness of our historical depths and 
trajectories, as also our historical transcendence of the traditional—Nicholas B. 
Dirks (1990: 25). 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
On October 21, 2001, when the then Chinese president Jiang Zemin along with other Asia-
Pacific heads of state wore brightly-colored “traditional” Chinese silk jackets for the official 
APEC photo shoot,21 he brought about a craze for “traditionally” looking clothing in China, 
which was dubbed by the media “tangzhuang re” (literally meaning the heat of “Tang dynasty 
clothing”).  These APEC jackets, according to the state spokesperson Zhang Qiyue, reflected 
“both traditional Chinese flavor and modern ideals” (China Daily 10/21/2001).  The Malaysian 
New Straits Times also called them “an updated version of a traditional Chinese jacket” 
                                                 
21 It is an APEC convention that on the final day summit, the heads of state attending the conference would wear a 
traditional garment presented by the host country.   
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(10/21/2001).  The tangzhuang, the name of the APEC jackets, suggests that the style dates back 
to the Tang dynasty (618-907), which was arguably the greatest period in China’s long, proud, 
and glorious history.  However, it is precisely the explicit association to the tradition of the Tang 
dynasty that has caused debates between the original designers of the jackets and dress 
historians.  One of the original designers thought it was all right to call the jacket the 
“tangzhuang” because it symbolized something “Chinese,” just as overseas Chinese are called 
“tangren,” and China town “tangren jie” (personal interview in 2002).  Dress historians, on the 
other hand, believed the name was a misnomer because the style of the jacket bore greater 
resemblance to “magua,” a popular style in the Qing dynasty (1644-1911),22 than clothing styles 
in the Tang dynasty.  Other designers on the original team took a “middle ground” approach and 
later “corrected” the name into “xin tangzhuang” (or new tangzhuang), emphasizing the new and 
modern aspects of the jacket.23   
The phenomenon of the tangzhuang craze and the debates surrounding the name raise 
important and interesting questions: What are considered traditional and/or modern styles of 
clothing by the fashion designers and dress historians?  How can a clothing style be conceived as 
simultaneously traditional and modern, two attributes that are frequently considered as 
opposites?  What can clothing styles and their representations tell us about modernity as well as 
tradition in China?  This chapter attempts to address the above questions by examining the ways 
in which clothing styles are entwined with the broad social and political conditions in 
contemporary China.  In the following, I will outline the evolution of clothing styles in the four 
                                                 
22 There were several news reports on scholars’ disagreement on the use of the term of the “tangzhuang.”  See 
Jiefang  ribao 10/22/2001; Beijing qingnianbao 02/10/2002. 
23 One of the original designers I interviewed holds this view, which is also reflected in the title of a book the team 
published, see Ding 2002. 
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major historical periods in contemporary China.  In presenting the changes in clothing styles 
through time, I will also highlight the changes in politics in the corresponding historical periods.  
Then, I will analyze Chinese official representations of the evolution of contemporary clothing 
styles, and examine the ways in which a moral tale of progress and modernization is constructed 
through these representations.  I argue that it is through such representations and discourses that 
clothing becomes more than something that merely provides covering and livelihood (see 
Chapter 2) for the Chinese citizens, and that time, modernity and their associated morality are 
woven into clothing styles.  In her study of Chinese modernity, Lisa Rofel borrows Clifford 
Geertz’s phrase and defines Chinese modernity as “a story people tell themselves about 
themselves in relation to others” (1999: 130).  However, the moral I find of the story told by the 
Chinese via clothing is not so much that they see their modernity “in relation to others,” instead 
they see it in relation to their own past.  Given the numerous scholarly uses and interpretations of 
modernity, some explanation about my use of the term in this chapter is in order.   
3.2 MODERNITY AND TEMPORALITY  
In a review of anthropology and modernity, Joel Kahn states that in Anglophone social science 
the term “modern derives much of its meaning” from modernization theory (2001: 657), which 
bears significant resemblance to the theory of unilineal evolutionism and is widely criticized by 
anthropologists as being Eurocentric (also see Tipps 1973).  Yet according to Kahn, recent 
anthropological studies have “substantially pluralized and relativized” the concept of modernity 
(Kahn 2001: 651).  Indeed, different models have been proposed to study modernity, particularly 
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in non-Western settings, to name but a few: “alternative modernity” (Knauft 2002), “other 
modernities” (Rofel 1999), and even “multiple modernities” (Hefner 1998).   
These recent anthropological studies of modernity have not only redirected scholarly 
attention to the topic of modernity, but have also enriched our understanding by embedding 
modernity in specific cultural contexts and experiences.  However, Kahn is not satisfied with the 
frameworks of “alternative” or “other modernities” because they entail that the differences 
between the West and the rest are irreconcilable so much so that modernity must be locally 
embedded.  He contends that modernity is not only plural in non-Western societies as the 
“alternative” and “other” modernity models suggest, but it is also plural in the West.  Therefore, 
he argues that it is fruitful to engage critical studies of Western modernity in the anthropological 
studies of modernity in non-Western settings (Kahn 2001).  Similar to Kahn, I am not totally 
convinced by the model of “alternative” or “other modernities,” not because it highlights the 
differences between the West and the rest, but because it invokes some form of orthodox 
modernity, which lies in the West, against which the modes of other or alternative modernities 
are always implicitly or explicitly juxtaposed.   
It is noteworthy that modernity has been interpreted in many different ways in Western 
scholarship (as also alluded to by Kahn): industrialization, democratization, bureaucratization, 
secularism, capitalism, rationalism, scientism, individualism, and the list can go on and on.  
Differently put by James Faubion, “modernity is, if nothing else, multidimensional” (1988: 365).  
However, it is not the intent of this chapter to sort out the various dimensions and/or 
interpretations of modernity and to conclude with the most determinant dimension of modernity 
(if it is at all possible).  Rather than focusing on the differences between the diverse perspectives 
and interpretations, this chapter limits its scope to one aspect of modernity on which scholars 
 60 
seem to largely agree: the temporal dimension.  Once again, Faubion’s words are illustrative of 
the point, though he clearly recognizes the difficulty in defining what modernity is.  He notes, 
“The indeterminacy of the modern is, however, commensurate with the indeterminacy of the 
objects (or whatever they might be) to which talk of modernity almost invariably alludes: the 
present; and the self” (1988: 366).  In other words, the modern or modernity has to do with the 
self’s sense of the present.   
The modern age in the West, according to Habermas (1987), began with the Renaissance, 
the Reformation, and the discovery of the New World, which gave rise to a new sense of the 
present, i.e., modernity.  Anthropologist Daniel Miller also argues that the key to modernity is 
that it indicates “a transformation in temporary consciousness” (1994: 13).  That is to say, it is 
the shift in temporal consciousness—a new sense of the present in opposition to the past where 
tradition claims to reside—that marks out modernity.  Therefore, from the vantage point of the 
temporal dimension, modernity as a heightened sense of the present is considered in Western 
scholarship as a rupture with tradition that claims to belong to the past, even though some 
specific traditions may be invented or reinvented in the present (c.f. Hobsbawm and Ranger 
1983).  The rupture of modernity can be reflected in various ways.  For example, according to 
Arjun Appadurai, the consciousness of the present is heightened by the “work of imagination” 
that is intensified by electronic mediation and transnational migration (1996: 3).  Consequently 
he sees the rupture of modernity with the past in that the modern and the global are now in 
intense confluence, which he calls “modernity at large” (1996).  In this chapter, I examine the 
ways in which temporality (and its ruptures) is objectified in and through the evolution of 
clothing styles in contemporary China.   
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3.3 CLOTHING STYLES AND MORALITY OF TIME 
Clothing styles may seem trivial at first sight, but style in general is always important, both 
intellectually and aesthetically.  As Alfred Kroeber points out, “The derivation of the word style 
is of course from stylus, the ancient writing tool, used metaphorically to express the individual 
manner peculiar to a writer” (Kroeber 1963: 66).  The meaning of the term extends from the style 
of one’s handwriting (or calligraphy), which could be examined aesthetically, to the style of 
one’s individual ways of expression in writing, which is to be appreciated intellectually.  
Similarly, clothing styles require both aesthetic and intellectual appreciation.  Indeed, the role of 
fashion designers parallels with the role of authors versus writers,24 in that fashion designers use 
the medium of fabrics in place of words to express their individual styles, a point that will be 
discussed in the next chapter.  The focus of this chapter is, however, on the social and historical 
aspects of clothing styles, the very aspects Kroeber emphasizes.  He writes,  
So far, we have the original meaning attaching to the word style; and this meaning 
with reference to individuals has never died out.  In addition, however, with lapse 
of time the word style has come also to denote a social or historical phenomenon, 
the manner or set of related patterns common to the writers or musicians or 
painters of a period or country (Kroeber 1963: 66).  
Indeed, by examining stylistic changes in Western women’s dress in long periods of time that 
exceed the lifespan of individual designers (Kroeber 1919; also Richardson and Kroeber 1940),25 
Kroeber finds that the patterns in the stylistic changes in women’s dress indicate that individuals 
                                                 
24 Geertz’s (1988) distinction between writer and author is relevant here, but will be discussed in Chapter 4.  
25 To analyze the stylistic changes, Richardson and Kroeber took six measurements of a dress: skirt length, waist 
length, décolletage length, skirt width, waist width, and décolletage width (Richardson and Kroeber 1940: 112).   
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are “immersed in a cultural matrix that predetermined most of their conceptualization and 
behavior” (Lowe and Lowe 1982: 527).  To be clear, the “cultural matrix” Kroeber refers to, 
which shapes the individuals in their creations of styles, is not equivalent to the external social 
and political conditions in which they live.  Kroeber thinks that stylistic changes are largely 
dictated by and within “the structure of fashion,” and “the unsettling larger influences [only] 
impinge on them [fashions]” (emphasis added) (1957: 19).  In other words, Kroeber seems to 
acknowledge a relative autonomy within the fashion industry, a point will be further discussed in 
the next chapter.  Kroeber’s limited acknowledgement of the influence of external social and 
political forces on fashion change may be in part due to the fact that he examined changes in 
only one particular style (women’s dress), and thus the changes appeared to be “a slow 
pendulum-like swing between extremes” (Kroeber 1957: 9).  Should he have had examined 
changes of multiple styles over longer historical periods that underwent more dramatic social and 
political transformations, fashion styles might not have appeared to be a simple approximation of 
or deviation from an ideal “equilibrium.”  That being said, the academic vigor Kroeber accords 
fashion and his insight that external social and political forces have bearings on fashion change 
are valuable to my current study of stylistic changes in contemporary Chinese clothing.   
Indeed, in the following section, I will examine how temporality comes to bear on 
Chinese clothing styles through the correlation between clothing styles and the historical, social 
and political environments in which they exist or existed in contemporary China.26 
                                                 
26 Here contemporary means from late Qing to the present. 
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3.4 EVOLUTION OF CLOTHING STYLES IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 
Since late 19th century, clothing styles have undergone dramatic changes in China,27 not in terms 
of the cyclical change of fashion, but historical changes that are enmeshed with politics.  Perhaps 
because of the largely linear nature of the stylistic changes of clothing in contemporary China, 
dress historians commonly illustrate the evolution of contemporary Chinese clothing as 
predicated on the four historical periods: late Qing dynasty (1644-1911), the Republican period 
(1912-1949), the Maoist or radical socialist period (1949-1976), and the Reform era (post-1978).  
In what follows, I will follow this convention to describe the evolution of clothing styles in 
contemporary China, underscoring the connection between clothing styles and their respective 
social and political contexts in each period.   
3.4.1 Late Qing 
As the last imperial dynasty, the Qing, like many of its predecessors, maintained a rigid clothing 
code for its rulers and subjects alike.  The elaborate sumptuary rules of the imperial family have 
been well documented (e.g., Garrett 1994: 29-61).  Similarly, the Qing mandarins and subjects 
were supposed to dress according to their rank and status.  This hierarchical way of dressing was 
not only legitimized by law, but also policed by moral scrutiny: A person who dressed 
appropriately knew his or her place in society, which pertained to the Confucian concept of li (a 
concept that is similar to but includes more than simply etiquette); otherwise he or she would be 
no different from uncivilized barbarians (Steele and Major 1999: 18).  Therefore, clothing was 
                                                 
27 In this chapter, my discussion of Chinese clothing is limited to clothing of the Han, and does not include clothing 
of the ethnic minorities except for the Manchu. 
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not just a reflection of one’s inner quality, but also an integral part of the imperial social order 
that was governed by the system of li, as an old Chinese phrase goes, “chui yi chang er tian xia 
zhi,” which means “[as long as] the clothing system is maintained, the social order is 
maintained.”   
However, to the above general characterization of clothing in the Qing dynasty, I have to 
add three caveats.  Firstly, the legal and moral constraints on clothing did not exclude 
possibilities of violation or transgression.  Wu (2005) did a study on the consumption behavior of 
wealthy families with lower ranks in the Jiangnan region in the Ming and Qing dynasties and he 
found that “jian yue,” consumption behaviors that transgressed the parameter of one’s rank or 
status, were fairly common.  Secondly, sartorial distinctions in this period were mainly reflected 
through color, fabric, patterns, embroideries, and ornaments and accessories, but not through 
clothing styles per se.  The main styles for men were the changpao (or cheongsam), magua (the 
Qing style jacket), a hat (skullcap), and a long queue (in a single plait); and the main clothing 
style for Manchu women was also cheongsam or the qipao, but blouses and long skirts 
(frequently worn with pants underneath), and often bound “lotus feet” for Han women.28  The 
cut, silhouettes, and the styles of clothing were rather limited during much of the Qing period.  
Lastly, new styles and demands for change began to emerge in the late Qing.  Historians have 
argued that “jianbian yifu” (cutting men’s queues and changing their clothing styles) as well as 
the women’s “natural feet movement” (tianzu yundong) were part of the revolution that led to the 
collapse of the Qing and the establishment of the Republican China (Zhonghua minguo). 29   
                                                 
28 Dorothy Ko sees foot-binding as a form of attire, see Ko 1997.  
29 This is a view presented in Chinese textbooks (e.g. An & Jin 1999: 7-8), which is shared by many dress historians.  
Gerth (2003) also details how the removal of the queue was central to the collapse of the Qing dynasty, also see 
Wang 2003: 64-70. 
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Following the contact with Japan, a rising power, and Western imperial powers (including the 
United States, Britain, France, Germany, Australia, Italy, and Russia) in the late Qing, Western 
clothing styles started to gain popularity, so much so that a group of tailors called “hongbang 
caifeng” from the Zhejiang and Shanghai areas became well known for their fine skills in 
making Western styles of clothing.30   
3.4.2 The Republican Period 
After the demise of the Qing and the establishment of the Republican government, Western 
styles of clothing, such as Western suits, became even more popular, since they were legalized 
by the new government as one of the formal attire, or lifu, in October 1912.  The changpao or 
cheongsam was also officially included as formal wear, as the new Republican government 
yielded to the pressure of the domestic silk industry (Wang 2003: 89-94; Gerth 2003: 68-121).  
In addition to the two different types of clothing, the Republican era is particularly identified 
with the invention and popularity of the “zhongshanzhuang” (for men) and the “qipao” (for 
women).  The popularity of these two styles made them the lifu of Republican period by default, 
a legacy still in evidence today.31  Elsewhere I have discussed how the qipao was reformed and 
appropriated by Han Chinese women during the Republican era (Zhao 2004).  Professor Bao 
Minxin, in his monograph on the qipao, details four major differences between Han women’s 
                                                 
30 They were also called “feng bang cai feng,” as they were originally from Fengtian, Zhejiang and then migrated to 
Shanghai area.    
31 Japanese dress scholar Yamanouchi Chiemi (in Chinese Shanneizhihuimei) surveyed 61 individuals in Xi’an and 
Shanghai on the issue of national dress in 1997, and most of them thought the qipao and the zhongshanzhuang was 
or should be the Chinese national dress (2001: 6).  
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reformed qipao in the Republican era and its Manchu predecessor in the Qing dynasty, ranging 
from silhouettes, fabrics and patterns, ensemble, to status symbolism (1998: 11-14).   
Here, I want to emphasize that the silhouettes or appearance differ between the two 
versions—the Han women’s qipao in the Republican period was more fitted and revealing and 
the Manchu version was baggier and concealing—because the former incorporated Western 
design techniques, such as darts, set-in sleeves, shoulder pads, etc.  In terms of cut, structure, and 
construction, Han women’s reformed qipao of the Republican period was very different from the 
Manchu qipao; the former utilized techniques of liti caijian (three dimensional cutting) while the 
latter employed only pingmian caijian (two dimensional cutting) techniques.  The differences 
between the two types of cutting techniques will be further illustrated later in this chapter, but the 
point I want to make here is that the adoption of Western design techniques did not make the 
qipao less Chinese.  On the contrary, in the face of these changes the qipao became a Chinese 
cultural icon.  Similarly, the making of the zhongshanzhuang also included some of the Western 
design techniques.  Some dress historians even acknowledge the influences of “qiling 
wenzhuang,” a jacket worn by many overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia and Japanese student 
uniforms, on the style of the zhongshanzhuang (Wang 2003: 96-101; An and Jin1999: 29-32).  
The promotion of the zhongshanzhuang by Sun Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen, who named the style 
after himself), Father of Republican China, and the symbolisms of his revolutionary ideals as 
represented by different features of the jacket have no doubt contributed to its quick reception by 
the Chinese as truly their own style.32   
                                                 
32 For details of the symbolisms, see Wang 2003: 98.  
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To summarize, the Republican period experienced a real plurality of clothing styles; three 
distinct genres coexisted: changpao and magua from the Qing dynasty, Western styles clothing 
such as Western suits (continued through the late Qing), and new inventions of the qipao and the 
zhongshanzhuang (as hybrids of the first two genres). 
3.4.3 The Mao Era 
After the Mao Zedong led Chinese Communist Party defeated the Guomindang (or KMT) 
Republican government, the People’s Republic of China was founded on October 1, 1949.  
Because of the economic reforms introduced since the end of 1978, the PRC is often divided into 
two periods: the radical socialist period, or the Mao era (1949-76), and the reform period (post-
1978).  This historical division is also meaningful in terms of sartorial changes in the PRC.  The 
Mao era is known in the West for one particular clothing style, the ubiquitous and unisex Mao 
suit.  Media reports and video clips of mass movements in the Maoist China always gave the 
impression of “a sea of blue ants” (or “green ants” during the Cultural Revolution).33  Although 
there is some truth to those images, they do not capture the entire sartorial picture of the Maoist 
period.   
In the 1950s, clothing styles from the Republican period such as the qipao and the 
zhongshanzhuang continued to be worn by many people.  In fact, unlike the Qing and the 
Republican governments, the PRC government never issued any laws or regulations pertaining to 
clothing.  However, this is not to suggest that there was no connection between the dwindling 
popularity of the qipao and the Western suits and the overall political environment in which the 
                                                 
33 These images lend conveniently to interpretations of a totalitarian, brain-washed, communist other.  
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proletarian ideology dominated.  According to A. C. Scott, the waning popularity of the qipao 
was because the people “tacitly understood” that “it was not patriotic to dress smartly” so that 
they put away their elegant qipao along with their silk stockings and high heeled shoes and wore 
their shabbiest clothes (1965: 130).  Garrett also shows historical evidence that the qipao was 
tolerated in the PRC until 1965 (1994: 106).  It was not until the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) 
when the qipao and Western suits were labeled as belonging to the “four olds” (sijiu),34 and so 
that they were completely abandoned and in some cases destroyed (An and Jin 1999: 82; Steele 
and Major 1999: 59-60).  High profile cases included Wang Guangmei, wife of Chairman Liu 
Shaoqi, who was forced to dress in the qipao with a necklace of pingpong balls and was 
interrogated and ridiculed by the red guards during a class struggle session, which was recorded 
in photographs and video documentaries. 
Political campaigns such as the Cultural Revolution without a doubt had impoverished 
Chinese clothing styles.  However, the impoverishment, and to a great extent, the uniformity, 
was not primarily achieved by forceful means as scenes of frequent violence during this period 
would suggest (cf. Kunz 1996).  Wilson argues that the discursive power of the state-initiated 
discourse of “pusu” (frugality) and the creation of role models of both cadres and ordinary 
people (such as Lei Feng) who lived frugal lifestyles significantly contributed to setting up moral 
restraints against lavish dressing (1999: 170-174).  Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 2, the 
situation during this period was exacerbated by the shortage of fiber and fabrics, as well as 
China’s attempts to solve the shortage problem by creating large scale textile plants, which 
consequently resulted in greater “uniformity” in fabrics as those plants produced the same fabrics 
in large quantities and had no incentives or “directives” to diversify their products.  Thus, the 
                                                 
34 They include old thinking, old culture, old customs, and old behaviors.  
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politics, the economy, and the discursive power of the discourse of pusu all contributed to the 
paucity of clothing styles during the Maoist period.  Even so, that the Chinese all wore the Mao 
suit was not an accurate description of the Maoist era, and not even of the Cultural Revolution 
decade.   
The “Mao suit” known to the West was and is called the zhongshanzhuang in China, or 
more precisely the “Mao style zhongshanzhuang.”  This style was a reformed version of Sun 
Yat-sen’s.  In the early 1950s, the central government transferred a group of “hongbang 
caifeng,” the group of tailors who made Sun’s version of the suit, from Shanghai to Beijing and 
formed a plant called “Hongdu” (red capital) specifically for the purpose of making garments for 
top government officials (Wang 2003: 169).  The Mao suit was the work of these tailors.  The 
differences between the Mao style jackets and the Sun Yat-sen jackets were mainly in the collar 
and fabric: the former had wider and looser collars and used all sorts of cheaper materials 
available at the time (mainly cotton and synthetic materials), while the latter had smaller and 
tighter collars and were mostly made of wool (primarily imported then).  Differently put, the 
Mao jacket was a “proletarian” version of Sun’s zhongshanzhuang.  Mao’s status and charisma 
probably had a lot to do with the popularity of the style and the misnomer.   
Even though the Mao suit was very common among China’s civilian population and very 
similar to the military uniform,35 it was not a uniform for the civilians.  According to Verity 
Wilson, no dress regulations were promulgated during this period (1999: 174).  In addition to the 
Mao style zhongshanzhuang, qingnianzhuang (the youth style) and junbianzhuang (the casual 
military style) were also very popular during the 1960s.  Together the three styles were called the 
                                                 
35 The military uniform is also zhongshanzhuang in style, but includes the military paraphernalia, including the 
buttons, badges, hat, and belt.    
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laosanzhuang or the “three old styles,” and all of them bore great resemblance to Sun’s original 
version of zhongshanzhuang (An and Jin 1999: 82).  Common colors of clothing in this period 
included blue, grey, and black, which constituted the laosanse or the “three old colors” (ibid).  
Green also became very popular when the red guards appropriated the military styles during the 
Cultural Revolution.  Evidently, there was not a great variety of clothing styles and colors during 
the radical socialist period.  Yet, ordinary people were still able to express their personal tastes 
and choices in muted and nuanced ways, a point made by Verity Wilson that deserves to be 
quoted at length: 
It was one of the ways people were able to engage in banter in a state system 
where gossip could be synonymous with informing.  Dress concerns, of this sort 
at least, were seen as a relatively safe arena for exercising judgment, skill, and 
choice.  The placement of pockets, the stitching of a seam, the depth of a collar 
and the suitability of the buttons were all details to engage the discerning dresser.  
A personal touch could be instilled by striped gloves knitted from leftover pieces 
of wool, and hand-knitted jumpers themselves could be uniquely fashioned...Even 
Mao badges, those most ideologically correct accessories, could be collected, 
swapped, pinned at various angles and in varying formations (1999: 174). 
3.4.4 The Reform Period 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 
1978 is one of the epoch-marking events in contemporary China.  Although there was no regime 
change as in the previous three periods, the post-Mao Chinese state adopted a new policy called 
“duinei gaige, duiwai kaifang,” which means “domestically implement economic reforms” and 
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“open doors to the international communities.”  Subsequently, the state moved away from the 
political and ideological struggles of the Maoist era to a renewed focus on economic 
development,36 which also entailed learning from the developed West.  Chapter 2 illustrated how 
China’s economic reforms gradually led to a market-based economy through the example of the 
textile and clothing industries.  Here, I focus on what the reforms mean to what people wear.   
The CCP’s attempt to settle ideological debates and move onto economic development 
did not immediately translate into a situation of “anything goes” in terms of people’s clothing 
styles.  In the early 1980s, people were still rather conservative with regard to what they wore, 
partly because of the lingering effects of previous ideological struggles and the overall morality 
of “jianku pusu” (austerity and frugality), and partly because new clothing styles were not yet 
readily available.  One popular type of clothing that was unique to the 1980s was “chun qiu liang 
yong zhuang” (double-use spring and fall wear), which generally referred to jackets and shirts 
that could be worn in the two seasons of spring and fall.  The uniqueness of this type of clothing 
lay in its name and functionality rather than its stylistic characteristics, which suggested that an 
overall abundance of garments was yet to come.  As far as the early 1980s is concerned, the 
zhongshanzhuang and its various versions still ruled the scene.  Compared to the “conservative” 
general public, top Communist Party leaders were at the vanguard in their attire.  The return of 
Western suits was the result of personal promotion by party secretaries Hu Yaobang and Zhao 
Ziyang (successor of Hu).  On one occasion, Hu said,  
...Don’t neglect the reform in lifestyles.  Lifestyle has to change according to the 
changes in the means of production.  Social revolution is historically linked to and 
                                                 
36 Ideological debates and discourses did not go away entirely, and sometimes they even made strong comebacks.  
The repression of the 1989 Tian’anmen incident is a key example.  
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even frequently starts with the reform in lifestyles.  For example, Mr. Sun 
Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen) led the revolution and overthrew the Qing dynasty.  He 
abandoned the changpao and magua, and promoted the zhongshanzhuang, [and 
ordered] men to cut their queues...We have to adapt to the development of 
modernization, [we] should not be afraid to reform our lifestyles, and [we] should 
not be bound by backward stuff [he used the term dongxi, which included ideas, 
habits, etc.].  Take eating for example, in our old tradition, eight or ten people eat 
from the same plate.  Why can’t we share and eat from our own plate?  Take 
clothing for another instance, Western suits are convenient, why not promote 
them?  (Yearbook of Shanghai Clothing 1985: 1) 
The fact that the top party official had to come out and make such comments points to the 
powerful effect previous ideologies, which he referred to as the “backward stuff,” have had on 
people’s attire.  Paradoxically, to unshackle constraints of the previous ideologies, he had to use 
the same line of reasoning and emphasized that ideology was linked to what people wore, and 
hence he proposed that people’s clothing styles and lifestyles in general should change as they 
were integral parts of the nation’s reform agenda and modernization project.  Therefore, his 
comments sent the message that it was “politically correct” to wear fashionable clothing, and in 
effect he turned choices of clothing into principally practical and personal rather than ideological 
matters.   
Evidently Hu’s efforts (as well as other party officials’ efforts) have worked; the xifu or 
the xizhuang, general terms for all types of Western suits but most commonly for the tuxedo, 
have not only become the formal wear of government officials, but also a sought-after style for 
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the civilian population. 37   In fact, the overall trend toward formal styles, as represented 
particularly by Western suits, was so prevalent at the end of the 1980s that it was not uncommon 
to see migrant workers wearing Western suits or sport jackets as they worked on construction 
projects or performed other types of manual labor, which often became the laughingstock of the 
fashion-savvy urbanites.  One frequently ridiculed outfit of the migrant workers, who are from 
the countryside, is an ensemble of dark Western suits and white sneakers (the style sometimes 
worn by U.S. comedian Ellen DeGeneres), which is considered by the urbanites to be 
inappropriate at best, but more often “tu” or “tuqi,” or “ba” in Shanghai dialect.  “Tu” means 
earth, in this context, it is used as an adjective, meaning earthy, backwards, unfashionable, and 
that which is associated with the countryside and the peasants.  The opposite of “tu” is “yang” or 
“yangqi,” which means fashionable, modern, and that which pertains to the foreign and the West 
in particular.  Therefore, the two terms of “tu” and “yang” are not only descriptive of fashion 
styles, but also indicative of the level of one’s inner quality or “suzhi,” in this case, backward vs. 
modern, narrow-minded vs. open-minded, rural vs. urban, and finally low-suzhi vs. high-suzhi.  
Ironically, however, the Western suit as an imported style, which is supposed to be inherently 
modern and fashionable, when worn by migrant peasant workers turns into something 
unfashionable and backwards.  Even more ironic, when the same outfit (a Western suit and white 
sneakers) was worn by Andy Lau (Liu Dehua), a Hong Kong superstar, no one seemed to have 
described him as tu or low-suzhi.  Thus, what the Western suit means varies depending on whom 
the wearer is and the context in which it is worn.  Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Western 
suits have staged a major comeback in China since the late 1980s.   
                                                 
37 The military uniforms remain more or less the same; they still bear great resemblance to the zhongshanzhuang 
style.  
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Another major comeback in the reform period was the qipao.  However, it is generally 
acknowledged that the craze for the qipao in the late 1980s was short lived (Bao 1998; Finnane 
1996: 125). Since then, the qipao was commonly worn by hotel staff and other young women 
working in the service industry, but only worn by middle class women during formal occasions 
as a fashion item and/or a formal dress.  While Finnane thinks that the inconvenience of the 
qipao is to blame for its diminishing popularity as it is unsuited for the fast tempo of modern life 
(1996: 125), others believe that the qipao has been elevated to the status of the “national formal 
dress” (Bao 1998) and “a signifier of cultural identity” in mainland China (Clark 1999: 164).38  
As a matter of fact, many Chinese women today choose to wear the qipao for their weddings or 
the shooting of their wedding pictures (Constable 2006).  The qipao shops, some of which are 
rather upscale, are frequently seen at tourist spots in mainland China and Hong Kong.  As a 
cultural icon of China, the qipao has also been adopted by high fashion both within and outside 
China. 
In addition to the revival of Western suits and the qipao, new styles were slowly but 
surely catching on, initially through Hong Kong (and the influence of its popular movies) and the 
newly opened-up south and coastal areas.  Bell bottoms were popular for a few years and quickly 
gave way to jeans and skirts.  T-shirts also became popular, acquiring an interesting name of 
“wenhua shan” (cultural shirt), frequently carrying sometimes funny, nonsensical, or politically 
subversive messages (Barme 1999: 145-178).  More often than not, the messages were written in 
foreign languages, primarily English, but they frequently did not make any sense due to 
misspellings.  In this context, the form that appears to be “yang,” or foreign and modern, seems 
to matter more than the actual content and meaning of the message; a similar pattern has been 
                                                 
38 The qipao is considered as a “symbol of cultural identity” beyond mainland China, such as in Hong Kong, 
Singapore and other overseas Chinese communities; see Chua 2000, and Hong Kong Fashion History 1992. 
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observed by Nicole Constable in her study of Chinese bridal pictures that often bear English 
captions (Constable 2006).  In terms of clothing styles, jeans and T-shirts have marked a trend 
toward casual styles of clothing since the late 1980s, a trend that was also supported by an 
emerging interest in sports and outdoor activities (Brownell 1995).  Besides professional sports 
wear (such as international brands Nike, Adidas, Puma, and the domestic brand Lining), “casual” 
and sportswear also emerged in everyday life: tights and bikinis became acceptable and even 
popular;39  jumpers, jackets, and blazers all became good outwear; wool sweaters and down 
jackets turned into essential items for the winter.  While these trends continued, designer labels 
and imported brands started to pick up steam since the second half of the 1990s (Mr. Yuan’s 
clothing line described in Chapter 4 is an example), reflecting demands for new status markers 
and expression of individualistic tastes following increasing social stratification since the 
economic reforms took hold.  At the turn of the 21st century, China has witnessed a renewed 
interest in retro styles, culminating in the tangzhuang craze in 2001 and 2002, thanks to the 
world leaders who wore the style at the 2001 APEC held in Shanghai, which was widely covered 
by domestic and international media.  
Evidently, clothing styles in the Reform period have experienced tremendous 
diversification as compared to those in the Maoist era.  While this process continues to evolve 
today, a few major trends can be spotted.  First, formal wear, as represented by “zhiyezhuang” 
(office wear), a trend that has evolved from the popularity of Western suits (xizhuang) in the 
1980s, remains a major category of everyday wear today.  Second, casual and sports wear have 
become increasingly popular, even to the extent of becoming the dominant style among the 
                                                 
39 Susan Brownell has an interesting discussion of the bikinis debates in the mid 1980s, which shows how the style 
emerged and became accepted.  See Brownell 1995: 270-4.   
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younger population.  Third, designer labels and imported brands have started to flourish since the 
late 1990s, catering to specific needs of individuals and groups.  Last but not the least, various 
cultural or sub-cultural styles such as the grungy look and the punk look have become more 
common in China’s urban centers.   
From the evolution of major clothing styles in contemporary China outlined above, we 
can see that there are different characteristics in each of the four historical periods.  The reform 
period is particularly different from the other three periods in contemporary China as far as 
clothing styles are concerned: while clothing styles were more stable and more closely tied to 
political ideologies in the previous periods (with the exception of certain urban areas in the 
Republican era), they are much more changeable, diverse, and relatively independent from 
political and ideological control in the reform era (yet more subject to market influences).  If we 
apply Kawamura’s notion of “fashion” as defined by changeability to the Chinese context, then 
fashion has only emerged in China in the reform era (Kawamura 2005).  Not surprisingly, it is 
also in the reform period that Chinese fashion professionals such as fashion designers and 
models have emerged, which will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively.  However, the 
visible differences between the reform era (the present) and the three preceding periods (the past) 
are not to be glossed over as fashion vs. non-fashion, or modern clothing vs. traditional clothing.  
When referring to “traditional Chinese clothing” as well as modern clothing, Chinese fashion 
professionals have something particular in their minds, which is pertinent to the debates between 
the original fashion designers and dress historians on the tangzhuang introduced in the beginning 
of this chapter. 
Although disagreements abound between Chinese dress historians and fashion designers 
with regard to the name and the style of the tangzhuang, they share a common ground—both 
 77 
groups believe that the method of traditional Chinese clothing making or designing is 
conceptually different from the Western method.  The traditional Chinese method is called 
“pingmian caijian,” which literally means “flat cutting” or “two-dimensional cutting.”  By 
contrast, the Western method as perceived by the Chinese professionals and academics is called 
“liti caijian,” meaning “three-dimensional cutting.”  Clothes made in the traditional Chinese way 
are flat or two-dimensional and not fitted to the body, whereas clothes designed and made in the 
Western way are three-dimensional and tend to have a better fit.   
To put it differently, the two methods of garment making are defined by the different 
effects the finished garments give on the body, each involving a different set of design 
techniques.  As boasted by the original designers of the APEC jackets, the tangzhuang jackets 
are modern in part because Western design techniques such as “draping,” “darts” (sheng) and 
“set-in sleeves” (zhuangxiu) have been adopted.  During an interview, one of the original 
designers told me that the former Chinese president Jiang Zemin’s jacket was designed by using 
the technique of draping.  In the absence of Jiang, they had to find someone with similar stature 
and they attached padding onto his belly and then draped the fabric over him in order to cut it.  
This example shows that Western design techniques such as draping, darts, and set-in sleeves use 
fabrics to sculpt and/or to accentuate certain parts of the body.   
The traditional Chinese “flat cutting” method, by contrast, conceptualizes the body as a 
flat surface that does not require draping.  Similarly, the traditional Chinese method does not 
allow darts on the front and back panels of the garments, as they would create an uneven surface 
and/or accentuate certain parts of the body.  According to this method, the measurements of the 
girths of the body are translated into width, and the differences between the girths of the chest, 
the waist, and the hip are not subtly considered.  Consequently, the finished garment gives a flat 
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and frequently baggy look.  Moreover, the “set-in sleeves” (zhuangxiu) are not traditionally 
Chinese either, as they are cut and made separately and then sewn onto the bodice, giving the 
shoulders a more defined look (sometimes with the help of shoulder pads).  By contrast, the 
traditional Chinese style sleeves, or “lianxiu,” are cut as a part of the bodice, which gives the 
shoulder a natural slope and often a baggy look as well.  Therefore, the adoption of draping, 
darts, and set-in sleeves in the construction of the APEC jackets make them more fitted than they 
would if only traditional Chinese design techniques had been utilized.   
That much is agreed on by both Chinese fashion designers and dress historians.  Yet, 
their views diverge when it comes to the treatment of the specific design techniques.  The 
Chinese designers are eclectic in choosing their techniques to design garments that appear to be 
traditional, like those APEC tangzhuang jackets, which many characterize as traditional Chinese 
clothing.  In contrast, many Chinese scholars believe that the two sets of design techniques are 
fundamental to the divergence between traditional Chinese style and Western style clothing (e.g., 
Tang 2002; Zhang 2001: 110-111).  They insist that traditional Chinese style clothing has to be 
made with traditional Chinese flat cutting techniques, so much so that they argue that the 
tangzhuang jackets are “jia gudong” (fake antiques).  Some were particularly bothered by the 
contradiction that the name of the tangzhuang alluded to the Tang dynasty (618-907), but the 
style of the APEC jackets resembled more the magua style in the Qing dynasty than clothing 
styles in the Tang.   
While I believe that the dress historians’ argument has the merit of bringing to light the 
“invented tradition” of the tangzhuang, insisting on the fundamental differences between 
Western and traditional Chinese design techniques and clothing styles is equally problematic, 
because such insistence leads to an essentialization that is not warranted by history.  In fact, the 
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technique of darting was not used in Europe until somewhere between the 13th and 15th century 
(Zhang 2001: 60-2).  On the other hand, darts and other three-dimensional design techniques had 
already become part of the Chinese design repertoire when the Chinese “hongbang caifeng” 
emerged in the late Qing.  If borrowing of the three-dimensional design techniques by the 
Chinese creates “invented tradition,” then this invented tradition did not begin with the 
tangzhuang, but with the hongbang caifeng’s creation of the zhongshanzhuang (probably even 
earlier if we pursue further back in history).   
Interestingly, few if any Chinese dress historians have questioned the “Chineseness” or 
the authenticity of the zhongshanzhuang or the Mao suit because of the Western design 
techniques involved in their creation.  Therefore, classifying a clothing style as Chinese or 
Western, traditional or modern, is not simply a matter of technicality (i.e., the design techniques 
involved), it also has to do with the historical context in which the style is created and the way in 
which such history is written or narrated.  In the following section, I will further probe the issue 
of tradition and modernity as related to Chinese clothing by analyzing the official representations 
of the evolution of contemporary clothing styles in China.   
3.5 A TALE OF MODERNITY? 
From the changpao and magua in the Qing dynasty to the diverse styles today as illustrated 
above, clothing styles in China have evolved tremendously, not in the form of cyclical change 
studied by Kroeber, but more in the form of linear progression along with the transition of the 
four historical periods in contemporary China (though some styles crosscut different periods).  
The linear rather than cyclical association between clothing styles and time lends itself to an 
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objectification of time.  As it is shown below, the objectification of time is rendered most 
evidently in the Chinese official representations of the sartorial evolution in contemporary China.  
For that reason, the official representations of the evolution of contemporary Chinese clothing 
styles are also narratives about time.  As such, these narratives are at the same time “political 
acts” of ordering the past, the present, and the future (Fabian 1983: x).  Indeed, the political 
moral of progress and modernization through time are deeply implicated in numerous textbooks 
and other official accounts of the sartorial evolution in contemporary China.   
As a part of the “China Cultural Year” programs in Paris, which was sponsored by the 
Chinese Ministry of Culture and took place between October 2003 and July 2004, an exhibition 
of contemporary Chinese fashion was organized.  In conjunction with the exhibition, a book was 
published in both French and Chinese, entitled Costumes chinois: Modes depuis 100 ans 
(Chinese Costumes: Fashions of the Past 100 Years).  Yang Yuan, chief editor of the book, 
summarizes Chinese fashion in the past century in this way:   
In the 20th century, the spiritual look of the Chinese changed dramatically; 
clothing fashions were closely connected to the changes of political events, and 
every shift and innovation in clothing represented the mode of the time.  This is a 
century in which Chinese clothing went through (zouxiang) being traditional 
(chuantong) toward modernity (xiandai), and from being feudal (fengjian) toward 
openness (kaifang).  It is also the golden age for Chinese clothing fashions, 
numerous fashions rose and fell, much more diversely and swiftly than any other 
time in Chinese history (2003: 10).   
According to Yang, clothing is not just about one’s appearance or look, but it also reflects the 
“spiritual” outlook of the wearer.  It is on the spiritual level that the changes in contemporary 
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Chinese clothing tell a moral story: the Chinese (hence the nation) are changing from being 
traditional toward modernity, from being feudal toward openness (kaifang).  It is noteworthy that 
Yang did not use definitive past tense, instead he uses the term of “zouxiang,” which means 
“moving toward,” suggesting a progression through time and that the ultimate “modernity” and 
“openness” have yet to come.  Meanwhile, he also emphasizes that the current situation is very 
exciting and encouraging because “we” are in a “golden age,” better than ever before.  Therefore, 
Yang’s account tells a dark feudal past, a golden present, and a bright future, where modernity 
lies.  Clothing bears the witness, indeed becomes the objectification of such an ordering of time.  
Thus, Yang’s narrative of the evolution of contemporary Chinese clothing is also a story of 
progress and modernization.   
In a similar way but with a clear Marxist overtone, Wang Zhao writes in the preface to a 
college textbook on the history of contemporary Chinese clothing,40  
The development of contemporary clothing followed the reforms in lifestyles 
(shenghuo fangshi).  Historical developments and reforms of clothing all closely 
tied to the changes in lifestyles.  Modern clothing, in particular, develops and 
changes under the pre-condition of reforms in life [styles] and [means of] 
production.  Especially in the post-1990s, people’s lifestyles have changed 
greatly.  Advanced means of production (shengchan fangshi), rich and colorful 
life, led to newer, more scientific, and more hygienic ideas in people’s attire and 
appearance, and consequently, in the new century the people in our great 
                                                 
40 Textbooks of all levels are closely regulated by the government in China.  Unlike college textbooks in the United 
States, Chinese textbooks are generally much more “standardized” and are used nationally.  
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motherland are wearing [clothes that reflects] the spirit of our time, cultural taste, 
national fashion, and artistic aura (An and Jin 1999: 2). 
Evidently, Wang believes that clothing styles today are better than those in the past, which is 
consistent with Yang’s account.  But different from Yang, Wang explicitly attributes the 
progress in people’s attire to the advancement of the “means of production,” a Marxist concept, 
which is in synch with the Communist Party line as seen in Hu Yaobang’s speech discussed 
earlier in this chapter.  Given the fact that Wang’s words appeared in a textbook, which is closely 
censored by the state, his Marxist overtone (and euphoria) is not surprising.  A more important 
question is, as raised by both Yang’s and Wang’s accounts: Why does the evolution of 
contemporary Chinese clothing styles have to indicate progress and modernization?  
Furthermore, how are the representations of contemporary Chinese clothing related to the way in 
which contemporary Chinese history in general is written in China?   
As indicated in Chinese high school textbooks, contemporary Chinese history began 
when the first Opium War broke out in 1840,41 and this history is narrated as China’s continuous 
quest for modernity.42  As the Chinese history goes, the quest includes the Nationalist revolution 
led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, which overthrew the Qing dynasty but quickly fell into warlordism.  
Although Chiang Kai-shek, Sun’s successor, was able to maintain control of the Republic of 
China for some years, it was the Communists who finally put an end to China’s humiliating 
semi-colonial status and established a truly independent nation-state known as the People’s 
Republic of China in 1949.  According to official Chinese historiography, contemporary Chinese 
                                                 
41 The war ended with the loss of the Qing to the British, which marked the Qing’s transition into a semi-colonial 
status. 
42 This periodization follows the position of Chinese high school history textbooks.  But if modernity is to be 
equated with capitalism, then it could be dated back to the first emergence of capitalist sprouts in the Ming dynasty 
as Spence (1990) suggests.  
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history is a continuous story of progress, modernization, and liberation, and the chaos of the 
Republican period and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) are but the trials and errors in the due 
process.  My discussion of official Chinese historiography here is not to contest its historical 
accuracy, although it apparently adds certain logic to history and makes historical transitions 
appear smooth and inevitable.  Instead, I want to draw attention to the coevalness of 
contemporary Chinese history, the history of contemporary Chinese clothing, and the rise of the 
Chinese nation-state.  Benedict Anderson (1983) has taught us that nation-states such as the PRC 
are but “imagined communities.”  Following Anderson, I think that the history of the 
establishment of Chinese nation-state is a historical construction and a dominant historiography 
that permeates all Chinese official historical narratives.  Given the power of this dominant 
historiography and simultaneously experiencing the broad processes of nation-making, it is hard 
for Chinese such as Yang and Wang not to fit the story of sartorial evolution during this period 
right into the meta-narrative of modernization and liberation of the Chinese nation.   
What, then, do the official representations of contemporary Chinese clothing and the 
dominant Chinese historiography in general tell us about Chinese modernity?  The 
modernization narratives do not give a clear answer; they only suggest that Chinese 
modernization is a continuous process.  But if “modernity” is not here and now, then where and 
what is it?  In a study of Chinese modernity, Lisa Rofel treats modernity as “a located cultural 
imaginary, arising from and perpetuating relations of difference across an East-West divide” 
(1999: xii).  As such, she thinks Chinese modernity is “a story people [the Chinese] tell 
themselves about themselves in relation to others [the West]” (1999:130).  Thus the question 
becomes: Is the West of the present, real and/or imagined, what the Chinese believe to be their 
future modernity?  The answer to the question requires some elaboration. 
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As the socialist PRC subscribes to Marxism, the Marxist teleology that places socialism 
and communism in a more advanced stage than the European capitalist societies seems to be a 
tempting point to locate the socialist version of modernity.  Scholars have noted that radical 
socialist China fought for modernity by claiming an ideological high ground: “modern Marxism” 
(Rofel 1999: 25).  It is true that the Chinese leaders had and still claim to have aspirations to 
reach the communist utopia one day, but the economic reality never convinced the Chinese, 
including the national leaders themselves that they were actually more advanced than the 
capitalist West, an illusion that was broken along with the failed Great Leap Forward campaign 
in 1958, which exacerbated, if not induced, the severe famines that killed millions of people in 
the following three years.  It is perhaps surprising that it was Premier Zhou Enlai and Chairman 
Mao who first put forward the economically-oriented goal of “Four Modernizations” in various 
versions in the 1950s and the 1960s.  The final version, as we know it today, of “agricultural 
modernization, industrial modernization, modernization of science and technology, and 
modernization of national defense,” first appeared in Zhou’s “Government Working Report” in 
December 1964 (Cao 2006).  The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in 1978 
simply restated the “Four Modernizations” as the national goal to be reached through economic 
reforms.  This suggests that even in the radical socialist period, the Chinese leaders recognized 
that China was still not modern and needed to be “modernized,” at least in materialist and 
economic terms.  A predicament arose immediately for the Communist Party leaders: How could 
a nation be ideologically more advanced while at the same time more backward economically 
than the capitalist West?  Isn’t it the Marxist dictate that the ideological superstructure is 
determined by the economic base?  In the apparently paradoxical situation, how can China define 
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its modernity in relation to the Western others?  If we consider modernity to be the self’s sense 
of the present, does China have to gain that sense by comparing itself to the West? 
The Chinese party-state’s solution to the dilemma is to emphasize modernization as a 
process, rather than to focus on modernity as a sort of fixed condition, and to do so, the 
Communist Party and the state constantly refer back to the progress that China has made.  The 
paramount example of such a practice is the state’s “three-step” blueprints to realize 
modernization, 43  with each step referring back to the previous step, using such phrases as 
“doubling the GDP” of the previous period.  According to this blueprint, the Chinese 
“modernity” locates in the future, but is built on previous and current modernizing efforts.  Like 
the narratives of the evolution of Chinese clothing, the discourse of modernization constructs the 
past, present, and future as a continuous progress.  Hence, the discourse of modernization 
provides a particular logic of time, in the same fashion that the official Chinese historiography 
orders time.  In this logic, modernity becomes a trope, or to borrow Rofel’s phrase (and 
Geertz’s), a story that Chinese people tell themselves about themselves.  The moral of this story 
is two-fold: On the one hand, if we desire the future, the better, and the modern, then we have to 
work hard towards it; and on the other hand, we should be encouraged by the fact that we have 
achieved a lot when compared to our situations in the past.  Therefore, Chinese modernity is a 
story that Chinese people tell themselves about themselves in relation to their own past, rather 
than in relation to others.   
                                                 
43 The “three steps” plan has been modified repeatedly by each party congress; however, overall consistence with 
respect to progress has been maintained in those various versions.  
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3.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter reviewed the dramatic changes of clothing styles in contemporary China.  These 
changes did not take place in the form of fashion cycles as Kroeber predicted; instead, they 
appeared to be in a linear progression, shifting along with the changes in the broad social and 
political environments.  The linear correlation between clothing styles and politics through time 
paves the ground for official representations of the evolution of contemporary Chinese clothing 
styles as a story of progress and modernization.  Consequently, the official narratives of the 
evolution of Chinese clothing create a structure of time, much in the same way as the broad 
discourse of modernization and the official historiography of contemporary China do.  In this 
structure of time, the past, the present, and the future are not in breaks or ruptures, but are related 
to each other and all serve the purpose of progress.  In this sense, the changes of clothing styles 
are rendered meaningful as an objectification and ordering of time, and yield insights about a 
uniquely Chinese notion of modernity.   
Countering previous studies of modernity, which either locate modernity in the West and 
portray the “rest” as “people without history” (Wolf 1982) or people stuck in time (Fabian 1983), 
or assert an insurmountable distance between the West and the rest and thus the West is always 
ahead and the divide perpetuates (Rofel 1999), I argue that the Chinese modernity is a story 
people tell themselves about themselves in relation to their own past, rather than the Western 
other.  This by no means suggests that the Chinese are oblivious of the influence of the West; in 
fact, Chinese designers and dress historians are very conscious of the West as they openly 
acknowledge influences of Western design techniques and clothing styles.  What this Chinese 
notion of modernity indicates is that such Western influences only become meaningful when 
they become “Chinese,” especially in relation to China’s past.  In this way, “local” meanings are 
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mapped onto clothing styles, and hence changes in China’s clothing industry are not just 
economic developments as outlined in Chapter 2, but also involve social and cultural meanings 
that require cultural interpretation.   
This chapter argues that one key meaning that the Chinese have mapped onto clothing 
styles in contemporary China is a Chinese notion of modernity.  In the Chinese notion of 
modernity, history is “one of the most important signs” (Dirks 1990).  The history of modern 
China as well as the history of contemporary Chinese clothing is simultaneously the rise of the 
Chinese nation-state.  As illustrated by the official narratives of the evolution of contemporary 
Chinese clothing, the Chinese state is the single most important agent in fashioning the 
historiography of modern China.  Therefore, this Chinese notion of modernity is intrinsically 
linked to the state.   
To attest to the power of the notion of Chinese modernity as related to and in harmony 
with history and tradition, the “tangzhuang” was very popular in China in 2001 and 2002 and the 
name became a household term, despite the fact that it was openly criticized by Chinese scholars 
as “fake antiques.”   
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4.0  FOR THE SAKE OF ART OR FOR THE MARKET?  THE CULTURAL 
ECONOMY OF FASHION DESIGN 
Being good in business is the most fascinating kind of art.  Making money is art 
and working is art and good business is the best art. – Andy Warhol  
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
On April 10, 2005, world renowned artist Mr. Chen Yifei passed away at the age of 59 in 
Shanghai.  Following his untimely death, heated debates surged between his critics and admirers 
with regard to his contribution to Chinese art.  Comments about Chen, which were often charged 
with emotions, quickly flooded China’s newspapers and websites.  Admirers acknowledged 
Chen as one of China’s greatest artists, whereas critics believed that he had “sold out” to 
commercial interests and was not at all a first rate artist.  As a matter of fact, Mr. Chen was one 
of the most sought-after modern Chinese artists; thirty three of his paintings were reportedly sold 
internationally at a total price of over 40 million yuan (about $4.8 million) between 1991 and 
1998.  It is also a fact that Mr. Chen was the founder and owner of Yifei Group, through which 
he applied his aesthetic vision to businesses in fashion, modeling, publishing, environmental arts 
and design, and film making, which he called collectively the “pan-vision industry” (dashijue 
chanye).  The debate surrounding Mr. Chen suggests that while for many Chinese the mixing of 
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art and commercial interests is a contested terrain that should be avoided, for others, like Mr. 
Chen, the logic of art and economy are intrinsic to a cultural industry.   
As I argued in Chapter 3, social and cultural meanings are mapped onto clothing styles in 
China.  Many fashion designers I interviewed see fashion as a cultural industry, in the sense that 
they think of fashion as not just a business, but a business that involves culture.  Hence, they are 
largely in agreement with Mr. Chen that the fashion business involves both economic and 
cultural (specifically here artistic) logics.   
The critics of Mr. Chen can find support in Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory and argue that 
art and economy are two separate and autonomous fields that are structured by fundamentally 
opposite principles or “laws.”  The field of art functions, according to Bourdieu (1993), as “the 
economic world reversed,” in the sense that its internal logic is the “refusal” or “disavowal” of 
commercial interests.  From this perspective, by pursuing an interest in business, Mr. Chen lost 
his “disinterestedness” and “violated” the logic of the field of art, and hence compromised the 
purity of his art.   
The intention of this chapter is not to examine the degree of Mr. Chen’s 
“disinterestedness” toward his art; instead I focus on his particular interest in combining the logic 
of art and economy in the other “field” in which he was actively involved, namely, the fashion 
industry.  I attempt to address the question of why Mr. Chen and other Chinese fashion designers 
try to combine in their work the logic of art and economy that appear to be opposite and 
irreconcilable.  In what follows, I will examine the views and approaches of Chinese fashion 
designers toward their work, particularly through the cases of two prominent fashion designers 
and their businesses.  I seek to understand the rationale behind the choices and strategies of 
Chinese fashion designers to cross the perceived “boundary” of the field of fashion as well as the 
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implications of their acts of combining the logic of art and economy both for the field of the 
Chinese fashion industry and the global fashion industry.  In so doing, I attempt to provide an 
understanding of what it means to be a fashion designer in China.  Given the initial 
conceptualization of the Chinese fashion industry as a field, some explanation of the field is in 
order.  
4.2 FASHION AS A FIELD  
Bourdieu (1993) uses the concept of “field” mainly to study literature and art, which he broadly 
calls the field of cultural production.  According to Randal Johnson, the editor of Bourdieu’s 
volume, a “field” is defined as “a structured space with its own laws of functioning and its own 
relations of force independent of those of politics and the economy, except, obviously, in the 
case of the economic and political fields” (Johnson 1993: 6).  By structure of the field, Bourdieu 
refers to the hierarchical distribution of positions that the agents or players of the field occupy 
(hence the structure of the field positions) and the different sets of strategies employed by the 
agents to improve their standing in the field (or the structure of position-takings).  To define 
literature and art as a field, or more specifically as a field of positions and position-takings, 
Bourdieu intends to escape the dilemma of what he calls “the internal reading” and “the external 
analysis” of a literary or artistic work (Bourdieu 1993: 34).  The former seeks explanations of the 
work in itself or within the system of works to which it belongs, thus it isolates the work from 
the social and historical context in which it is produced.  To Bourdieu, this approach is 
ahistorical and asocial.  On the other hand, the latter focuses on “the social conditions of the 
production of the producers [here writers or artists] and consumers [readers or patrons],” and 
 91 
explains the act of the producers and their work as meeting the demand of the consumers and 
patrons, who are generally the dominant class or its factions (Ibid).  According to the external 
analysis, the work is somehow taken as a reflection of the worldview of the social group at which 
the producer targets and of which he or she tends to be a member.  To Bourdieu, the external 
approach is reductive.  With a field analysis, the limitations of both approaches are avoided, 
because Bourdieu thinks a (literary or artistic) work is a work not only because of its position or 
the position of the producer in the field (e.g., a novel is a novel because it is written by a 
novelist), but also because of the inherent position-taking by the producer in competition with 
other producers.  Differently put, a work, and by extension, the field, is also defined by and 
objectified through the struggle between the different positions and position-takings in the field, 
specifically between those of the orthodox and the heresy, the established figure and the new-
comer, or the elite and the popular.   
To conceptualize the fashion industry as a field and to understand its internal workings, 
we have to first identify the different positions of the agents or players in the field as well as their 
different approaches to their position-takings.  Since the question on hand only has to do with 
Chinese fashion designers, other players in the field such as models and the media are not 
discussed in this chapter; instead they will be examined in the next chapter.  In this chapter, I 
only focus on the positions and position-takings of the Chinese fashion designers, which are 
directly connected to their objectives in their work. 
Artistic originality and commercial success are both desirable objectives of a fashion 
designer.  Even though closely related, the two objectives are distinct from each other; success in 
one does not necessarily translate into success in the other.  In fact, as Bourdieu puts it, the two 
objectives work in opposite directions—pursuing artistic originality entails exclusivity and 
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“restricted production,” while pursuing profit maximization involves “large-scale production” 
(1993: 53).  According to Bourdieu, “restricted production” and “large-scale production” are two 
distinctive modes of production that constitute two sub-fields of cultural production.  As Randal 
Johnson puts it,  
The field of restricted production concerns what we normally think of as ‘high’ 
art, for example ‘classical’ music, the plastic arts, so-called ‘serious’ literature.  In 
this sub-field, the stakes of competition between agents are largely symbolic, 
involving prestige, consecration and artistic celebrity…The field of large-scale 
production involves what we sometimes refer to as ‘mass’ or ‘popular’ culture: 
private owned television, most cinematic productions, radio, mass-produced 
literature.  Sustained by a large and complex culture industry, its dominant 
principle of hierarchization involves economic capital or ‘the bottom line’ (1993: 
15-16).  
Differently put, the distinction between the two objectives of artistic originality and commercial 
success parallels two inherent and divergent processes pertaining to art and commodity, which 
Igor Kopytoff describes as “singularization” and “commoditization” (1986).  While the process 
of “singularization” works to preserve the uniqueness of art items and resist market exchange, 
the “commoditization” process pushes objects into the market for exchange (ibid).  Therefore, 
designing for the sake of art (yishu) or for the market (shichang) is a choice a fashion designer 
has to make.  Between the two ends of art and the market, three different approaches have been 
theorized, which result in three business models, or as some scholars put it, three “fashion 
systems,” including “haute couture,” “prêt-à-porter,” and “fast fashion” (Reinach 2005).  
Designers of “haute couture,” or high fashion, or in Chinese, gaoji shizhuang, emphasize 
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originality, exclusivity, and luxury.  They want the clothes they design to be treated as art and 
themselves artists.  On almost the opposite end, designers of “fast fashion,” or low-end mass-
produced ready-to-wear clothing, do not care much about the artistic value of their designs, 
instead they are most concerned about the cost and speed of turnover that would directly impact 
their financial results.  Designers in this group are frequently accused by others as “imitators” or 
“counterfeiters” who simply copy very quickly whatever sells well on the market (Reinach 
2005).  Between haute couture and fast fashion, there is “prêt-à-porter,” or in Chinese, gaoji 
chengyi, meaning high quality ready-to-wear clothing, which claims to embrace both originality 
and marketability.   
The three types of fashions of haute couture, prêt-à-porter, and fast fashion are 
hierarchically ordered according to their level of originality (as well as price).  While haute 
couture and prêt-à-porter are generally regarded as creative, original, upscale, and expensive, 
“fast fashions” are frequently looked down upon as unoriginal, low quality, cheap, and unethical 
replications or knockoffs of the former two.  Hence, the three types of fashions constitute the 
“structured positions” in the field of fashion.  Moreover, in the globalized world of fashion 
today, the structure of fashion often extends beyond the confines of nation-states.  In other 
words, the structure of the fashion field is not limited to the fashion industry of a particular 
country, but it is also global.  As stereotypes have it, Paris is the capital of haute couture in the 
world, and Italy is identified with its high quality prêt-à-porter, and in this order, “China, by 
definition, is fast fashion,” even while no proper term for the concept of “fast fashion” exists in 
Chinese (Reinach 2005: 11).   
The stereotypical characterization of China as a fast fashion system essentially 
caricatures a China that is flooded by a sea of unoriginal, cheap knockoffs and counterfeits of 
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Western fashions.  By extension, Chinese fashion designers are assumed to be “copycats” of 
their Western colleagues.  According to this essentialist view, the Chinese field of fashion is 
filled with only one type of “position,” and Chinese designers’ strategies in their “position-
takings” always favor marketability over artistic originality.  However, my research on Chinese 
fashion designers and fashion companies finds that such a simplistic and essentialist 
characterization does not do justice to Chinese fashion designers and the Chinese fashion 
systems.  On the contrary, my field research indicates that the reality is much more complicated 
for Chinese fashion designers, who are much more sophisticated in their approaches to fashion 
design than being mere “copycats.”  As a group, they hold diverse views and methods rather than 
a uniform approach to their work and business, to which I now turn.   
4.3 DIVERSE VIEWS AMONG CHINESE FASHION DESIGNERS 
During my field research, I had the opportunity to interview about eighty Chinese fashion 
designers, and over twenty of them more than once. 44   Among them, many are seasoned 
designers, some have even attained the status of “celebrity designers,” but more than half of 
them are junior designers who have just started their careers or have only a few years of 
experience in the trade.  Prior to each scheduled interview, I would design an interview guide, 
which included some general questions I had for all designers and some specific questions that I 
came up with after doing some preliminary research about the designer to be interviewed through 
newspapers, the internet, other publications, and/or other designers or friends.  One of the 
                                                 
44 I met and talked to a greater number of designers in different venues (including fashion shows and trade fairs), but 
I consider an interview here in a more formal sense that it is scheduled ahead of time either by me or through a 
friend of mine, and that I have designed an interview guide prior to the interview.   
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general questions I asked was how they dealt with the problem of designing for the sake of art or 
for the market.  Surprisingly, they expressed conflicting views in their answers.  It was 
particularly interesting to me that Ms. Ye and Mr. Yuan (pseudonyms), who are among China’s 
most prominent designers, had rather contradictory views.    
To answer my question, Ms. Ye said, “art leads design, and design in turn leads life” 
(yishu yingdao sheji, sheji yingdao shenghuo).  Ms. Ye further explained to me that fashion 
design should be the artistic expression of the designer’s originality, taste, and unique style, and 
that without art there would be no identity, no life, and no future to a fashion design.  Clearly, 
Ms. Ye thought that fashion design should be for the sake of art.  Contrary to Ms. Ye’s view, Mr. 
Yuan thought that “a designer should only dream others’ dreams rather than his or her own” 
(shejishi yigai fa bieren de meng, er bushi ziji de meng).  He considered designers’ originality 
only secondary to serving the interest of their bosses and consumers.  When pressed as to why 
the designers should not dream their own dreams, Mr. Yuan said that if the designer cared only 
about his or her individuality and creativity, he or she would lose sight of the market and 
subsequently his or her design would not be accepted by the market.  Evidently, Mr. Yuan 
believed that fashion design should be for the sake of the market, which directly opposes Ms. 
Ye’s view.   
Ms. Ye’s and Mr. Yuan’s firm but opposing views were especially interesting, not only 
because they were different from many younger designers I interviewed who took the middle 
road and claimed that both originality and marketability were important to their designs (though 
there were also supporters of either Ms. Ye’s or Mr. Yuan’s views), but also because their 
divergent views suggest multiple “positions” and “position-takings” in the field of Chinese 
fashion, which contradict the stereotypical view of Chinese designers as unoriginal “copycats” 
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and Chinese fashion as a fast fashion system.   By highlighting Ms. Ye’s and Mr. Yuan’s views 
here, I do not suggest that their views are more or less representative of all Chinese fashion 
designers—I would need a random and representative sample to make that type of claim.  
However, the prominence and influence of both designers does add extra weight to their views 
and approaches.  To put their prominence in context, I have to briefly outline the history in 
which fashion designers emerged as prestigious professionals in China.   
4.4 THE EMERGENCE OF FASHION DESIGN AS A PRESTIGIOUS PROFESSION 
IN CHINA 
As described in Chapters 2 and 3, China’s textile industry did not develop to the extent that it 
could provide the necessary input to support a fast changing fashion industry from the late Qing 
to the radical socialist period of the PRC (1949-1976).  The political and moral environment 
during those periods (with the exception of the turbulent Republican era) also prohibited people 
from dressing freely.  It was not until the post-1978 reform period when China’s fashion industry 
began to develop.  During this period, a few factors have set the stage for the development of the 
fashion industry.  First, the state-initiated economic reforms encouraged market fragmentation 
and competition, which called for the creativity of fashion designers.  Second, the Communist 
Party leaders encouraged the diversification of styles and redefined the ideological dimension of 
clothing to serve the interest of the country’s economic developments.  And finally, the 
economic reforms opened China up to influences of international fashions and fashion industries.  
All these factors have been discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.  In what follows, I will only outline 
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the milestones in the processes of institutionalization of the profession of fashion design in 
China.   
In 1980, Central Institute of Arts and Crafts (CIAC has since 1999 merged with Qinghua 
University) started the very first college program in fashion design in China.  In 1984 both CIAC 
in Beijing and Donghua University in Shanghai established departments of fashion design.  Since 
then, the numbers of college and university programs in fashion have increased dramatically.  
According to Professor Jia Jingsheng, there was an incomplete estimate of 720 colleges and 
universities, not including private professional schools, that offer training in fashion design 
(China Fashion Weekly 09/19/2003).  The development in education and training in fashion 
design has produced a large number of professionally trained fashion designers by the 1990s.  In 
1993, China Fashion Association (CFA) was founded in Beijing, as a branch organization of 
China National Textile Industry Council, with an initial membership of only 64 people, among 
whom less than 10 were actual fashion designers and the rest were officials and college 
professors.  In 1997, CFA started to organize the first China Fashion Week, the most important 
annual fashion event in China, during which the “China Top Ten Fashion Designers Award” 
(shijia shejishi) and the most prestigious “Golden Top” award (jinding jiang) are awarded to 
accomplished designers.  In 2002, CFA had a selected member of over eleven hundred designers 
(CFA’s official website). By then, the profession of fashion design has been firmly established 
and institutionalized.   
Although so far I have only described the structural forces that gave rise to Chinese 
fashion designers and the broad processes in which the profession became institutionalized, I 
have to add that the efforts of individual fashion designers have also contributed enormously to 
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defining both their own identities and the identity of their profession.  Ms. Ye and Mr. Yuan are 
cases in point.  
As college graduates of fashion design in the mid 1980s, Ms. Ye and Mr. Yuan belong to 
China’s first generation of professionally trained fashion designers.  As such, their 
accomplishments as successful designers also shape the development of the profession of fashion 
design in China.  One particular event in Ms. Ye’s and Mr. Yuan’s career not only made them 
well-known fashion designers, but also elevated the status of their profession in general.   
In 1996, one of China’s largest fashion corporations advertised in national newspapers to 
hire fashion designers with an annual salary of one million yuan (about US$121,000 at the time).  
Ms. Ye and Mr. Yuan were among the few candidates considered for the positions.  To put it in 
perspective, the one million yuan job ad came out at a time when most Chinese people were 
making about ten thousand yuan or less a year.  Not surprisingly, everything associated with the 
news caught a tremendous amount of public imagination as well as scrutiny.  I was a junior in 
college at that time, and I first heard of the news from a radio talk show in Wuhan that solicited 
debates among the audience as to whether a fashion designer could be worth one million yuan.  
Although I do not remember the exact arguments of both sides, I vividly remember that the “side 
against” used the familiar and somewhat demeaning term of “caifeng” (tailor) to label the 
candidates, by contrast the “side in favor” used the new term of “shizhuang shejishi” (fashion 
designer).  The different terminologies turn out to be rather significant to an understanding of the 
rise of Chinese fashion designers.   
Although the terms of “caifeng” and “shizhuang shejishi” both refer to specialists in 
garment making, “caifeng” is the familiar term prior to the industrialization of China’s garment 
industry, and it specifically refers to craftsmen (gongjiang) who learn their skills of making 
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clothes through apprenticeship with a master, and they make clothes on a small scale.  
Furthermore, the caifeng were officially ranked below the intellectuals (shi) and the farmers 
(nong) in the traditional Chinese status hierarchy.  On the other hand, shizhuang shejishi or 
fashion designers only emerged since the economic reforms, and generally received their training 
in college or post-secondary professional schools.  Consequently, Chinese fashion designers’ 
status is aligned with the intellectuals by the merit of their education even within the frame of 
traditional status hierarchy.  Another major distinction between the two is that innovation is not 
required of the caifeng (the quality was perhaps not even appreciated by previous social customs 
or ideologies that in general valued convention), while fashion designers are expected to be able 
to come up with innovative designs.  As garments were increasingly manufactured in factories 
after the 1980s, the caifeng or tailors were gradually replaced by garment workers and fashion 
designers, maintaining only a marginal presence in China today.  However, “shizhuang shejishi” 
was still a new term as well as a new profession when the one-million-yuan hire took place in 
1996.  For many people, myself included, it was the first time that “shizhuang shejishi” 
registered in their mind (and mine) as a prestigious profession, and one that could demand big 
money.  In the midst of all the media hype, Mr. Yuan and another designer took the jobs, while 
Ms. Ye declined the offer.  
The media sensation of “million-yuan designers” not only brought the profession of 
fashion design to the public consciousness,45 it also caught the attention of the media.  Increasing 
media coverage has since been devoted to fashion events, such as fashion shows, fashion fairs, 
and design and/or modeling competitions, subsequently contributing to the elevation of the status 
                                                 
45 After the success of this corporation, several Chinese fashion companies followed suit and launched their own 
publically advertised hire of “million- yuan designers.” 
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of fashion designers.  In fact, nationally famous designers are not only regarded as artists, but 
also celebrities, thanks in part to frequent media coverage.  That said, only a handful of Chinese 
designers can be called “celebrity designers,” and most others generally have a much more 
difficult time working their way up.  Ms. Ye and Mr. Yuan are among the lucky few who have 
attained the status of “celebrated Chinese fashion designers” over the years.  Such an attainment 
is not just due to their involvement in the media sensation of the “one-million- yuan hire” in 
1996, but also because of their education, long experience of working as designer or chief 
designer in several fashion companies, high profile visits to Paris and other world fashion 
centers, influential fashion shows, and above all the numerous titles and prestigious awards they 
have won.  To top it off, Ms. Ye won the “Golden Top Award” (jinding jiang) in 2001, the 
highest honor awarded by the China Fashion Association, and both Ms. Ye and Mr. Yuan won 
CFA’s “Top Ten Fashion Designers Award” (shijia shijishi) in 1995, the first time such awards 
appeared in China.  Currently, Ms. Ye is a professor at a fashion design institute, the owner of a 
design studio located in Beijing, and she also serves as Vice President of the CFA.  Mr. Yuan is 
Chairman and Artistic Director of a fashion company based in Shanghai, and a member of the 
Fashion Art Committee at the CFA.  In addition, he is also Guest Professor at several academic 
institutions.   
The successes of Ms. Ye and Mr. Yuan are not simply personal accomplishments, they 
are also models for younger designers and designers-to-be to emulate.  To borrow Bourdieu’s 
terms, their paths to success are the “trajectories” through which they establish their “positions” 
within the field of fashion.  Given the emergent nature of the fashion field in China, their 
“strategies” and approaches to their position-takings are particularly meaningful by providing 
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prominent examples and references.  It is in this sense that their views are more than personal 
views, and their business models are more than individual cases, as discussed below.      
4.5 MS. YE AND MR. YUAN 
I met Ms. Ye in a hotel lobby when she was on a business trip to Shanghai.  I made the 
appointment for an interview with her days earlier, and we decided the best time was in the 
afternoon when she would have some time between her other meetings, during which we could 
meet and talk in her hotel lobby over coffee.  When the day came, I called her cell phone in the 
morning and confirmed the time and place of our meeting.  Given our two previous failed 
attempts to meet on other occasions and in other cities, I considered this arrangement a perfect 
success, so I arrived before the scheduled time of our interview at the Galaxy Hotel where she 
stayed.  Although I had not met Ms. Ye before, I recognized her immediately when two middle-
aged women walked toward the open coffee bar in the hotel lobby.  Compared to her image on 
various websites, she dressed more on the conservative side.  She was in black: black shoes, 
black pants, a basic black shirt, and on top of it a black light cashmere cardigan.  Her assistant 
came along in case she was late for her next appointment.  We sat down at a table, ordered some 
drinks, and our interview started right away.   
Ms. Ye spoke about the Chinese fashion industry and fashion designers with enthusiasm.  
She was proud of the boom China is witnessing (see Chapter 2), she was also proud that Chinese 
fashion designers are catching up so quickly with Western designers, and she was optimistic 
about the future of China’s fashion industry.  After seeing and indeed being a part of such 
tremendous growth of the industry in the past two decades, she had good reasons to be proud and 
 102 
optimistic.  Yet, her pride was also tinged with nationalist sentiments, and her optimism was 
mixed with a sense of responsibility as a prominent fashion designer.  In her brief narration of 
the development of China’s fashion industry, she conveyed a very clear message: We Chinese 
did it with regard to garment manufacturing, and we Chinese fashion designers can also make it 
with our Chinese fashion designs in the world of fashions.  Curious about what she meant by 
“Chinese fashion designs,” I asked her how she interpreted the “Chinese-ness” in her own 
designs.  She said that she heavily utilized Chinese materials (such as silk), motifs (ethnic 
patterns and prints), and artistic genres in her designs.  She used three terms to describe the 
characteristics of Chinese artistic genre, of which she saw her own design as a part, “piaoyi” 
(flowing and graceful), “jianjie” (of simplicity), and “hanxu” (modest or reticent).  Those three 
terms generally pertain to the Chinese sense of beauty and are frequently used to describe 
traditional Chinese paintings or art forms.   
After over an hour long interview—way over her initial estimate of half an hour, and 
ignoring her assistant’s reminders of her next meeting—I came to understand why Ms. Ye said 
“art leads design, and design in turn leads life” in response to my question about her views on 
fashion design.   She tied her design philosophy to the broad environment of the Chinese 
economy and the historical responsibilities of Chinese designers that she saw in the grand 
mission of the revival of the Chinese nation.  Her argument boiled down to this: China has 
already become a powerhouse in garment manufacturing, which is an extraordinary achievement 
for the nation, and China will also become a world fashion leader, but in order to achieve this 
goal, Chinese fashion designers have to find their own identities, which is not possible without 
“art” (to her, the Chinese art), i.e., their own unique and innovative designs.  Ms. Ye’s view 
builds in part on an optimistic reading of the Chinese fashion industry and the overall Chinese 
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economy, a sentiment shared by many Chinese citizens who have benefited from China’s recent 
economic boom, fashion designers included.  However, there are also Chinese fashion designers 
whose views are much less optimistic, and Mr. Yuan is one of them.   
My interview with Mr. Yuan was easier than the one with Ms. Ye in terms of scheduling.  
It turned out that Mr. Yuan’s company was only half an hour away by taxi from the apartment I 
rented in Shanghai.  I called him up one day and he agreed to my request for an interview in his 
office the next afternoon.  Our interview was interrupted a few times and subsequently lasted 
several hours because Mr. Yuan had to meet with three groups of visitors.  But while I was 
waiting, he showed me a book he wrote on fashion and his design portfolios, which included 
many creative designs and interesting ideas inspired by Peking opera that he was working on for 
a fashion show in the next season for a different company, and I also took the opportunity to see 
his showroom.  Although the interview took place in his office, it was very relaxed, less 
structured, but friendly.  He accepted my presence with ease while he welcomed his visitors.  His 
office was very spacious, more like an artist’s studio than an executive’s office; all walls were 
fully decorated with paintings and Chinese calligraphy, brushes of different sizes took up much 
of the space on his huge desk.  In one corner of the room, there was a reception area surrounded 
by comfortable sofas and chairs, where our interview and the reception of other visitors took 
place.  Mr. Yuan’s attire fitted very well with the friendly, laidback atmosphere of his office.  He 
wore a velvet blazer over a low-rise turtleneck wool sweater, khaki pants, and leather shoes, all 
of which were in different shades of brown, nicely layered and subtly complementing each other.  
His attire and color scheme reminded me of pleasant outings to Shanghai suburbs in the warm 
sunshine of the early fall.   
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Despite the interruptions, Mr. Yuan had ample time to fully explicate his position that 
fashion designers can only “dream others’ dreams.”  He viewed fashion as a business in which a 
designer had to put the consideration for the market ahead of his or her own aspirations for 
artistic expression.  The importance of the market seems to be an evident point that many other 
Chinese designers have frequently related to me during my field research.  Not totally satisfied 
with Mr. Yuan’s answer, I asked him what he thought of the Chinese fashion market and why he 
believed that it would clash with the designers’ own “dreams.”  The Chinese fashion market, 
according to Mr. Yuan, has “Chinese characteristics,” a twist on a popular Chinese political 
slogan, “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”  Much like a politician, Mr. Yuan related to me 
that China was still a poor country with the bulk of the huge population living in the countryside, 
and that these “characteristics” meant that most Chinese could not keep up with the latest 
fashions.  Mr. Yuan’s deterministic logic is not merely based on economic factors, however.  He 
shared with me an anecdote: He was once asked at a press conference by a cynical Chinese 
fashion journalist why China still could not produce the world’s first rate designers.  He simply 
retorted, “Once there are the world’s first rate Chinese fashion journalists, then there will be the 
world’s first rate Chinese fashion designers.”  After finishing the story, he turned to me, as if 
continuing to respond to the journalist, “We [Chinese fashion designers and journalists] are in 
the same boat, and all of us are the products of our time and history.”  Similar to his comments 
on the “Chinese characteristics,” the history Mr. Yuan talked about is not just economic history, 
but also political and cultural history.  He mentioned that the “time” of his generation (people 
who came of age in the Maoist era) had influenced his and his peers’ conservative ways of 
dressing.  He also compared Chinese fashion designers to “fish without water.”  By “water” he 
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meant affluent consumers with good taste for fashion, without whom he believed that Chinese 
fashion designers would not be able to find the market for their unique and innovative designs.   
Mr. Yuan’s retort is more than an angry response to the fashion journalist.  He truly 
believes that the growth of fashion designers is intricately linked to maturation of the fashion 
media, other supporting industries, and the consumers.  His analogy between Chinese designers 
and “fish without water” also suggests that even if Chinese designers came up with original and 
innovative designs, Chinese consumers would not be able to either appreciate or afford them.  
More broadly, Mr. Yuan thinks that the legacies of China’s past, the lack of an adequate 
consumer base, underdeveloped supporting industries such as high quality fabrics, dyeing and 
printing, and the immature fashion media have all hampered Chinese designers’ ability to 
produce a world class fashion brand.  In Mr. Yuan’s opinion, it is in the “water” of the Chinese 
society that Chinese designers have to swim; they have to work with what they have and thus 
cater to the dreams of Chinese consumers rather than their own.   
Evidently, Ms. Ye and Mr. Yuan have rather different ideas toward fashion design.  Ms. 
Ye believes that art should be the driving force of fashion design; whereas Mr. Yuan thinks that 
fashion design is restricted by the market and can only serve the interest of the market.  
Interestingly, their arguments are both grounded on the development of China’s fashion industry 
in particular and the contemporary history of Chinese society in general.  Although they appear 
to agree with each other on the basic facts about Chinese society and economy, they have 
different readings of these facts.  Ms. Ye looks at the boom China is witnessing, and she is 
optimistic about the future of China’s fashion industry, in which she believes there is an 
important role for Chinese fashion designers to play.  On the other hand, Mr. Yuan’s reading of 
China’s recent past and present is quite pessimistic, and to some extent almost fatalistic.  
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Consequently he derives a market determinist view toward fashion design, even though he does 
not seem to separate his “personal” interest in art from his business, as evidenced by his creative 
work for other companies and by the dominant presence of paintings, calligraphy, and brushes in 
his office.   
Given the keen insights of both Ms. Ye’s and Mr. Yuan’s and their long experience of 
working in China’s fashion industry, it is no surprise that their views are highly consistent with 
their current business models, which will be the focus of the following section.   
4.6 THEIR BUSINESS MODELS 
As already mentioned, Ms. Ye owns a design studio in Beijing, and Mr. Yuan owns a designer 
label company based in Shanghai.  A design studio and a designer label company represent two 
different business models, in which the chief designers or artistic directors have different degrees 
of control over their designs.  As a designer-owner of a studio, Ms. Ye has more control over her 
designs than a designer-owner of a designer label company, like Mr. Yuan, has over his.  This is 
because Ms. Ye’s studio does not involve mass production and does not sell directly to the 
consumers.  Instead, her clients are fashion manufacturers who lack design capacities, and with 
whom she works in a horizontal and cooperative manner.  Just as her clients can choose and 
reject her designs, she can pick her clients directly or indirectly by choosing the particular types 
of clothes or fabrics to design in a particular season.  For example, if she is interested in 
designing silk, she will target at the silk manufacturers; if she is interested in making dresses, she 
will look for dress-makers as her clients.  Of course, there are times that orders come in first and 
require her to design particular types of clothing.  But even those companies for whom she 
 107 
designs entire seasonal collections have to respect and rely on her expert opinion, rather than 
dictate to her what her designs should be like.  Furthermore, for the samples that are rejected by 
one client, she can always seek other clients who might be interested.  The bottom line is that the 
relative low cost of producing samples does not negatively impact her financially in any 
significant way if some of the designs are rejected by any or all of her clients.  Therefore, Ms. Ye 
has control over the designing process, independent of her clients, and consequently she can 
explore and produce very original and innovative designs.   
Ms. Ye’s studio was four years old when I interviewed her in 2004, and it had already 
expanded into six branch studios, with a staff of over 20 designers.  Although her studio might 
not be well-known to regular consumers, she was clearly able to capitalize on her innovative 
designs, services, and her publicity and build the brand of her name-sake studio among the mass 
producers.  I asked Ms. Ye whether she wanted to design her own line of clothing some day.  She 
said that would be every designer’s dream.  However, she didn’t think it would happen for her 
any time in the near future because she did not have the capital required for a designer label, and 
she did not want the support of external investors as that would compromise her control over the 
designs and also require a different set of management skills and marketing strategies from those 
utilized in her current business.  All in all, Ms. Ye said that she was happy with the way her 
studio was running.   
In contrast to Ms. Ye’s studio, Mr. Yuan’s company is a mass producer that sells directly 
to the consumers.  Consequently, he has to closely follow the market’s reactions to each of the 
styles his company designs and produces.  If one style sells well, he will produce more of it; 
conversely, if one style does not sell, he will have to stop further production, offer discounts on 
those garments already on the market, or even pull them off the shelves.  Facing the direct 
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financial impacts and rewards of the market, it is understandable that Mr. Yuan believes that a 
designer can only “dream others’ dream.”  However, to prioritize the market does not entail a 
complete passive response to market demands.  On the contrary, to maintain success in the 
market, one has to carefully study the market that one serves.  In Mr. Yuan’s case, it is the 
Chinese marketplace that he attentively studies and from which he strategically seeks out a niche 
for his own line, and subsequently ensures its commercial success.   
When I asked Mr. Yuan about his target consumers, he described them in this way: They 
are “men in my generation [in their 40s and 50s], who are rich enough to afford world class 
name-brand suits, such as Hugo Boss and Ermenegildo Zegna, but can’t afford or don’t want to 
buy their entire wardrobes from Hugo Boss or Zegna, and yet they are very picky about the 
quality of the clothes they buy.”  This description is markedly different from the general terms 
such as “middle-class” or “white collar” that many other Chinese fashion companies frequently 
use to describe their target consumers.  Mr. Yuan clearly identified a specific market segment in 
China: a group of affluent but not extremely wealthy, status and image-conscious male 
consumers who are looking for a combination of status markers, quality, comfort (both physical 
and psychological), and value.  As Chinese society becomes more and more stratified in the 
reform era, status symbols such as clothing have gained tremendous significance in people’s 
social life, a trend of which Mr. Yuan is well aware.46  He not only identified a niche market, but 
also set up a unique market strategy that further refined his target market and strengthened the 
                                                 
46 Class is a touchy issue in China.  During the Maoist era (1949-79), “class” was only interpreted as related to the 
means of production in a Marxist framework, such as “the haves” and “the have-nots.”  The Communist revolution 
was supposed to have done away with the class of “the haves,” but the descendents of “the haves” were still labeled 
as “the exploiters” in the context of the ideological “class struggles” that were popular during the Maoist period.  In 
the post-Mao reform period, the economic reforms brought about class distinctions in economic terms in China.  
Subsequently, there is an increasing interest in sociology and anthropology to study “social stratification” in China 
based on the income and prestige of various occupations (e.g., Bian 1996; Gao 2005; Li 2002; Zhang 2002), and 
social distinctions in people’s consumption patterns (e.g., Davis 2000; Goodman 1999). 
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competitive position of his product line.  He decided not to directly compete with but to 
supplement world leading brands available in Shanghai, such as Hugo Boss and Zegna.  To do 
so, he only included basic items, casual wear, and accessories, but not formal wear in his 
collection.  In this way, he avoided what a new label could not offer, that is, a prestigious status 
symbol (as Zegna or Boss suits would); at the same time he offered something his customers 
would look for—quality auxiliary products at competitive prices.  By aligning his products with 
leading world name brands, Mr. Yuan also avoids competition from most domestic brands that 
are deemed cheap by his target consumers.   
As Mr. Yuan was describing his target consumers and marketing strategy, I had in mind a 
collection of basic items such as shirts, pants, ties, and belts, and casual wear including blazers, 
jackets, sweaters, and some sports gears, etc.  I took a tour of his showroom while Mr. Yuan was 
receiving his last group of visitors of the day, and my expectations were largely confirmed.  The 
clothes were well made, and the fabrics felt good, in terms of styles they were quite similar to the 
ones commonly produced by Ralph Lauren and Tommy Hilfiger, but the prices were much 
cheaper than Hugo Boss or even Ralph Lauren.  I was most impressed by the logo of Mr. Yuan’s 
line, which was neatly designed in both French and Chinese in a traditional font, very elegant 
and grand-looking.  After an afternoon-long interview and a tour of Mr. Yuan’s company, I was 
convinced that Mr. Yuan carefully studied his target consumers and strategically supplied what 
the consumers wanted but was not readily available in the Chinese market.  There was little 
surprise that the company was already profitable even though it was just one year old.47   
                                                 
47 Mr. Yuan told me about the profitability of his company during the interview, which was also confirmed to me by 
other designers who were close friends of Mr. Yuan.  
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Ms. Ye’s studio and Mr. Yuan’s designer label company represent two distinct business 
models, in which the designers (particularly the chief designer or artistic director) face different 
sets of choices and constraints, benefits and risks.  On the one hand, Ms. Ye’s studio does not 
involve mass production or serve the consumers directly, which allows her to maintain 
independent control over her designs.  But the financial returns are much more limited than what 
mass production can potentially offer.  On the other hand, Mr. Yuan’s company involves mass 
production, and consequently it faces the direct impact and rewards of the market.  Working with 
the model, Mr. Yuan felt that he was only able to design what the market wanted.  That being 
said, he did not passively react to market demands; instead, he actively studied the Chinese 
market and sought out a market niche for his clothing line, which turned out to be great 
commercial payoff.  From the vantage point of fashion design, it is clear that Ms. Ye’s and Mr. 
Yuan’s business models correlate nicely with their divergent views: Ms. Ye value originality and 
she has the freedom to be creative and original in her studio; while Mr. Yuan outweighs the 
market over originality and he designs for the sake of the market in his designer label company.   
As aforementioned, the divergent views of Ms. Ye’s and Mr. Yuan’s contradict the 
essentialist stereotypes of Chinese fashion designers as mere copycats of their Western 
counterparts.  But are they copying the international business models?  At a first glance, the 
different views and approaches of Ms. Ye and Mr. Yuan seem to parallel the differences between 
haute couture and fast fashion, which hinge on originality and marketability respectively.  
Therefore, it is important to compare and contrast Ms. Ye’s and Mr. Yuan’s business models 
with the international fashion systems of haute couture and fast fashion.   
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4.7 THEIR BUSINESS MODELS IN CONTRAST TO HAUTE COUTURE AND FAST 
FASHION  
Haute couture, the French term for high fashion, is a luxurious type of custom-made clothing 
utilizing the most expensive fabrics and sophisticated handworks.  In terms of design, haute 
couture offers the most freedom for designers to pursue their creativity and originality.  The 
uniqueness of each garment is guaranteed by its limited quantity, or in Bourdieu’s term, 
“restricted production” (Bourdieu 1993: 53), and it is supposed to be identified with the 
particular artistic expression of the designer.  Well-known couture designers (couturiers or 
couturieres) are frequently treated as artists, and their designs are sometimes collected by 
museums.48  In the fashion world today, haute couture is frequently represented by about two 
scores of fashion houses located in Paris,49 who are members of Fédération Française de la 
Couture, the guardian of the exclusivity of couture.  Due to its luxurious and exclusive nature, 
the customer base for haute couture is very small, and the sales from the couture business are not 
enough to cover the cost of making the couture garments and the mandatory and expensive 
fashion shows twice a year (Dickerson 2003: 375-6; Frings 2005: 150-2).  However, the couture 
fashion shows attract a tremendous amount of publicity worldwide, which earns great prestige 
and recognition for the fashion houses.  As a business model, the couture houses have to cash in 
on their prestigious names/brands in order to remain financially afloat.  Specifically, the couture 
houses rely on licensing and/or selling their name-sake ready-to-wear bridge lines (the prêt-à-
porter lines) and accessories such as perfume and bags for profitability.   
                                                 
48 For a brief history of haute couture, see Breward (2003), Dickerson (2003: 369-79).  
49 There are also about one dozen haute couture houses in Italy, but they are smaller and less influential as the 
Parisian haute couture houses.   
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Although Ms. Ye favors art over the market in her design philosophy as any couture 
designer would, her design studio is by no means a couture house.  First of all, she does not 
design her own line of clothing.  In fact, even if she chose to design a couture line, she would not 
have the supporting industries and skilled staff to support it (specialty fabrics, advanced dyeing 
and printing technology, and abundant skillful sewing staff are essential to the success of the 
couture houses in Paris), neither would she have a customer base large enough to sustain it.  
Second, her designs are truly “samples,” not for individual consumers, but the mass producers 
who lack design capabilities.  Last but not the least, she does not seek inspiration (or “guidance”) 
from Western art; instead, her designs are rooted in the tradition of Chinese art.   
Unlike haute couture, fast fashion emphasizes quick response, efficiency, mass 
production, and cost saving.  It is a mass consumer-oriented business model, in which artistic 
originality and exclusivity are not likely to be maintained, given its goal is to mass produce or 
reproduce the popular styles in the shortest time possible.  As a business model, fast fashion is in 
fact not a Chinese invention.  The term was first used in 1990 by the Apparel Research 
Committee of the American Apparel Manufacturers Association in a task report, in which it is 
referred positively to a “quick response” system of product line development. 50   The then 
forward-looking report sees fast fashion as most adaptable to the future of fashion production.  
According to Reinach, the “finest fruit” of European culture is masterfully snatched by the 
Chinese and ripens in China (2005: 12), and ironically the forward-looking and positive business 
model now entails not just efficiency, but more importantly imitation, low quality, and 
                                                 
50 The “1990 Task Report of the Apparel Research Committee of the American Apparel Manufacturers Association” 
is entitled “‘Fast Fashion’ – Quick Response Product Line Development.”   
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cheapness.  In the meantime, there is no proper Chinese terminology for the concept of fast 
fashion. 
From the outset, Mr. Yuan’s company has a lot in common with the fast fashion model, 
as both focus on mass consumers, efficiency, cost, and profit.  But, Mr. Yuan’s line is not cheap, 
as fast fashion would imply.  Although his line builds on leading world brands, he does not 
counterfeit or copy them.  Instead, he consciously maintains an image of his own brand, which is 
reflected by, among other things, the meticulously designed logo in French and traditional 
Chinese writing.  He also strategically differentiates his collection from those of his Western 
competitors.  For example, he intentionally avoids suits in his collection.  His commercial 
success is not derived simply from competing against his Western competitors with relatively 
cheaper garments, but more importantly from his in-depth knowledge of the Chinese consumers.  
After all, it is the Chinese consumers whom his brand is serving.  His extensive knowledge of 
and experience in China’s fashion industry allow him to identify a niche market that is composed 
of a particular group of Chinese consumers who seek status symbols as well as quality, comfort, 
and value.  The identification of this niche market coupled with Mr. Yuan’s ability to offer what 
the consumers are looking for at a competitive price ensures the success of his line.  Because of 
all those factors, Mr. Yuan’s company is not a fast fashion model, but a uniquely Chinese high-
end designer label. 
From the comparisons and contrasts above, it is clear that neither Ms. Ye nor Mr. Yuan 
imitate the international fashion models of haute couture and fast fashion.  Their examples 
demonstrate that not all Chinese fashion designers are “copycats” and Chinese fashions are not a 
uniform fast fashion system.  The disparity between the reality and the stereotypes of Chinese 
fashion designers reflects the instability of the field of the global fashion industry—on the one 
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hand, Western fashion centers try to hold onto their glory and prominence; and on the other 
hand, Chinese fashion designers attempt to find a name (or position) for themselves in the world 
of fashion.  Differently put, the rise of the Chinese newcomers poses a threat to the existing 
structure of the field of global fashion.  It is clear that there are implications for the global 
fashion industry in both Ms. Ye’s enthusiasm for Chinese fashions and Mr. Yuan’s competition 
with global brands for the Chinese market.  But since their businesses are not globally oriented at 
the moment, it is far more important to understand the implications of Ms. Ye’s and Mr. Yuan’s 
views and approaches for the field of the Chinese fashion industry.  In the following sections, I 
will analyze the implications by addressing two related questions: 1) What is a (Chinese) fashion 
designer?  And 2) what is a fashion design?  
4.8 WHAT IS A (CHINESE) FASHION DESIGNER? 
As I mentioned in Chapter 3, the role of a fashion designer parallels that of an author or writer, 
both involving attaching the name of an individual to his or her work.  Therefore, insights about 
an author or writer help us understand what a fashion designer is.  Building on the insights of 
Michel Foucault (1979) and Roland Barthes (1982), Clifford Geertz (1988) underscores the 
distinction between “authors” and “writers” (Barthes’s terms), or “founders of discursivity” and 
“producers of particular texts” (Foucault’s distinction).  The former perform a function, the latter 
an activity; the former produce a “work,” the latter a “text” (Geertz 1988: 18).  By making this 
distinction, Geertz draws attention to the dimension of writing in ethnography and makes the 
point that great anthropologists (authors) are great in part because of the way in which they 
write.  In the case of fashion designers, a parallel point can be made: They are fashion designers 
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because of the way in which work.  In fact, that is also a part of the argument of Bourdieu’s field 
theory, except that he uses the term of “position-taking.”  If we stop at this point, though a very 
important point, then we would miss a deeper commonality between an author and a fashion 
designer, that is, they both involve the issue of signature or authorship.  
In an insightful study of Western history of aesthetics, Martha Woodmansee notes that, 
“[i]n contemporary usage an ‘author’ is an individual who is solely responsible—and thus 
exclusively deserving of credit—for the production of a unique, original work” (1994: 35).  She 
argues that the notion of the “author” as the sole producer and owner of his or her intellectual 
work is a historical construct.   It has to do with the emergence of the writers who sought to 
make a living off of their writings that were not protected by law in the eighteenth century 
Europe, which subsequently gave birth to copyright laws.  Prior to those developments, an 
author, according to Woodmansee, 
was first and foremost a craftsman; that is, he was [a] master of a body of rules, or 
techniques, preserved and handed down in rhetoric and poetics, for manipulating 
traditional materials in order to achieve the effects prescribed by the cultivated 
audience of the court to which he owed both his livelihood and social status 
(1994: 36).   
Without looking into the complicated historical process in which the author as a craftsman was 
replaced by the author as a genius, I want to simply point out here that the profession of garment-
making has undergone similar transformations in China in recent decades, and that Chinese 
fashion designers want to be treated as geniuses or artists (authors), but in the specter of the 
caifeng, which is after all how their trade was known in China for centuries.   
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As is previously discussed, one key distinction between a fashion designer (shizhuang 
shejishi) and a caifeng is creativity: while a fashion designer is always expected to be creative 
and original, a caifeng is only expected to follow conventions or instructions.  Given the 
emergent nature of the field of the Chinese fashion industry, it is understandable that Chinese 
fashion designers, explicitly or implicitly, resort to art and originality, in order to keep 
themselves distinguished from the caifeng.  Because of the specific context of the rise of 
profession of fashion design in China, Ms. Ye’s emphasis on art is more than just a personal 
inclination or an individual approach to her business.  It is perhaps also why Mr. Yuan seems 
quite ambivalent about the separation of art and his business, as he seems to enjoy the artistic 
aura of his office and creating original designs for fashion shows.  Just as originality is intrinsic 
to the hierarchy of the three types of fashions of haute couture, prêt-à-porter, and fast fashion, 
the logic of art and originality is also internal to the very status of Chinese fashion designers.   
To return to the question raised in the beginning of this chapter, now we can see that 
there are good reasons for Chinese fashion designers to cross the perceived boundary between 
the fields of art and economy in the specific context of China’s fashion industry.  But is there a 
general condition in which fashion designers, Chinese included, tend to combine both the logic 
of art and economy in their work?  To address this question, we have to look at the nature of 
fashion design.   
4.9 WHAT IS A FASHION DESIGN? 
As previously discussed, the controversy over Mr. Chen Yifei has to do with the 
conceptualization of the two fields of art and economy as completely separate and autonomous 
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spaces (per Bourdieu, see illustrations below).  As such, we face the problem of having to locate 
fashion in either the field of art or economy, and subsequently treating a fashion design as either 
a piece of art or a commodity.  This treatment, however, is not congruent with reality.  On the 
one hand, a fashion design is evidently a commodity, aiming at pre-identified target consumers.  
On the other hand, artistic originality is also very important to a fashion design, so much so that 
it determines the quality of a fashion design, as seen in the hierarchical order of haute couture, 
prêt-à-porter, and fast fashion.  Therefore, a different conceptualization is needed in the case of 
fashion design.   










 Field of art              Field of economy 
 
In an edited volume, Phillips and Steiner propose an alternative conceptualization of art, 
artifact, and commodity.  They write: 
[O]ne might say that the delicate membrane thought to encase and protect the 
category of ‘art’ from contamination with the vulgar ‘commodity’ has been 
eroded and dissolved from both sides.  No longer treatable as distinct and separate 
categories, the art-artifact-commodity triad must now be merged into a single 
domain where the categories are seen to inform one another rather than to 
 118 
compete in their claims for social primacy and cultural value (Phillips and Steiner 
1999: 15-6).   










Phillips and Steiner’s observation on the erosion of the distinctions or boundaries 
between art, artifact, and commodity (see illustration above) is particularly helpful to the analysis 
of fashion design, because fashion design clearly does not fit well in the rigidly defined 
conceptual space of either art or commodity.  However, their conceptualization of art and 
commodity as a single domain or field hinders our understanding as well, because that would 
obscure meaningful distinctions between the two.  Indeed, Bourdieu’s conceptualization of art 
and economy as two separate and autonomous fields, where art and commodity are located, has 
the advantage of analyzing the different logics that operate in each field.  In the field of art, it is a 
mode of restricted production, while in the field of economy large-scale production dominates.  
The two distinctive operating principles are also aptly put by Kopytoff as “singularization” and 
“commoditization” (1986).  To ignore the distinctions between art and commodity risks throwing 
the baby out with the bathwater.   
As contradictory as it may seem, a compromise is possible between the two frameworks.  
If we do not insist that art and commodity belong to two separate and autonomous fields or one 
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single field, then it is possible to conceptualize them as belonging to the two fields of art and 
economy that intersect, and at their intersection lies fashion design (see illustration below).  With 
this conceptual frame, we are able to not only resolve the problems of the dissolving boundaries 
between art and commodity noted by Phillips and Steiner, but also preserve their meaningful 
distinctions highlighted by Bourdieu and Kopytoff.  Indeed, this conceptualization of fashion 
design as situated at the intersection of the fields of art and economy is most suited to analyze the 
seemingly conflicting objectives of fashion designers—they want to be artistic and original, and 
simultaneously they want to make money as well.  Because their work belongs to the two fields 
of art and economy at the same time, fashion designers, Chinese included, can and often need to 











This chapter began with the controversy over Mr. Chen Yifei’s contribution to Chinese art, 
which raised the question why Mr. Chen and Chinese fashion designers cross the “boundary” 
between the fields of art and economy that have conflicting operating principles or logics.  To 
answer the question, I applied Bourdieu’s field analysis to fashion and identified three field 
positions: haute couture, prêt-à-porter, and fast fashion.  The three types of positions, indeed 
three types of fashions and businesses, are hierarchically ordered primarily based on the level of 
originality.  In this hierarchy, Chinese fashions are stereotypically characterized uniformly as fast 
fashions that are unoriginal, cheap, and low quality; and by extension, Chinese fashion designers 
are assumed as imitators of their Western colleagues.   
I challenged the validity of the stereotypes of Chinese fashion and fashion designers by 
presenting the different views and approaches of two prominent fashion designers: Ms. Ye and 
Mr. Yuan.  Ms. Ye values artistic originality over the market.  She utilizes heavily Chinese 
materials and motifs, and she tries to establish her identity by drawing inspirations from 
traditional Chinese art.  Based on her view of fashion design, she chooses to set up a design 
studio where she can be innovative and original.  Although she believes that art should be the 
driving force of fashion design like Western designers of haute couture, her design studio is not 
modeled after the Parisian couture houses.  Her clients are primarily industrialized mass 
producers instead of wealthy individuals with vanguard tastes for fashion who patron haute 
couture.  Different from Ms. Ye, Mr. Yuan chooses to design for the market.  With his in-depth 
knowledge of his target consumers and strategic planning and marketing, Mr. Yuan carves out a 
niche market and successfully establishes his own brand.  The success of his company is not a 
result of blindly imitating Western fashion or business model, but dependent on the fact that his 
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collection offers a unique set of value that the Chinese consumers are looking for.  In sum, 
neither Ms. Ye nor Mr. Yuan are copycats of Western designers or business models.  On the 
contrary, their diverse views and approaches contradict the stereotypes of Chinese fashion and 
fashion designers.   
The examples of Ms. Ye and Mr. Yuan not only call the stereotypes of Chinese fashion 
designers into question, they also partly explain why Chinese fashion designers need to resort to 
“art” or originality in order to find a name or position for themselves in the world of fashion.  As 
new-comers to the global fashion industry, Chinese fashion designers face more challenges, 
among which are the stereotypes about them, and subsequently they need to be original so that 
they will not be so easily dismissed as copycats.    
The fact that Chinese fashion designers like Ms. Ye and Mr. Yuan directly or indirectly 
resort to art also has to do with the particular context of Chinese fashion industry, which only 
came into being since the 1980s.  As a newly established profession, Chinese fashion designers 
need to be original in one way or another in order to distinguish themselves from the caifeng, the 
lowly-esteemed craftsmen who are seen as lacking creativity but have been making clothes for 
centuries in China.  It is particularly telling that even though Mr. Yuan prioritizes marketability 
over originality in his own business, his designs for fashion shows are highly original and 
artistic, a pattern shared by many Chinese fashion designers that will be further examined in the 
next chapter.  In fact, one would be hard pressed to believe that he would be able to win all the 
prestigious awards that he did without being original and creative.  Likewise, he would not be as 
successful as he is without winning those awards and titles.  Through the explicit emphasis on 
(like Ms. Ye) or indirect resort to (as in Mr. Yuan’s case) artistic originality, Chinese fashion 
designers are able to forge a new identity of their profession in contrast to the caifeng.  It is in 
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this sense that I claim that what it means to be a fashion designer in China has to do with the way 
in which they work.  The meaning is related to the specific Chinese historical and socio-cultural 
context. 
In addition to the specific context of the field of Chinese fashion, I also argue that the 
nature of fashion design, which is located at the intersection of the conceptual spaces of art and 
commodity, provides the opportunity for Chinese designers to combine the economic 
imperatives with the logic of art in their work and business.  It is precisely because fashion 
crosscuts the fields of art and economy that a cultural-economic approach is required to 
understand the internal logic in the field of fashion.  In this sense, Andy Wharhol’s notion of the 
art of business is not really far-fetched.  In the next chapter, I will continue to take a cultural-
economic approach to examine fashion shows during the China Fashion Week.    
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5.0  CHINA FASHION WEEK: THE OBJECTIFICATION OF THE CHINESE FIELD 
OF FASHION 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
As a field, China’s fashion industry functions not just because of the work of fashion designers 
(as well as their supporting staff and workers who contribute to the production of fashion), but 
also the work of various other agents or players in the field, including models, journalists, buyers 
and consumers.  To understand how those key agents or players work together to make the 
operation of the field of fashion possible, one has to figure out how they are related to each other, 
i.e., what their relative positions are in the field of fashion.  Because China Fashion Week (CFW) 
is a regular national event that Chinese fashion designers, models, journalists, and fashion buyers 
as well as consumers congregate, it offers a perfect site to examine the relationship between 
those key players in the field and hence shed light on the ways in which the field of fashion 
works in China. 
To study the workings of the field of fashion through fashion week is not entirely 
original.  In a study of London Fashion Week (LFW), Joanne Entwistle and Agnes Rocamora 
(2006) argue that the event is a materialization of the field of fashion, in the sense that the 
boundaries and the hierarchical positions of the agents are rendered visible by the spatial and 
temporal arrangements at the LFW.  They base their argument on a number of observations they 
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make at the LFW.  To list a few: first, the controlled access to the fashion shows marks the 
boundary between those who are inside and those who are outside the fashion field.  Second, 
within the “field,” that is, literally inside the venue of fashion shows, the seating arrangements 
(sitting vs. standing, and front rows vs. back rows) indicate one’s position (they use the term 
“fashion capital”) in relation to the rest of the field.  And third, time is also hierarchical during 
the LFW; those who have more “fashion capital” tend to be “fashionably late” (Entwistle and 
Rocamora 2006: 742).  Because of the correlations between the spatial-temporal structure at the 
LFW and the structure of the positions in the field of fashion, Entwistle and Rocamora argue that 
the LFW represents the microcosm of the British field of fashion.  Moreover, they argue that by 
rendering the British field of fashion visible, the LFW reproduces the structure of the field.  
Entwistle and Rocamora’s study of London Fashion Week provides a theoretical 
framework and a point of comparison for my study of China Fashion Week in this chapter.  
Following Entwistle and Rocamora, I argue that the CFW is an objectification of the Chinese 
field of fashion, and as such it reveals significant similarities and differences from the British 
field of fashion.  Based on my field research on the CFW in November 2004, I provide an 
ethnographic account of the CFW, and compare and contrast the event with the LFW as 
described by Entwistle and Rocamora.  I will seek to understand how the institution of fashion 
week developed and became localized in China, and how the institution of CFW as a microcosm 
of the field of fashion reflects and/or refracts the hegemonic power of the state that often 
permeates Chinese society.  Since the main events at the CFW are catwalk fashion shows and the 
birth of China’s fashion industry is fairly recent, it is important to look at how fashion shows and 
fashion models have emerged in China.  
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5.2 FASHION SHOWS AND MODELING IN CHINA 
According to Pan Kunrou (2003), a retired fashion commentator, the first Chinese fashion show 
was conducted in Shanghai in 1909, learning from an example in Philadelphia.51  However, the 
earliest occurrence of fashion shows in China was interrupted during the war times in the 1940s.  
Western historians also recorded events of fashion shows of sorts that were organized by the 
Chinese nationalists to promote national products (guohuo) during the 1920s and 1930s (Finnane 
1996: 118; Gerth 2003: 203-4).  The very first fashion show the Chinese witnessed after the 
founding of the Peoples’ Republic of China in 1949 was in 1979 when French couturier Pierre 
Cardin brought French models to China to showcase the garments he designed.  Although Pierre 
Cardin’s first fashion show was restricted to an audience of “the professionals” (zhuanye renshi) 
and cadres in the textile industry, it was so well received that he was authorized by the Chinese 
central government to do another show for the general audience at the Beijing Hotel in 1981.  
Pierre Cardin’s fashion shows were an eye-opener for the Chinese because they not only 
displayed western fashions (particularly at a time when the zhongshanzhuang was still the 
predominant style as discussed in Chapter 3), but they also introduced the format of fashion 
shows and modeling.  Aside from the excitement, 52  the Chinese leaders perhaps also felt 
embarrassed that a country as large as China did not have any fashion models, as my one of my 
interlocutors suggested.   
                                                 
51 I interviewed Ms. Pan twice in Beijing in 2004, during which she generously provided me with the reference of 
her article (2003) and other useful information to my research.   
52 Several Chinese designers recalled their experience of Pierre Cardin’s early fashion shows as exciting and 
surprising, which was reflected by a common phrase they used, “[I never thought that] clothes could be made that 
way!”  
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In 1980, China’s very first team of fashion models was formed in Shanghai, named 
“Shanghai Fashion Performance Team” (Shanghai shizhuang biaoyan dui), and the models were 
called “fashion actresses” (shizhuang yanyuan).  According to Professor Liu Xiaogang at 
Donghua University, the early “fashion actresses” worked only part-time, and when they were 
not participating in fashion shows they returned to work in the garment factories (personal 
interview in 2004).  One of the main missions of the team was to “foster cultural exchange,” 
which meant to work with foreign designers when needed.  Due to the limited scope of their 
activities, these “fashion actresses” were not at all in regular demand.  Nevertheless, this team 
was an ice-breaker and certainly had its heydays.  In 1983, they were “invited” to perform at 
zhongnanhai, the headquarters of the PRC central government (Pan 2003).  In 1985, twelve of 
them were chosen by Pierre Cardin to work for his fashion shows in France, the first time for 
Chinese models to work overseas.   
The success of the Shanghai team soon inspired many other cities including Guangzhou, 
Shenzhen, Beijing, and Dalian to follow suit and set up their own “fashion performance teams.”  
Like the Shanghai team, these teams were all part of the primarily “planned economy” or 
“command economy” (see Chapter 2).  The internal organizations of the teams were not in the 
form of an agency, but a worker-cadre relationship (Bao 1999: 19).  The work for the teams was 
generally assigned by the government.  In addition, as indicated by their names, the early fashion 
models in the PRC were considered “actresses” and fashion shows were considered 
“performances,” which suggested their closer kinship to other cultural performances like Peking 
Opera than a promotion of commercial interests.  These names reflected partly the lack of 
references in the Chinese cultural repertoire and partly China’s underdeveloped state of 
commerce at the time.  As the textile and apparel industries moved into a market-driven 
 127 
economy in the late 1980s, reforming the “fashion performance teams” became imminent.  In 
1992, China’s first modeling agency, Xinsilu, was formed in Beijing, in fact transformed from a 
“fashion performance team” that had been established a few years before.  The new agency was 
based on a contractual model-agent relationship rather than the previous actress-cadre 
relationship (Pan 2003: 30).  That is to say, the modeling industry in China started to shift from a 
command economy to a market-based economy in 1992.  As noted in Chapter 4, the market 
reform in the fashion industry also led to the establishment of the China Fashion Association in 
1993.  In 2000, the first national organization of fashion models, China Professional Fashion 
Models Committee was formed within the CFA, which marked the formal institutionalization of 
the fashion modeling industry.   
Today, fashion modeling has become a distinct profession in China, and fashion shows 
have become a major and popular means to promote fashion products, brands, trends, and 
designers, at fashion companies’ wholesale buyers’ fairs, in shopping malls, at trade fairs and 
exhibitions, and during city or national level fashion weeks.  Each year, there are about 200 
fashion related trade fairs, exhibitions, festivals, and fashion weeks nationwide (Ding 2003: 
13). 53   In contrast to the early fashion shows in the PRC, fashion shows today are called 
“shizhuang xiu” rather than “shizhuang biaoyan,” and the models are called “mote” instead of 
“yanyuan.”  The new terms of “xiu” and “mote” are popular neologisms borrowed from the 
English terms of “show” and “model” respectively.  The new terms reflect a desire of the 
Chinese modeling industry to learn from the West and to forge a new identity that is different 
from previous perceptions of fashion shows as “performances” and models as “actresses.”  
Besides the promotion of fashion, fashion shows are also frequently included in the programs of 
                                                 
53 This estimate is supported by a fashion journalist’s own calculation, whom I interviewed in 2004.  
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all sorts of entertainment parties or concerts, ranging from college graduation parties (even at the 
departmental level), 54  to club parties, and to large scale city level celebrations.  Modeling 
contests and beauty pageants have also become very popular since the late 1990s (Brownell 
2001). 55   However, fashion shows during China Fashion Week are considered the most 
professional and widely reported fashion shows in China.   
As a gala of fashion shows, China Fashion Week is one of the most important fashion 
events in China.  Like the London Fashion Week and other major fashion weeks in the world, it 
is held twice a year (since 2003) in Beijing: one in the spring (in March or April) showing fall 
and winter fashions of the same year, and the other in the fall (in November or December) 
showing the following year’s spring and summer fashions.  Due to less variety of winter clothing 
and fewer participants in the spring event, the CFW in the spring is typically smaller in scale 
than the one in the fall.  In addition, all the important awards are given only in the fall.  
Therefore, the CFW in November or December is much more sought-after by domestic and 
international media as well as by the general audience.  The fall CFW I attended in 2004 is a case 
in point.56  Before I get to my field observations of the 2004 CFW, the eighth CFW in China, it 
is important to understand how and why the institution of the CFW was established. 
                                                 
54 I first witnessed this at my department’s graduation party in Wuhan in 1994. 
55 Modeling contests and beauty pageants are very similar in format, and sometimes same candidates compete for 
both.  In the Chinese popular imagination, the two are frequently grouped together as part of the “beauty economy.”  
However, there are differences between them.  Miss China Universe (2004), Wang Meng, pointed out to me during 
our interview that beauty pageants emphasize both inner and outer beauty and that beauty queens often have 
missions in charitable works.  Models, by contrast, generally work through an agency that does not have a stated 
mission for charity.    
56 The 2004 CFW (fall) is generally called the “CFW 2005 Spring/Summer Collection” in the media. 
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5.3 THE HISTORY AND AGENDA OF THE CHINA FASHION WEEK 
As discussed in previous chapters, China’s fashion industry only began to develop after the state 
initiated economic reforms since 1978 when the Chinese economy shifted from a primarily 
“planned economy” to a market-based economy.  In addition to the economic measures to boost 
the growth of the clothing industry (see Chapter 2), top government officials also tried to release 
the ideological baggage of clothing from the radical socialist era by making public speeches and 
wearing Western suits themselves since the mid-1980s (see Chapter 3).  It is fair to say without 
the help of the state, China’s fashion industry would not have flourished in the 1990s.   
To better assist and regulate this new industry, the China Fashion Association (CFA) was 
formed as a branch organization of the China National Textile Industry Council (CNTIC) in 
1993.  Although the CFA was established as a voluntary organization, its parent organization 
CNTIC had close ties to the central government—its predecessor was the former Ministry of the 
Textile industry (see Chapter 2 for the evolution of the Chinese government bureaucracy 
pertaining to the textile and apparel industries).  Mr. Du Yuzhou, Chairman of the Council who 
was also the former Minister of the Ministry of the Textile Industry, served as the first and 
second President of the CFA until the end of 1998.  The CFA and CNTIC also inherited a large 
number of personnel and the office building from the former Textile Ministry of the central 
government, which is prominently located on Chang’an Street, only a few blocks away from the 
Tian’anmen Square.57  In 1998, when Mr. Du Yuzhou resigned from his post as President of the 
                                                 
57 According to a high ranking official of the Council who I interviewed in 2004, the Council and CFA then hired 
more personnel from the job markets on a contract basis than from the former Textile Ministry.  Because of the 
personnel inherited from the former Textile Ministry, the Council also received funding from the central government 
to account for their salaries and benefits, including retirement benefits.  However, the funding was not for the 
contract-based employees.  
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CFA, his resignation had to be approved by the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council 
(CFA official website), which further revealed the CFA’s close connection to the state.  With the 
CFA’s close ties to the state, hosting the China Fashion Week reflects the desire of state desire to 
jumpstart China’s fashion industry.   
For the CFA, the goal of organizing China Fashion Week was to provide a stage for both 
domestic and international brands and fashion designers to “showcase new products and display 
characteristics of new designs” (CFA official website).  But through the stage of the CFW, the 
CFA also had its own agenda, among which was to give awards to fashion companies, brands, 
designers, and other fashion professionals.  These awards are part of the CFA’s designed projects 
(gongcheng) to quickly build China’s “named fashion designers” and “named brands,” dubbed 
by Mr. Du Yuzhou as “mingshi gongcheng” and “mingpai gongcheng” respectively (CFA 
internal documents).  These awards become specific measures of the CFA to facilitate rapid 
growth of China’s fashion industry. 
In order to effectively execute the “mingshi gongcheng,” the CFA established an 
elaborate structure of awards for fashion designers at the CFW.  The awards are hierarchically 
set up into three tiers, each with varying degrees of prestige.  At the very top is the most 
prestigious Golden Top Award (jinding jiang), which is awarded once a year to one designer.  In 
the middle is the “Top Ten Fashion Designers Award” (shijia shejishi), and at the bottom is the 
least prestigious but more numerous “New Designers Award” (xinren jiang).58  While the first 
two are awarded to practicing designers, the third tier awards are for the designers-to-be, i.e., 
college students majoring in fashion design.  According to the CFA rules, to be qualified for a 
                                                 
58 In the third-tier awards, now there are more contests and awards equivalent to the “New Designers Award,” all of 
which are sponsored by and named after particular companies in the fashion industry.  
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higher level award, one has to win a one-tier less prestigious award (CFA internal documents).  
This award system actually took quite some time for the CFA to work it out. 
When the first CFW was held in 1997, the first Golden Top Award was granted to Mr. 
Mark Cheung (also known as Zhang Zhaoda).  According the CFA rules, he had to be a former 
winner of the “Top Ten Designers Award.”  Indeed he was.  This only became possible because 
two classes of “Top Ten Designers Award” and three classes of “New Designers Award” had 
already been awarded before the first CFW.59  In other words, the first two classes of “Top Ten 
Fashion Designers” (and the first three classes of “New Designers Award”) were selected based 
on criteria other than the performance of the designers’ fashion shows.  One early winner of the 
“Top Ten Fashion Designers award” confirmed to me that those early awardees were selected 
based on tests (including theoretical questions) and a few sample designs.  Nowadays, however, 
the “Top Ten” are chosen mainly on the basis of their fashion shows.  The rules for selecting the 
Golden Top Award have changed as well.  The earlier Golden Top Awards were chosen 
internally by the CFA,60 but since 2001 the Golden Top Award was decided by more transparent 
procedures.  First a committee of judges, comprised of college professors, renowned fashion 
designers, foreign experts, fashion journalists, and executives from the retail sector (a recent 
addition), would nominate qualified candidates based on their fashion shows, and then the CFA 
members attending the annual CFA conference during the CFW would vote to determine the 
final winner (CFA internal documents).  Because of all the necessary preparations, including 
                                                 
59 The first class of “Top Ten Fashion Designers” and “New Designers Awards” were awarded in 1995 after the 
CFA was formed, and one class of “Top Ten” in 1997, but two classes of “New Designers Awards” in 1997.  Two 
classes of “Top Ten” were awarded in 1998, but since then the three classes of awards are synchronized with the 
CFW.  
60 It almost became a scandal at the first CFW when the media ranked Ms. Wu Haiyan as the number one designer, 
but in the end the Golden Top Award was given to Mr. Zhang Zhaoda by the CFA. 
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forming various committees, training fashion journalists,61 and hosting design contests in order 
to cultivate both the experience and “credentials” of the fashion designers, it took the CFA four 
years to launch the first CFW in December 1997, with only nine fashion shows in that year.  In 
1998, more fashion designers participated in the CFW and all three types of awards began to be 
synchronized and awarded together at the CFW in the fall.  Since then, the three tiers of awards 
have become institutionalized at the fall China Fashion Week.   
In the following section, I will present my general observations of the CFW based on my 
field research at the CFW in the fall of 2004, followed by my field research on Mark Cheung’s 
show, the finale of the CFW in 2004.   
5.4 CHINA FASHION WEEK, FALL 2004 
The China Fashion Week 2004 was held between November 19th and 25th, at the China World 
Hotel and the Beijing Hotel,62 which have been the conventional sites for the CFW.  Only one 
fashion designer, however, chose a third site for her show, a move interpreted by observers as 
aimed to capture more media attention.  Like the LFW, all the events at the CFW were access-
controlled—there were gates to all the events and gate-keepers who checked for tickets and in 
some instances for invitations in addition to tickets. The gate-keepers were generally the hotel 
security guards, but for the last show by Mark Cheung detailed below, the police served as the 
gate-keepers.  The tickets were generally issued by the CFA, and the invitation by the host 
                                                 
61 Similar to the CFA, most fashion media were created in the 1990s.  For instance, two major national fashion 
newspapers, China Fashion Weekly and Fashion Times were founded in 1994. 
62 Journalists jokingly called the two sites “Zhongguo da [fandian]” (meaning “China big”) and “Beijing da 
[fandian]” (“Beijing big”). 
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designer.  The tickets were not for sale, but were distributed ahead of time by both the CFA and 
the host designer.  The CFA would send the tickets to its members, the registered media, and 
fashion institutions in Beijing (who would in turn distribute the tickets to their students).  The 
CFA also reserved a number of un-ticketed seats for its own officials, officials of the Textile 
Industry Council, judges, and “distinguished guests” (guibin) including government officials, 
foreign guests, and corporate sponsors.  For most of the fashion shows at the CFW, the ticket 
alone was sufficient to gain entry to the shows.  In many cases, the host designer would also 
reserve some seats for his or her friends, buyers, or VIP customers by providing them with 
invitations along with the tickets.  In general, the number of tickets issued would exceed the 
capacity of the show theater out of the desire for a full house but for fear that some people with 
tickets would not show up.  As a result, in many popular shows, there were people standing in 
the back, although no standing tickets were issued for the CFW (unlike the LFW, which 
according to Entwistle and Rocamora [2006: 741] issues standing room only tickets).   
 Tickets and invitations allowed entry to the events, but once inside the show theater space, 
seating was another story.  Although no specific seats were designated on the tickets, there were 
some seats that were reserved for special groups of people.  There were seats on the three sides 
surrounding the T-stage.  At the foot of the T were seats designated for the “distinguished 
guests,” as they were noted by the back of the chairs “guibinxi.”  Those seats commanded the 
best view; they were placed right in front of the media cameras.  The front-row seats on the other 
two sides were marked as “VIP” seats (sometimes they were simply reserved as such with or 
without special marks), and they enjoyed better and close view of the show.  Those seats were 
generally reserved for the invited judges, fellow designers, friends, and the VIP customers of the 
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host designer.  Seats in the back rows that enjoyed the worst view were undistinguished, and they 
were for the general ticketed audience.   
As a foreign researcher, I was not a member in the Chinese field of fashion, thus I could 
not get tickets directly from the CFA.  However, during the course of my research, I was able to 
establish connections with various members in the Chinese fashion field, including fashion 
journalists, designers, and fashion show producers.  Through the help of my connections, I 
managed to attend twenty-five out of the total of thirty fashion shows, the opening ceremony, 
and the fashion forum, two design contests, and a few press conferences at the 2004 CFW.  For 
most of the fashion shows, I was able to find someone who had an extra ticket or invitation, but 
there were a few instances when no tickets or invitations were available and I had to ask 
journalists or fashion designers to escort me through the guarded entrance.  In one instance, the 
show producer, who was a good friend of a friend of mine, had to literally come out and escort 
me in through the backdoor as “his staff” because the show was held outside of the main sites 
and had fewer seats available, so much so that even members of the media could not get in 
without an invitation.63  
Because the demand for individual fashion shows varied, it was hard to gauge how many 
people or media actually attended each individual show (and no official statistics are available).  
But according to the CFA press release, there were a total of five hundred fashion editors and 
reporters (including some international ones) registered with the CFA.  Foreign designers also 
participated in the fashion week; among the thirty shows, three were by Japanese designers, one 
color show by Kodak, one by a Korean designer, one by a group of eight young French designers, 
and one Italian men’s wear show.  Although I have seen all the shows by foreign designers and 
                                                 
63 Hundreds of people, including members of the media, could not get in to see the show.  
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brands, in this chapter I only focus on the show by Chinese designers.  In particular, I will focus 
on my experience of the finale show by Mark Cheung, one of the most sought-after shows during 
the CFW.     
5.5 THE FINALE OF CFW 2004: MARK CHEUNG’S JIANGNAN  
Although the CFW has only a short history of eight years, it has become a tradition that Mr. 
Mark Cheung, the first Golden Top Award winner, would be the host of the final show at the 
CFW.  According to journalists, Mr. Cheung wants to encourage younger designers to create 
new designs with his own example; the subtext is that even an accomplished designer like him 
works hard and churns out something new every year.  The finale show from the master (dashi) 
was the hottest show of the CFW, which meant that tickets to the show were in high demand.  
Indeed, unlike many other shows, the tickets to Mr. Cheung’s show were not distributed by the 
CFA, but by his team to ensure the exclusivity of the audience.  But for my acquaintance with 
Mr. Cheung’s personal assistant, I would not have been able to get an invitation letter and a 
ticket to the show.   
The show was held in the Banquet Hall at the Beijing Hotel on the evening of November 
24.  I arrived at the Banquet Hall about thirty minutes in advance of the scheduled show time.  
Most of the seats, except the first three rows, were already taken.  The theater was not that big 
compared to the other site of the CFW (the China World Hotel), housing probably about five to 
six hundred seats, which surrounded the T-stage on three sides.  Facing the “T” was the media 
stage camped with tripods and cameras.  In front of the media stage, there were a few rows of 
empty seats prominently reserved by the CFA for the “distinguished guests.”  The position of 
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those seats corresponds to what is called the “zhuxitai” (literally meaning the “chairman’s seat”) 
of most large events that involves government officials in China.  From previous experience, I 
learned that the “distinguished guests” would generally include CFA officials, Textile Industry 
Council officials, corporate sponsors, distinguished foreign guests, and government officials 
(image 3 captures a corner of the media stage and some of the “prestigious guests”).  The first 
few rows of seats on the two sides of the runway were the VIP seats.  Experience from previous 
shows told me that those VIP seats were reserved for judges and people with invitation letters, 
including friends and VIP customers of the designer.  Behind the VIP seats were seats for the 
general audience.   
Feeling emboldened with an invitation in hand, I walked directly toward the front rows 
on one side of the runway.  But before I got there, I was stopped by a policeman, not regular staff 
of the designers (who would generally receive guests with invitation letters and direct them to 
the VIP seats) or security guards of the hotel (who typically controlled the entrance) as in other 
shows.  I showed him my invitation, but he did not even look at it, only told me in cold voice, 
“Those are not for you.”  In puzzlement, I looked around for an empty seat further back and I 
located one in the fourth row on the opposite side.  When I was about to make my way directly 
through the opening between the T-stage and the zhuxitai area, I was stopped once again by the 
policeman, who told me that I should take other “detours” but was too busy to explain to me 
where those “detours” were or why I could not use the pathway.  In fact, I was familiar with the 
setting of the theater from watching previous fashion shows and knew there were no real 
“detours.”  So, I had to elbow through the media stage, and on the way I found out from the 
journalists that the Mayor of Beijing was on his way to the show and that was why there was a 
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heavy presence of the police and why so many front seats were “reserved” (apparently the Mayor 
was not coming alone). 
I finally sat down and took a good look at the setup of the stage.  The backdrop of the T-
stage was composed of three huge panels of watercolor painting, which stood out in the dimly lit 
theater hall.  The painting looked like a typical small rural town in South China (jiangnan, or 
south of the Yangtze River), characterized by three iconic jiangnan objects: a little bridge 
(xiaoqiao), a small river (liushui), and rows of houses (renjia).  The bluish watercolor and dim 
light dramatized the romantic aura of a smoky jiangnan town faded into the distance.  For a brief 
moment, my thoughts meandered: perhaps the people living in the houses were cooking, or 
perhaps it was because of the drizzle.  It looked all so familiar yet distant, as if coming out of a 
nearly faded memory.  As someone who grew up in South China, I knew where this memory 
came from: not exactly from what I remembered of my hometown, but from a “collective 
memory” of the “yanyu (smoky and drizzling) jiangnan” passed down by generations of Chinese 
poets and artists.  If the image of the rustic, romantic, and mystic jiangnan drew my thoughts 
away, then the stage extended from the backdrop took me back to the show theater.  The runway 
carried the same motif as the painting; it looked like a little bridge, guarded by wood posts linked 
by ropes (see image 1 for the setup of the stage).   
The setting reminded me that the name of the show, Jiangnan with a subtitle “Mark 
Cheung 2005 Haute Couture Fashion Show,” was on the invitation, and the Chinese characters 
of jiangnan were written on the envelop in beautiful calligraphy with signatures (one in Chinese 
and one in English) and seals of Mr. Cheung arranged in a traditional manner.  The invitation 
was nicely designed.  It was folded in three ways.  On the front was the image of the tiles on the 
roof of a typical jiangnan house, and the edge of the front fold was cut off in the shape of the end 
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of the roof.  On the second fold was a traditional style Chinese painting of a watery jiangnan 
scene.  Inside the folds, from right to the left (as in the traditional Chinese way) were the name of 
the show and then a classic poem by a famous poet Xu Zhimo, beautifully illustrating the 
scenery of jiangnan.  To the end of the poem, Mr. Cheung added, “...My only choice is to let the 
silk thread take me back to [my] dream of the jiangnan.”  Below the poem was an image of a 
traditional scholar sailing on a small boat, and further below was a picture of Mr. Cheung and his 
impressive resume written in both Chinese and English.  Reading Mr. Cheung’s invitation was a 
total aesthetic experience.  
The room was quickly filled up, even in the seats for the “prestigious guests.”  Right in 
the center of the front row, I saw Mr. Du Yuzhou, Chairman of the National Textile and Apparel 
Industry Council, in front of him was a big long-lens camera supported by a tripod.  In the rear of 
all three sides, people were standing up squeezing into whatever room they could find.  I turned 
to the people next to me, and quickly found out that both were college students majoring in 
fashion design.  But before I could have a longer chat with my neighbors, the music was turned 
up, smoke came out of the runway, and the show began. 
The show lasted about thirty-five minutes, and a total of sixty to seventy ensembles were 
displayed, which were divided into two sets—day wear and evening wear (as most shows did).  
Ruffles and layering were two dominant features of the entire collection, perhaps inspired by 
rows of roof tiles on those jiangnan houses or perhaps the waves of the river (as one journalist 
pointed out in her report).  The overall darker tones of blue, black, and burgundy of the entire 
collection were clearly taken from typical jiangnan scenes.  The colors of the clothes and the 
painting in the background were strikingly harmonious.  For the most part, clothes in the first set 
were wearable, cheery, and youthful, represented by blue bell bottoms, embellished with ruffles 
 139 
(see image 2). The second set of the collection shifted dramatically to evening gowns, 
accompanied by the spectacular shifts of music from solo flutes to a dramatic ensemble of 
traditional Chinese instruments.  If not for the consistency in colors, the ruffles, and the layering 
(as well as the traditional Chinese music), the two sets of clothes would have appeared to be two 
completely separate shows.  The styles of the gowns were mostly European style ball gowns, and 
many of them were truly elegant and sophisticated, but too busy in details and layering to be 
contemporary.  Indeed, quite a few gowns resembled the 18th century Rococo style.  It was hard 
for me to picture an occasion for which those gowns could be worn in China other than on the 
runway.  
5.6 THE CULTURAL ECONOMY OF CHINA FASHION WEEK 
I enjoyed Mark Cheung’s show enormously, especially the rustic, romantic, and nostalgic aura of 
the clothes, the setting, and the music. 64   The entire show was magnificently done, and 
everything was coherently tied to the central theme of the Jiangnan.  But for the heavy presence 
of the media and the frequent flashes of the cameras, I would have mistaken it for a theatrical 
performance.  Indeed, the theatrical aspects of fashion shows have led scholars to ponder the 
connections between fashion shows and theater performances (e.g., Kondo 1997; Troy 2003).  
But, I am also acutely aware that fashion shows mean business: lots of money is spent on the 
                                                 
64 Mark Cheung accepted my request of interview with him, but the interview never materialized before I had to 
leave China.  His use of traditional Chinese art and the rural and nostalgic scene were perhaps due to his attempt to 
define the “Chineseness” of his designs, which was particularly important for a prominent designer like him who 
had opportunities to do fashion shows in many foreign countries representing China.  Other prominent designers, 
like Ms. Ye discussed in Chapter 4, had similar experiences as well as inclinations to resort to traditional Chinese 
culture for inspirations.    
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production of shows and major players in the fashion industry are involved in the process; 
simply put, fashion shows are spectacular commercial promotions.  Mark Cheung, as a seasoned 
designer who oversees five lines of clothing,65 of course knows the economic interests at stake.  
However, none of the styles from his five brands were displayed during his show.  The names of 
his five prêt-à-porter lines were not even on the huge backdrop painting.  In fact, he calls his 
show an haute couture show (both on the backdrop and the invitation).  The differences between 
the collection he showed at the CFW and his prêt-à-porter lines that he sells on the market are 
striking.  As discussed in Chapter 4, prêt-à-porter and haute couture are two distinct types of 
fashion with different economic rationales—the former hinges on mass production and the latter 
exclusivity.  I couldn’t help but wonder why he didn’t show the clothes he was selling or sell the 
clothes he showed.  I did not understand why there was such a remarkable disconnection 
between fashion show and fashion business even for such an experienced designer.  I posed my 
question to fashion journalists and designers who attended the 2004 CFW, among whom was 
Ms. Wang. 
Ms. Wang is a veteran fashion journalist working for a major Chinese fashion newspaper, 
whom I befriended during Shanghai Fashion Week a month before the CFW.66  She accepted my 
interview at a café inside a bookstore after the CFW.  She responded to my question about 
disparity between clothes in the show and those on the market by explaining that it had 
something to do with the fact the CFW was not clear with the categories of the shows and 
included both haute couture and prêt-à-porter collections.   By contrast, the two types of 
                                                 
65 As of 2004, Mark Cheung had five lines of clothing under his name: two lines in men’s wear, one prêt-a-porter 
line for older women and one for younger women, and one line of women’s jeans.  
66 There are two Shanghai Fashion Weeks, organized by different organizations.  One is called shishang zhou, and 
the shizhuang zhou, but both are translated in English as “fashion week.”  I attended both fashion weeks in Shanghai 
in 2004, although the second one was held after the China Fashion Week in Beijing.  
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collections were shown in two different events, i.e., two different fashion weeks in Paris.  Ms. 
Wang’s point is clearly valid, but I was less concerned about whether Chinese fashion designers 
or CFA were confused about the distinctions between haute couture and prêt-à-porter; instead I 
was interested in finding out why Chinese fashion designers like Mark Cheung put so much 
emphasis on haute couture in their shows even while no couture brands or market existed in 
China.  So I sharpened my question and raised it again to Ms. Wang.  She directed her answer to 
the role of the media.  
“That’s because the artistically oriented haute couture catches the attention of the media, 
and there was no cheaper but more effective way to spread your name than doing a successful 
fashion show during the CFW,” Ms. Wang said.  It is true that nearly all the Chinese fashion 
related media, sometimes entertainment related media, and some international media would 
congregate in Beijing and cover the CFW.  This means that fashion designers, brands, and 
sponsors would get a week of free advertising on TV, in newspapers and magazines, on both the 
national and local levels.  In the case of the major trade newspapers that I read, such as China 
Fashion Weekly and Fashion Times, the “free advertising” even lasted several months.  The hype 
started long before the CFW, and the coverage included introducing in great detail the designers 
(and others such as the models) who would host fashion shows at the CFW, and speculating who 
would win the top awards.  Weeks after the CFW, there were still photographs, fashion 
commentaries and analyses from the experts and editors.  The biggest winners from the free 
media coverage are the award winners at the CFW, especially the Golden Top Award winner.   
Ms. Wang’s answer points to a key function of fashion show for the designers, that is, to 
promote their names.  Success at the CFW, especially winning an award, leads to rapid national 
fame and visibility for the designer.  If that goal should be achieved, the cost of producing a 
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fashion show, though not directly promoting the designer’s prêt-à-porter lines, would appear to 
be insignificant compared to the amount of media exposure he or she would get.67  Quick fame 
on the national stage can easily translate into economic gains in numerous ways, such as landing 
a better-paid job, winning financial backing to start a new line, and/or getting more customers.  
The career trajectories of earlier award winners, such as Mr. Yuan discussed in Chapter 4, 
powerfully validates such an approach to fashion shows at the CFW.   
Therefore, although there are clear economic imperatives to the fashion shows at the 
CFW, for the designers the pursuit of commercial interests is only indirectly realized through the 
quest for fame, or symbolic capital if you will, during which the designers frequently resort to 
art.  Just as fashion design has its own artistic and economic logics as I argued in Chapter 4, 
there are both economic and cultural rationales to fashion shows, especially those shows during 
the CFW.  Using art, particularly motifs from traditional Chinese art (e.g., Mr. Cheung’s use of 
traditional Chinese painting, music, and poetry), Chinese designers hope to achieve recognition 
on the national stage of the CFW and then quickly translate that recognition into financial 
success.  This pattern perhaps has to do with the emergent nature of China’s fashion industry, in 
the sense that Chinese designers hope to jumpstart their careers by winning awards at the CFW, 
just as the state hopes to jumpstart China’s fashion industry by instituting a complex competition 
and award system through the CFW outlined previously.  This leads to another point: Various 
parties or players in China’s fashion industry have to work together to ensure the smooth 
working of the cultural economy of the CFW.   
                                                 
67 According to CFA documents, the average cost of a show at the CFW is about two hundred thousand yuan, which 
includes the registration fee, rent of the show theater, and the production of show, but that does not include the cost 
to produce the garments, gift bags, press conference, or the post-show party.  
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Besides the fashion designers and the state (and its agent, the CFA) who have an interest 
in the award system,68 the media also play a key role in the functioning of the CFW.  Evidently, 
both the designers and the state need the media to spread the titles of the awards and the names 
of the winners.  But the media create hype about the CFW, particularly the awards and their 
winners, not because it is an order from the state, but because they have an interest in doing so.  
Several journalists confirmed that the issues of their newspapers or magazines that cover the 
CFW reach the highest circulation of the entire year.  Covering the awards at the CFW is a win-
win situation for the media, the designers, and the CFA.  The CFW is not just a mission for the 
CFA, but also a money making enterprise.  As more and more designers are willing to participate 
in the CFW, the CFA generates more revenue through the registration fees.  In addition, the 
media hype surrounding the awards also brings corporate sponsorship for the events at the CFW.  
For example, two large Chinese fashion companies sponsored the “New Designers Awards” at 
the 2004 CFW.  Of course, the sponsors wanted to increase their media exposure by hyphenating 
their names with the awards.  Therefore, the fashion designers, the media, the CFA (and by 
extension, the state), and the corporate sponsors (not including the financial backers of the 
designers) all share an interest in the economy of the CFW that centers on the awards that appear 
to be merely symbolic.  To win those awards, subsequently to ensure the functioning of the 
economy of the CFW, the aspiring designers are compelled to be artistic and unique with their 
shows, including but not limited to the collections that they designed.   
Although the focus on awards and publicity makes fashion designers gravitate toward 
artistically oriented haute couture shows, I have to concede that there are many prêt-à-porter 
shows as well during the CFW today.  This in part has to do with increased participation of 
                                                 
68 In addition to the awards for the designers, there are awards for the models and journalists as well at the CFW.   
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foreign designers who generally use their shows to promote their prêt-à-porter lines at the CFW.  
More importantly, the interests of the fashion designer and the company who financially supports 
the designer are not always aligned when it comes to producing a show that does not reflect the 
company’s product lines.  In the case of the designer who is not the owner of the fashion 
company, the company would be better off should the show directly promote the name of the 
company or its brands rather than that of the designer.  Thus, it is not surprising that fashion 
companies would pressure their designers to show their prêt-à-porter collections during the 
CFW.  Ms. Zhou, a fashion designer I interviewed during the CFW in 2004, is a strong believer 
of this explanation.   
Ms. Zhou is Chief Designer of a women’s wear company based in Dalian, and she was a 
winner of the “Top Ten Fashion Designers” award a few years ago (I learned of her award 
through the CFA documents because she only mentioned that she had done fashion shows at the 
CFW before).  I met Ms. Zhou by accident during the 2004 CFW.  We both went to in a small 
restaurant for lunch in the basement of the International Trade Center, which is adjacent to the 
China World Hotel, a major site of the CFW.  Since it was busy lunch hour and perhaps too 
many customers were there because of the CFW, the waiter asked the customers to share tables, 
and I happened to share a table with Ms. Zhou who was dining alone.  Through some courteous 
exchange of words, I found out that Ms. Zhou was a fashion designer.  I introduced myself as a 
researcher on China’s fashion industry and asked if she would accept an interview with me.  She 
agreed.  I joined her two days later in her interview with a group of fashion models at the 
Starbucks shop inside the building of the China World Hotel.  Ms. Zhou did not do a show that 
year, and she went to the CFW mainly to interview and select models for photo shoots to be used 
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in the coming season’s advertisements and to reunite with her fellow designers.  After she sent 
the models off, our interview began.   
She told me that when she showed her prêt-à-porter collection at the CFW a few years 
earlier, there were not that many designers showing them, but it became increasingly a trend that 
the designers would show prêt-à-porter (that they sell on the market) rather than unmarketable 
haute couture collections.  I asked her why the designers had changed their approach.  She said it 
was because the companies that financially supported the fashion designers realized that their 
actual lines on the market did not get any exposure in the previous years’ fashion weeks; instead 
their support only helped the designers to achieve personal fame.  Designers might then end up 
leaving the company for better jobs or might be tempted to start their own businesses on the side.  
I turned the subject to her personal experience and asked whether she felt the same constraint 
from her company when she showed her prêt-à-porter collection at the CFW.  She said that she 
had a very good and stable working relationship with her boss, whom I later found out to be her 
elder sister.  During the interview, I was quite impressed by her dedication to her company, and 
she even asked me to visit her company’s stores in Beijing and Shanghai and offer her my 
feedback.69  Ms. Zhou’s example may be somewhat unique in her connection to her financial 
backer (her sister), but her point about the intricate relationship between fashion designers and 
their corporate backers was also confirmed by many other designers and journalists who I had 
talked to.   
Therefore, the cultural economy of the CFW that centers on the awards seems to be 
complicated by the fashion companies that are interested in promoting their marketable prêt-à-
                                                 
69 After I visited her stores in Beijing and Shanghai and did some basic research on her company, I called her and 
followed up with an hour of interview on her line of clothes.   
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porter collections rather than the designers to whom they provide financial support.  As a result, 
the current trend seems to be that there are more and more prêt-à-porter shows and less and less 
haute couture shows during the CFW.  This trend, however, does not change the fact that there 
are enormous interests in the awards from various agents or players in the field including the 
designers, the CFA, the media, and the corporate sponsors (different from the financial backers 
of the designers).  Because of the strong interest, the structure of awards at the CFW is likely to 
continue in the foreseeable future.  As long as winning awards presents a shortcut to success, 
there will be efforts, especially from the designers, to emphasize their creative and artistic talent.  
Indeed, many designers included couture designs in their shows at the 2004 CFW without 
naming their shows as “haute couture collections” as Mark Cheung did, which made it difficult 
to calculate the exact numbers of prêt-à-porter shows and haute couture shows.  Even for the 
established designers like Mark Cheung who do not need any more shortcuts to success, art is 
still a major means to try to stay at the cutting edge of fashion, i.e., to be continuously creative 
and artistic with their fashion shows.  Because of all those factors, couture designs will likely 
remain conspicuous at the CFW, especially when the awards continue to be a center piece of the 
CFW.   
This pattern of the CFW is different from London Fashion Week, which only shows prêt-
à-porter collections.  But it is not the only feature of the CFW that is unique.  The spatial and 
temporal structure of the CFW also reflects distinctive characteristics of the Chinese field of 
fashion when it is contrasted to the LFW.  
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5.7 CFW AS THE OBJECTIFICATION OF THE CHINESE FIELD OF FASHION 
In their study of London Fashion Week, Entwistle and Rocamora (2006) make the observation 
that the gates and gate-keepers map out the boundary of the British field of fashion.  Indeed, a 
similar observation can be made about the CFW.  The controlled access to the CFW events does 
to some extent delineate a relatively autonomous space, and the tickets and invitations generally 
symbolize membership to the Chinese field of fashion.  However, there are also key differences 
between the CFW and the LFW, and by extension, between the Chinese field of fashion and its 
British counterpart.    
The first major difference has to do with the seating arrangements inside the show 
theater.  According to Entwistle and Rocamora, the front-row seats in the show theater are more 
privileged than the back-row seats as they enjoy better views and are more easily seen by others 
in the audience, or as they put it, the front-row seats enjoy the advantage of both “seeing and 
being seen” (2006: 742-5).70  They argue that the distinction in the seating arrangements displays 
and reaffirms the distinguished positions of the occupants of the front-row seats in the British 
field of fashion who are typically celebrities, fashion icons, renowned journalists and designers, 
and so on.  From my own field research, this pattern is also observed at the CFW: the front-row 
seats in the show theater are clearly privileged and are generally reserved for the judges and the 
invited VIP guests of the host designer, while the back-row seats are for the general audience 
with tickets.  But different from the LFW, there is a lack of participation of celebrities and 
fashion icons at the CFW, and the front-row occupants are generally the host designer’s fellow 
designers, friends, VIP customers, as well as the judges selected by the CFA.  More importantly, 
                                                 
70 In a study of fashion shows, Kondo also notes that the audiences of the fashion show gaze at each other and thus 
perform for each other (see Kondo 1997: 103).  
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the most privileged seats at the CFW are not the front-row seats on the two sides of the runway; 
instead, they are located at the foot of the T-stage, right in front of the media and their cameras.  
These seats are reserved by the CFA for their own officials, government officials (such as the 
mayor of Beijing), and other distinguished guests.  Consequently, they enjoy the central and 
most commanding view of the show, and are most easily seen by others in the audience as well.  
Therefore, although the CFW and the LFW are similar in that the seats in the theater map out and 
thus reproduce the hierarchy within the field of fashion, the seating arrangements at the CFW 
serve as a constant reminder that political power, especially the power of the state, is literally 
“front and center” in the Chinese field of fashion.   
In addition to the spatial display of “distinctions” in the theater space, Entwistle and 
Rocamora point out that the temporal structure of the fashion show also suggests hierarchy, in 
the sense that those who enjoy the highest status in the fashion field tend to be “fashionably late” 
for the show (2006: 742).  Once again, here the CFW differs from the LFW.  As my experience 
of Mark Cheung’s show indicates, the ones who tend to be late are not necessarily those who are 
fashionable, but those who are in power (in fact, the show would not start without them).  
Similarly, the last show (by Mark Cheung) at the CFW also seems to be the most important one, 
which is crystallized in the Chinese phrase of “yazhou xi” (the last and most important show).  
Thus, congruent with the spatial structure of the shows, the temporal structure of the shows also 
indicates the significance of power at the CFW.  Given that the state (and its agents) was deeply 
involved in the development of the fashion industry and in the establishment of the CFA, it is not 
surprising that the power of the state features so prominently at the CFW.   
Therefore, if we follow Entwistle and Rocamora’s argument that the institution of fashion 
week maps out and reproduces the field of fashion, then we have to promptly add that the 
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uniqueness of the Chinese field of fashion is that it is wide open when it comes to the power of 
the state.  To make this point clear, I have to return to Bourdieu’s field theory, which provides 
the theoretical framework for Entwistle and Rocamora’s study of the LFW.  As noted in Chapter 
4, Bourdieu’s notion of a field is defined as “a structured space with its own laws of functioning 
and its own relations of force independent of those of politics and the economy, except, 
obviously, in the case of the economic and political fields” (Johnson 1996: 6).  Following this 
notion, Entwistle and Rocamora conceptualize the British field of fashion as an autonomous 
space independent of politics, although they clearly acknowledge the existence of power at the 
London Fashion Week to the extent that various players are hierarchically positioned in the field.  
By contrast, the Chinese field of fashion as objectified by the CFW is not completely 
autonomous in relation to political power, though the boundary of the field is enacted during the 
CFW through the mechanisms of gates, gate-keepers, tickets, and invitations.  Different from the 
British field of fashion, state power overrides the boundary of the Chinese field of fashion and 
becomes internal to the field—government officials do not need tickets or invitations to get into 
the fashion shows and yet maintain privileged seats, which reflect their privileged positions in 
the Chinese field of fashion.  Hence, like the LFW, the CFW is an objectification of the Chinese 
field of fashion, but unlike the British field of fashion, state power is featured “front and center” 
in the Chinese field.  Without further research, I can only suggest that this characteristic of the 
Chinese field of fashion is perhaps due to the fact that China is still not a democratic society and 




In this chapter, I examined Chinese fashion shows and China Fashion Week, a major event that 
brings together various players in China’s fashion industry.  As an imported institution, China 
Fashion Week maintains some similarities to Western fashion weeks.  Building on Entwistle and 
Rocamora’s insights about London Fashion Week, I argue that China Fashion Week is an 
objectification of the Chinese field of fashion, in the sense that various positions in the field are 
rendered visible through temporal and spatial arrangements at China Fashion Week and by so 
doing the structure of the field positions are reproduced.  However, China Fashion Week is also 
localized in significant ways; there are major differences between China Fashion Week and 
London Fashion Week. 
One of the key differences is the elaborate award structure of the CFW, which was set up 
by the CFA to jumpstart China’s fashion industry.  The awards of CFW lead Chinese fashion 
designers towards showing artistically oriented haute couture designs rather than showing their 
prêt-à-porter collections that are sold on the market.  The divergence between the clothes on the 
runway and the clothes on the market is caused by the designers’ belief that unique and artistic 
designs are better positioned to win awards at the CFW, which could lead to instant national 
fame and which in turn could lead to faster or greater financial success.  This approach to fashion 
shows at the CFW has also been proven to be a viable shortcut to success by the career 
trajectories of many designers who were earlier awards winners.  Although the financial backers 
of the designers do not directly benefit from the awards and subsequently pressure the designers 
to show their prêt-à-porter collections, the creative couture designs are able to find their way 
onto the runways of the CFW.  Besides the designers, the media, the CFA, and the corporate 
sponsors all share an interest in maintaining the attention-catching awards of the CFW.  
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Consequently, fashion shows during China Fashion Week, though they are evidently platforms 
of commercial promotions, contain uniquely Chinese rationale, which has to do with the need for 
China to quickly spread the names of Chinese fashion designers and speed up the development 
of the fashion industry.  
Another major difference between the CFW and the LFW is the position of political 
power in the field of fashion. As Entwistle and Rocamora observe, the boundaries set up at 
London Fashion Week indicate that the British field of fashion is an autonomous space that is 
independent of politics.  In contrast, the Chinese fashion field as objectified by China Fashion 
Week reserves privileged positions for government officials.  The prominent presence of 
government officials at China Fashion Week not only indicates the connections between the state 
and the CFA, but also serves as a reminder that the field of fashion is embedded in Chinese 
society where the power of the state and the Communist Party is a dominant force that can 
penetrate any relatively autonomous fields at will. 
The Chinese characteristics of fashion shows and fashion week suggest that fashion 
shows, particularly those during the CFW, are not just commercial means to promote fashion, 
but also “localized” strategies for the designers and other players to obtain better positions in the 
field of fashion.  Because China Fashion Week is embedded in Chinese society, an ethnographic 
approach is needed to unravel the cultural economy of China Fashion Week, and subsequently 
the Chinese field of fashion. 
In the next chapter, I will further explore the boundary (this time the geographic 
boundary) of the Chinese field of fashion, and focus on the exportation of Chinese made clothing 
to the United States.  I will examine the relationship between the two fields of Chinese clothing 
 152 
industry and the U.S. clothing industry through the main material connections between them, i.e., 




Image 1: Backdrop of Mark Cheung’s Show 
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6.0  GLOBALIZATION: A CLOTHING PERSPECTIVE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The winter of 2005 was a joyful time for the Pittsburgh Steelers’ fans, because their team did the 
almost impossible.  It went into the postseason as a wild card team and upset all the “stronger” 
teams on the road and was on its way to win the Super Bowl.  The joy spread far beyond 
Pittsburgh and the United States.  Mr. Zeng, a friend of mine who lives in Shanghai, China and 
works in the business of international garment trade, was so excited for me that he sent me a 
Steelers jersey via FedEx.  The Steelers jerseys, as I was told by Mr. Zeng, were in high demand 
and mine was a sample for the follow-up orders from Reebok (merged with Adidas since 2006), 
the sportswear giant that makes jerseys for the U.S. National Football League (NFL).   
My Steelers jersey, although in the form of a sample and then a gift, was made along with 
millions of other garments in China that were bound for consumption in the United States.  The 
previous chapters of this dissertation have focused on the domestic aspects of China’s clothing 
and fashion industry.  But, the Chinese clothing industry does not exist in isolation; instead, it 
has significant global connections.  To continue using the concept of “field” borrowed from 
Bourdieu, international trade provides the linkage between the fields of the Chinese clothing 
industry and the global clothing industry.  In fact, this linkage is a key component of the Chinese 
clothing industry. As discussed in Chapter 2, the export of apparel is crucial to China’s clothing 
industry and the overall Chinese economy: China’s clothing exports account for over a quarter of 
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the world’s total export of garments and it has been a critical hard currency earner for China to 
finance its modernization projects and to keep millions of workers employed.  The U.S. market is 
particularly important to the Chinese clothing industry, as it is the largest single country importer 
of Chinese made garments, which accounted for about 23.1 percent of China’s garment exports 
in 2003.71   In the same year, China was also the largest garment exporter to the United States, 
capturing 16.9 percent of the total U.S. imports of clothing.   
In this chapter, I explore the global connections of China’s clothing industry by looking 
at China’s exportation of apparel.  In particular, I focus on the trade dispute between the United 
States and China with regard to textile and apparel products in 2005.  I examine how various 
parties are connected through Chinese made garments and how different meanings are mapped 
onto those goods at different sites.  By so doing, I join the anthropological critique of the global 
homogenization or Westernization thesis and argue that the meanings of the global goods are 
always locally constructed (Friedman 1991; Howes 1996; Inda and Rosaldo 2002).  Furthermore, 
I argue that while the various meanings of the Chinese made clothing are constructed at different 
sites and thus they are disconnected from each other, the movement of the goods connects 
various interested persons and groups into a global network, and this global network is a crucial 
mechanism for the interested parties to act and react to each other and at the same time provides 
a vital channel through which power unevenly impact the interested persons and groups that are 
involved in the network.  Through the study of Chinese apparel exports, I propose a “clothing 
perspective” to the anthropological study of globalization.  To fully explicate this perspective, I 
                                                 
71 As an aggregate, the European Union is the largest importer of Chinese made clothing.  In terms of market share, 
Japan has the highest percentage of imports of Chinese clothing, which accounts for more than 70 percent of Japan’s 
clothing imports. 
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have to first briefly review recent studies on globalization in anthropology, especially those on 
the transnational flow of goods.     
6.2 TRANSNATIONAL FLOW OF GOODS, GLOBALIZATION THEORIES, AND 
NETWORK ANALYSIS 
“Following the thing,” as suggested by George Marcus (1995), is one of the “tracking” strategies 
for anthropologists to study the complex phenomena of globalization.  Even though goods move 
in various directions in the world, recent anthropological studies of the transnational flow of 
goods have mostly focused on goods that originate from the developed West and flow into the 
developing rest.  According to these studies, Western goods are not simply material objects, but 
also cultural symbols that possess transformative power and provide a catalyst to cultural change 
in the receiving societies.  The film The Gods Must Be Crazy provides a good albeit fictional 
illustration of how a Western object, in this case a coke bottle that fell out of an airplane, leads to 
a series of political and cultural changes among a !Kung tribe in the Kalahari Desert.  Western 
objects such as the coke bottle among the !Kung are generally recognized by scholars, 
sometimes as “social hieroglyphics” that are coded with a set of production relations (Marx 
1967: 74) and sometimes as a “fetish” (Marx 1967; Taussig 1993) that are laden with potent 
transformative power.  However, with regard to the nature of the changes brought about by those 
Western goods, scholars have different views.  One view holds that the inflow of Western goods 
ushers changes in non-Western societies in the image of the West and consequently leads to a 
“global homogenization” or Westernization.  George Ritzer (2000), for example, thinks that 
McDonald’s is engulfing the world and creating an effect of “McDonaldization” of societies 
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(also see Schlosser 2001).  Similarly, other scholars have named the global homogenization 
thesis as “Coca-Colonization” of the world, referring to the intrusion of Coca-Cola into non-
Western societies (see Hannerz 1992b: 217; Howes 1996: 1-16).  In effect, what the global 
homogenization thesis argues is a form of Western cultural imperialism (Tomlinson 1991, 1997).  
Anthropologists, however, generally disagree with the global homogenization paradigm, 
and believe that the global goods are subject to local resistance and/or appropriation and 
consequently the global becomes contextualized, hybridized, creolized, or localized (e.g. Howes 
1996; Friedman 1991).  Aside from the prominent example of McDonald’s and its localized 
consumption practices (e.g. Watson 1997; Traphagan and Brown 2002), local consumption of 
Western textiles, clothing, and toys are also studied by anthropologists.  Emma Tarlo (1996) 
points out that the swadeshi (or homespun) movement in India was initiated by Gandhi in order 
to resist British textiles and as a means to fight for the overall national independence.  Jean 
Comaroff (1997) records that although European styles of clothing were adopted by the Africans 
(beginning in the nineteenth century with the British mission to “civilize” the Africans), they 
were also juxtaposed and sometimes even syncretized with the local folk dress, and the two types 
of clothing jointly constituted a complex relationship between dress and the politics of ethnicity 
and class.  Grewal’s (1999) example of how Barbie dolls didn’t sell in India until they were 
dressed in saris also shows how the global and the local are reconfigured simultaneously at their 
encounter.  These studies demonstrate that Western-made goods are always “remade” once they 
move into a non-Western context.  In fact, my study of fashion design and fashion shows in 
China in Chapters 4 and 5 also supports the argument that the inflow of Western goods and 
practices does not create a mirror image of the West in China, and hence it joins a growing 
anthropological effort to challenge the global homogenization thesis.  
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This chapter, however, looks at the reverse flow of goods from China to the West, the 
United States in particular.  Studies of goods flowing from the Third World to the First World 
are evidently less common, and primarily focus on raw materials such as sugar (Mintz 1985), 
other foods and crafts (Kasfir 1999; Silverman 1999).  Similar to the works reviewed above, the 
flow of goods from the rest to the West also involve two processes of “de-territorialization” and 
“re-territorialization” (Inda and Rosaldo 2002), in the sense that the meanings of the goods 
change from their place of production to their place of consumption.  Sidney Mintz’s (1985) 
study of sugar is a classic example.  He finds that when the meaning of sugar changed from a 
delicacy, medicine, or spice to a daily necessity for the working class in Europe, it concomitantly 
became a means of survival for the workers in the sugar plantations in the Caribbean.  Mintz’s 
work also suggests that the meanings of non-Western goods are frequently wrought with the 
political economy that frames the unequal relationship between the West and the rest.  Jane 
Collins’s study on Brazil’s international trade of grapes provides another example.  She indicates 
that changes in Western consumption patterns, specifically the increasing standardization of 
consumer environment in the West has unevenly impacted grape producers in Brazil; large farms 
that can afford the refrigerated distribution infrastructure are winning greater market shares at the 
expense of small farms that ironically produce better grapes.  As a result, what considered good 
locally in Brazil in terms of the products does not translate into good business that is largely 
shaped by international capital (Collins: 2000).  Mintz’s study of sugar and Collins’s study of 
grapes not only point out that the different meanings are associated with the goods in different 
locations, but also emphasize the connections between people in different locations established 
through the movement of the goods.  The connection is important because it forms a network 
through which power is unevenly distributed and conditions the movement of the goods.   
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Network analysis is also applied by some scholars to the transnational flow of Western 
goods.  Robert Foster’s study of Coca-Cola is an excellent example (2002: 151-174).  Foster 
observes that Coca-Cola provides a network that connects Roberto C. Goizueta, the former 
chairman and CEO of the Coca-Cola Company based in the United States, to an average 
consumer such as Elizabeth Solomon (pseudonym) in Papua New Guinea.  While non-Western 
consumers such as Ms. Solomon were imagined by the company’s executives like Mr. Goizueta 
as human vessels to be filled with more and more cola, for Ms. Solomon, an old lady, the drink 
symbolizes “the white man’s world entangling her children and grandchildren in urban Port 
Moresby” (Foster 2002:171).  Through the network of Coca-Cola, Mr. Goizueta and Ms. 
Solomon constitute each other’s context in which they construct their own meanings of the 
commodity.  Forster’s study of Coca-Cola more explicitly explained how seemingly 
disconnected meanings are mapped onto the commodity that paradoxically connects them into a 
common network.     
Like Mintz’s study of sugar and Collins’s study of grapes, Foster’s use of “network 
analysis” of Coca-Cola provides a methodological tool to study the movement of garments from 
China to the United States.  Building on the insights of these exemplary studies, this chapter 
proposes a “clothing perspective” to study both the global disconnections of meanings attached 
to the Chinese made garments in different locations and the global connections between various 
interested persons and groups in China and the United States.     
The utilization of a “network analysis” does not conflict with the “field analysis” in 
previous chapters.  The “network” here is constituted through the movement of the Chinese 
made garments, and the persons and groups connected to the network through those garments are 
in fact what I refer to as “the agents or players” in the field of the clothing industry.  While the 
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approach of “field analysis” has strength in studying the internal dynamics of the field, i.e., the 
clothing industry, a network analysis has the advantage of examining the connections between 
separate fields, here the fields of the Chinese and U.S. clothing industries.  In addition, in a 
network analysis, specific field positions, such as those occupied by workers, designers, and 
executives, are not always important distinctions; instead common interests may be shared by 
those who occupy different field positions.  As we shall see later, common interests rather than 
differences in field positions matter more in the network constituted by the transnational 
movement of the Chinese made garments.  I use “persons and groups” (sometimes interested 
parties) instead of “agents or players” in this chapter intentionally in order to avoid the 
association with specific field positions and their inherent attributes and distinctions.  Before I 
apply a network analysis to the Chinese exportation of clothing to the United States, some 
background information is needed to understand how the Chinese and U.S. clothing industries 
become connected, which has to do with the nature of the apparel industry.  
6.3 “AN IMPERFECT INDUSTRY” 
The apparel industry (as well as the textile industry) has been closely connected to 
industrialization and modernization since the Industrial Revolution started in Britain in the 18th 
century.  Yet, no matter how advanced the technologies have become over the years, one of the 
key operations of the industry remains the same, that is, it requires human operators sitting 
behind sewing machines to stitch the garments.  Consequently, labor is one of the major 
components of the cost of the garments, and worse yet, a “flexible” cost.  To reduce costs, the 
apparel industry in the United States (as well as in Britain and elsewhere) constantly seeks to 
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exploit cheap labor both at home and abroad.  The labor intensive nature and the exploitation of 
labor in the apparel industry lead Joanne Entwistle to call it “an imperfect industry” (Entwistle 
2000: 212).  The labor intensive but not capital or technology intensive nature of the apparel 
industry also means that the cost or barrier of entry into the industry is low, so much so that the 
apparel industry is frequently a major means for developing countries such as China to kick off 
their industrialization process and grow their economy.  Consequently, the need for the U.S. 
apparel industry to outsource its labor-intensive manufacturing in order to reduce costs is met 
with the need for China (and other developing countries) to develop its economy.   
U.S. apparel firms’ strategy to outsource their manufacturing operations to developing 
countries where cheap labor is abundant is a part of the post-Fordist flexible accumulation, a 
process that has become significantly pronounced since the 1970s (Harvey 1989: 145; Kilduff 
2005).  Since the 1990s China has become a major choice of destination for sourcing for the U.S. 
importers and retailers.  However, the current turn by the U.S. firms to China is but a 
continuation of this pattern of production in Japan, then Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan in 
earlier decades (Bonacich and Waller 1994: 21-22).  This pattern of production involves both 
Western firms and Chinese suppliers.  The Western firms typically control the brand, 
distribution, and marketing, and they are called the “original brand manufacturers” (OBM).72  
The Chinese suppliers are only responsible for the production of the garments, and they are 
called “original equipment manufacturers” (OEM).  In the case of my Steelers’ jersey, the 
Chinese factory that made the garment is the OEM, while Reebok is the OBM.  The distinctions 
between the two types of manufacturers have significant implications.  The OBM controls the 
high value-added processes (such design and marketing), while the OEM the low value-added 
                                                 
72 Sometimes, they are also called “original design manufacturers” (ODM). 
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processes (such as assembly and packaging).  In monetary terms, about 75 percent of the 
proceeds from the sale of the garments would go to the OBM, while just about 25 percent (often 
less than that) would go to the OEM.  Moreover, because the OBM controls the brand and the 
access to the market, it has much greater power over the OEM.  For example, if the OEM 
couldn’t meet the demands of the OBM, the OBM could simply replace them with other OEM 
suppliers in or outside China.  The fundamental power imbalance between the OEM and the 
OBM also reflects the unequal relationship between China and the United States, which is 
particularly conspicuous when it comes to the international trade treaties and regimes pertaining 
to textiles and apparel. 
6.4 IMPERFECT INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGIMES 
Although the U.S. corporations (as well as the consumers) benefit from outsourcing their 
garment manufacturing, such acts would also result in job losses in the United States, particularly 
in southern states such as North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia where the textile and 
apparel industries are concentrated.  To prevent job losses in the textile and apparel industries, 
the U.S. worker and labor unions, and relevant interest groups are aligned with local and federal 
politicians and have made the textile and apparel industries one of the most protected industries 
in the United States.   
In the 1950s, the United States instituted protective measures such as the Voluntary 
Export Restraint (VER) against the imports of Japanese cotton products.  However, this 
protective measure failed because it actually led to dramatic increase of imports from Hong 
Kong and Taiwan.  In the 1960s, the Kennedy administration tried to remedy the shortcomings 
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of the VER by instituting the Short Term Arrangement on Cotton Textiles (STA) and later the 
Long Term Arrangement for Cotton Textiles (LTA), in order to expand the restrictions on 
imports of cotton products from Japan to other U.S. trading partners.  But the STA and the LTA 
also failed because the textile and apparel industries quickly shifted from cotton products to wool 
and man-made fibers that were not then restricted by those trade regimes.  The continued loss of 
jobs in the U.S. textile and apparel industries led to further expansion of protection.  In 1974, the 
United States successfully negotiated an international treaty called the “Multi-fiber 
Arrangement” (MFA), which allowed the United States (as well as Europe and Canada) to 
restrict textile and apparel imports from developing countries to limited quantities adjustable 
only on an annual basis.  The quota system of the MFA was the most comprehensive and long-
lasting protective trade regime against U.S. imports of textile and apparel products.73  
The MFA was an unfair trade agreement, and it clearly violated the principles of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the dominant international trade regime since 
World War II that included most countries in the world as members (socialist countries such as 
China were not members of the GATT).  As acknowledged by the U.S. International Trade 
Commission, the MFA departed from the GATT specifically in two respects: “(1) they [the 
quotas] were applied on a country-specific basis, in contradiction of the nondiscrimination 
obligation (all GATT members be treated equally when any trade measures are applied), and (2) 
they contradict the general principle of reducing or avoiding absolute quantitative limits” (U.S. 
ITC 2004: 8).  Consequently, the developing countries, whose clothing exports were unfairly 
restricted by quotas assigned to them by the developed importing countries such as the United 
States, attempted repeatedly to eliminate the MFA through multilateral negotiations under the 
                                                 
73 For the brief history of the U.S. trade protection against textile and apparel imports, see Rivoli 2005: 127-130. 
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framework of the GATT, and it became a major agenda of the “Uruguay Round” (1986-1994).  
In 1994, an agreement was reached under the framework of the GATT that the MFA quota 
system would gradually phase out over a ten-year period and be completely removed by January 
1, 2005.  As the GATT was superseded by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, the 
agreement was replaced by the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) with the same 
intent to phase out the MFA within the same time frame (Scott 1998).  Nevertheless, before 
2005, the exportation of most Chinese made textile and apparel products to the United States had 
been subjected to quota restrictions sanctioned by the U.S. government under the MFA.   
As a member of the WTO (since December 2001), China was supposed to enjoy the full 
benefit of quota-free export of textile and apparel products to the United States in 2005 after the 
new trade regime of the ATC went into effect.  However, when China negotiated with the United 
States in 1999 for its accession to the WTO, the United States (the European Union later 
followed suit) added a particular safeguard clause called Paragraph 242 in the bilateral 
agreement, which allows the U.S. government to impose temporary quotas on the U.S. imports 
of textile and clothing from China up until December 2008 if such imports from China have 
caused “the existence or threat of market disruption” (Paragraph 242 of The Working Party 
Report on China’s Accession to the WTO).  Like the MFA, Paragraph 242, which specifically 
targets textile and apparel imports from China (but not from other countries), unfairly privileges 
the United States and violates the fair trade and nondiscrimination principles of the WTO and the 
ATC that aims to eliminate import quotas.  That fact that the United States was able to 
successfully negotiate with China to include such a clause in their bilateral agreement indicates 
the imbalance of power between the United States and China, especially in economic and 
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political terms.  Nevertheless, the contradiction between Paragraph 242 and the ATC became the 
source of a heated trade dispute between the two countries in 2005. 
6.5 THE U.S.-CHINA TEXTILE AND APPAREL TRADE DISPUTE IN 2005  
By January 2005, under the ATC all the U.S. quotas of the imports of textile and clothing 
products were eliminated, which resulted in a dramatic surge of U.S. imports of textile and 
clothing from China.  Several product categories increased over 100 and even 1000 percent of 
those in the same period in 2004.  The surge was caused in part by the fact that the U.S. 
government withheld quota restrictions on the majority of the product categories until the end of 
2004 rather than lifting them gradually as they had agreed to in the 1994 GATT agreement (U.S. 
GAO report, April 2005, p. 10), and the sudden elimination of all the quotas was coupled with 
large demands for cheap and good quality products from China.  Yet, the surge of U.S. imports 
of Chinese textile and clothing was reported widely by the U.S. media as a “flood” and “threat” 
(e.g. the New York Times, 03/10/2005).  On April 6, 2005, seven petitions were filed by 
American Manufacturing Trade Action Coalition (AMTAC), National Council of Textile 
Organizations (NCTO), National Textile Association (NTA), and the labor union UNITE HERE, 
requesting the U.S. government to take safeguard actions against the importation of seven 
categories of Chinese textile and clothing products.  More petitions continued to be filed by the 
same groups later in June, July, and up until November when a new broad agreement was 
reached between the governments of the United States and China.  On May 13, the Committee 
for the Implementation of Textile Agreements (CITA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce 
invoked Paragraph 242 and initiated threat-based safeguard quotas against the importation of 
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three product categories of textile and clothing products with Chinese origin.  Five days later, 
CITA decided to impose safeguard quotas limiting the importation of four more categories of 
Chinese made textile and clothing products, citing Paragraph 242 (http://otexa.ita.doc.gov).74  
Since then, a lengthy and heated textile and apparel trade dispute broke out between the United 
States and China.   
Soon after the U.S. decision on limiting Chinese textile and apparel imports, the two 
governments followed the procedure under the WTO agreement and began consultation and 
negotiation.  While the U.S. government cited Paragraph 242 to justify its decisions, the Chinese 
government invoked its rights as a member of the WTO and the quota-free trade agreement of 
the ATC that both sides signed as members of the WTO.  The two sides were so adamant on 
their positions that it took eight rounds of consultation and negotiation for the two governments 
to finally reach a new broad agreement on November 8, 2005,75 which far exceeded the three-
month period of consultation stipulated in Paragraph 242.  The negotiation process took so long 
that before the agreement was reached some categories of the Chinese products already exceeded 
the limits of the quotas and were subsequently withheld by the U.S. Customs Office.  As 
mentioned earlier, before the new agreement was reached, the U.S. government continued to 
issue quotas to limit the importation of new product categories from China in order to step up the 
pressure on the Chinese government.  At the same time, the U.S. government did not unilaterally 
declare those safeguard measures permanent as it could after the required three-month 
                                                 
74 These seven categories include cotton knit shirts and blouses (category 338/339); cotton trousers (category 
347/348); cotton and man-made fiber underwear (category 352/652); men’s and boy’s cotton and man-made fiber 
shirts, not knit (category 340/640); man-made fiber trousers (category 647/648), man-made fiber knit shirts and 
blouses (category 638/639), and combed cotton yarn (category 301).  More categories were imposed with safeguard 
quotas later during the negotiation and consultation process.   
75 This agreement is entitled “memorandum of understanding between the governments of the United States of 
America and the People’s Republic of China concerning trade in textile and apparel products,” available at: 
http://www.ustr.gov. 
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consultation period expired; instead, it continued to negotiate with the Chinese government for 
fear of an escalation of the trade dispute.  In the end, both sides compromised in the new broad 
agreement: China accepted quotas on 34 categories of textile and apparel products exporting to 
the United States from 2005 through 2008, much broader than the existing 19 product categories 
under temporary safeguard restrictions, while the United States raised the percentage of annual 
increase of its importation of the safeguarded Chinese textile and apparel products, from 7.5 
percent as stipulated in Paragraph 242 to between 10 and 17 percent from 2005 through the end 
of 2008 (when all the quotas on Chinese textile and clothing imports would be finally lifted).  
The U.S. also agreed to allow entry of the Chinese imports withheld by the U.S. Customs due to 
quota limits, with an understanding that the quantity exceeding the new annual quota limits 
would be in half “subsidized” by the United States and the other half counted toward the quotas 
of those product categories for the next year. 
The new agreement between the United States and China, though a compromise between 
the two, is far from a fair trade agreement.  Above all, the privilege of the United States is 
protected by Paragraph 242, and the final agreement is but an enactment of Paragraph 242, albeit 
in a more lenient way.  Just as the U.S. OBM buyers have the upper hand over the Chinese OEM 
suppliers, the advantage of the United States over China in terms of trade can be attributed to the 
fact that the United States is buying more from China than the other way around.  However, just 
because the United States has the upper hand, does not explain why it exercises that privilege.  
After all, it is not in everyone’s interests to limit the imports from China.  Because the quotas are 
sold in China, they become extra costs to the garments.76  The U.S. corporate buyers (importers, 
                                                 
76 The quotas are free from the U.S. government, but the Chinese government sells them to the Chinese 
manufacturers.  Quotas are also available in the “black market,” sold by the profiteers.  
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retailers, and outsourcing manufacturers) would in many ways be better off without the extra 
costs of the quotas, and so would the U.S. consumers.  To understand why the U.S. government 
imposes quota limits on clothing imports from China, we have to examine the different positions 
and interests within the U.S. textile and apparel industries, which I divide into opposition to and 
support for apparel imports from China.   
6.5.1 Strong Opposition from Domestically-based U.S. Manufacturers and Workers  
As previously mentioned, the rise in the U.S. importation of Chinese made clothing was reported 
by the media as a “flood” and “threat,” by connotation, something needed to be contained.  No 
one else had taken this threat more seriously than the domestically-based U.S. textile and 
garment manufacturers and workers.  From their position, the imports from China represent 
competition and a threat to their own market shares and/or jobs.  To protect their own interests, 
they tend to overstate the threat of imports from China and eagerly demand the U.S. government 
for more protection.77  Representing their interests, various groups and organizations such as the 
AMTAC, NCTO, NTA, UNITE HERE, and DMC (Domestic Manufacturers Committee of the 
Hosiery Association) lobbied policy makers in Washington D.C. vehemently for safeguard 
protection against imports from China in 2005, which turned out to be rather successful. 
                                                 
77 For example, the American Textile Manufacturers Institute, in a study entitled “The China Threat to World 
Textile and Apparel Trade,” estimated that China would take over 2/3 of the U.S. market in 24 months after the 
quotas were lifted in 2005.  Many scholars believe that such a scenario is unlikely given that a host of factors 
including cost are involved in the U.S. corporations’ sourcing decisions (e.g. Abernathy et al. 2004). 
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6.5.2 Support from U.S. Corporate Buyers and Consumers 
To the U.S. corporate buyers, including importers, retailers, and manufacturers that outsource 
their production to China, however, clothing imported from China is not a threat, but a good 
deal.  In a survey of a large number of U.S. corporate buyers conducted by the U.S. International 
Trade Commission in order to assess the competitiveness of certain foreign suppliers to the U.S. 
market, the Commission states, “China is expected to become the ‘supplier of choice’ for most 
U.S. importers (the large apparel companies and retailers) because of its ability to make almost 
any type of textile and apparel product at any quality level at a competitive price” (p. xi).  
Clearly, the views of the China-made garments shared by the U.S. corporate buyers differ from 
those of the domestically-based manufacturers, workers, and the interest groups that represent 
them.  As mentioned above, the consumers would also be better off without the quotas, so 
consumers should have an interest in supporting the Chinese imports as well, although they 
should not be seen as a unified group because many consumers take many other factors such as 
quality, environmental concerns, and fair labor practices, etc., besides price, into consideration 
when it comes to their decisions of buying.   
The diverse views and interests raise the question why only the voices of the 
domestically-based U.S. workers and manufacturers, but not those of the U.S. corporate buyers 
and consumers seemed to have been heard by the U.S. policy makers in their handling of the 
U.S.-China textile and garment trade dispute in 2005.  Economist Pietra Rivoli’s (2005) study of 
the global textile and apparel industries provides valuable insights to the U.S. trade policy 
making process.   
Rivoli attributes the frequent wins of protectionism in the U.S. textile and clothing trade 
to two major factors.  One factor is what she regards as the “snarling together” phenomenon 
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among the interest groups, such as AMTAC, NCTO, NTA, and UNITE HERE (she calls them an 
“alphabet army”), who represent the interests of the domestically-based U.S. manufacturers and 
workers (Rivoli 2005:123).  These interest groups are able to speak with a single voice because 
the U.S. textile and apparel industries are geographically and historically concentrated in the 
southern states such as the Carolinas and Georgia, and this concentration is further strengthened 
by a shared cultural and historical bond among the textile manufacturers.  By contrast, the U.S. 
corporate buyers are not as unified; organizations such as the National Retail Federation (NRF) 
represent diverse interests ranging from the interests of a small tourist shop to those of Saks Fifth 
Avenue, and thus they have a much harder time speaking in unison.  I would also add to Rivoli’s 
point here that the geographical diversity of the importers (including the retailers) separates them 
into different voting districts, which makes them less effective than their geographically 
concentrated rivals in their concerted efforts to influence the policy makers.  Nevertheless, Rivoli 
thinks that the voice of protectionism in unison is generally met with sympathy from the 
American voters who rather tolerate this type of protectionism than hear news that another 
American factory is being closed and another American community being destroyed due to job 
losses resulted from outsourcing.   
The voting behavior of American public leads to Rivoli’s second factor that contributes 
to protectionism in the U.S. textile and apparel trade, which has a lot to do with the politics of 
deal-making in Washington D.C.  As Rivoli puts it, the access to the U.S. market is treated by 
the politicians as a “currency,” to be traded for votes, for foreign policy favors (such as for 
Pakistan’s help in the war against terrorism), and sometimes ironically for the same interest 
groups who advocate protectionism to accept broader trade liberalizing initiatives  (124).  
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Therefore, protectionism in the U.S. textile and apparel trade is very useful, if not essential, for 
political purposes in the eyes of American politicians.     
Although Rivoli did not study the 2005 U.S.-China textile and apparel trade dispute per 
se, her analyses of the processes of the U.S. trade policy making help explain how the different 
positions on the U.S. imports of China-made clothing were only translated into a largely 
protectionist though compromised safeguard policy adopted by the U.S. government in 
November 2005.  In the politics of deal making and negotiation, the concerted voice of 
domestically-based U.S. manufacturers and workers is much more powerful than disconcerted 
ones of U.S. corporate buyers.  Similarly, this also explains why the voices of average American 
consumers, who clearly have an interest in this issue, are largely absent in the U.S. government’s 
decision making process on the textile and apparel trade policies—they are too diverse to be 
meaningful to the politicians, especially when it comes to votes during elections.  In fact, one 
would be hard pressed to find an average American consumer, who is not in the above-
mentioned categories of the interest groups, would go to the public hearings held by CITA in 
Washington D.C. to voice his or her support for more imports of Chinese made clothing because 
he or she would be able to save a few bucks.  As a matter of fact, the imports from China could 
be easily replaced by equally cheap if not cheaper imports from elsewhere.  So, it is unlikely 
even for those cost conscious consumers to voice their support for imports from any single 
foreign country, let alone those consumers who are more concerned about environmental and 
social factors than costs.  As a result, politics rather than economic rationale dominates the 
decision making process in this largely economic matter of textile and apparel trade dispute with 
China in 2005.   
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6.5.3 The Chinese Side 
As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, there are multiple positions occupied by various agents or 
players, such as designers, models, workers, and so on, in the field of the Chinese clothing 
industry.  But the differences among these players (and their positions) are internal; when it 
comes to the export of Chinese made garments, they share a common interest, that is, to 
eliminate the discriminatory quota system and expand the international market share of the 
garments they make.  Because China is not yet a democracy, the Chinese government is solely 
responsible to represent their interests.  Interests of the textile and apparel industries are very 
important to China; after all, China’s textile and apparel industries employ about 19 million 
workers.78  Yet in the end, the Chinese government gave in to the U.S. pressure and signed the 
new agreement that is largely favorable to the United States.  Such a resolution is in some ways 
expected.  First of all, this is because of the existence of the discriminatory clause of Paragraph 
242 against China, which eventually framed the resolution.  Second, in terms of trade with the 
United States, China exports more than it imports from the United States.  There are simply not 
enough bargaining chips at the disposal of the Chinese government.  Third, aside from the 
interests in the textile and apparel industries, China also received pressure from the United States 
on other issues such as the intellectual property rights and currency appreciation.79  The Chinese 
government could not prioritize the interests of the textile and apparel industries over all other 
                                                 
78 The Chinese Minister of Commerce Bo Xilai made the comment on the social significance of the Chinese textile 
and apparel industries during the press conference after he signed the new trade agreement with the U.S. Trade 
Representative, Rob Portman, on November 8, 2005.  The transcript of the press conference is available at: 
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Transcripts/ 
79 During the 16th annual U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) meeting, which was held in 
July 2005, the Chinese media have reported the debated issues including the intellectual property rights and the 
valuation of Chinese currency between the United States and China, e.g., http://finance.sina.com.cn, accessed on 
July 11, 2005; and http://www.xinghuanet.com, accessed on July 11, 2005.   
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interests and other industries.  In the final analysis, the resolution to the 2005 Sino-U.S. trade 
dispute reflects the unequal standings of China and the United States in the global political 
economy.  Power, be it political or economic, has factored into the U.S.-China garment trade, 
which connects the Chinese producers and the U.S. consumers and ultimately the Chinese and 
U.S. clothing industries (or the two fields).   
6.6 GLOBAL NETWORKS OF CHINESE MADE CLOTHING: CONNECTIONS 
AND DISCONNECTIONS  
The export of China-made garments to the United States clearly provides a material connection 
between people (eventually the consumers) in the United States with the Chinese suppliers and 
workers, just as my Steelers’ jersey connects me, through Mr. Zeng, to some garment factory and 
its workers in China.  I, as a U.S. consumer, and the Chinese garment workers are connected to a 
network that is formed through the movement of the garment.  But this material connection does 
not mean that the meanings of the garments that are transpired at the sites of consumption and 
production are the same.  In fact, the meanings of the garments for the Chinese producers are 
disconnected from the meanings of those garments for the U.S. consumers.  To illustrate this 
point, I will provide a vignette of mine that describes my use of the Steelers’ jersey and some 
examples of the Chinese garment workers.    
As newly converted fans of the Steelers, my wife and I decided to go to a sports bar to 
watch the Super Bowl XL game, which was held in Detroit, Michigan on February 5, 2006.  
Right after lunch, we headed out for a bar, and I was of course wearing my Steelers’ jersey sent 
to me by my friend from Shanghai.  After a few failed attempts (because the seats were fully 
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booked), we luckily located a table without reservation in a sports restaurant/bar at the 
Waterfront, a booming area for shopping and recreation in Pittsburgh.  We killed some time over 
snacks and drinks (the game was scheduled to begin in the evening), just as many people did in 
the restaurant.  By people, I meant the Steelers fanatics: They were all decked out in black and 
gold jerseys, some were holding the Steelers’ “Terrible Towels,” and some even brought out 
their favorite stuffed animals dressed in Steelers’ jerseys.  Finally, the game began and we 
watched the game over dinner and drinks on a large flat-screen TV.  Each time the Steelers 
scored or made a big play, we cheered, “go Steelers, go!”  But when the Seahawks, the Steelers’ 
opponent, were about make a big play, we booed them even though they were only on TV.  By 
cheering for the Steelers and booing the Seahawks, a sense of familiarity and togetherness, or to 
use an anthropological term made popular by Victor Turner, “communitas,” was developed 
among the audience in the restaurant (1969: 97).  Total strangers became very friendly and were 
not awkward at all about striking up a conversation with each other during the commercial 
breaks.  My Steelers’ jersey clearly helped to mark me as “one of us”: When the Steelers scored 
a touchdown, one guy whom I had never met before came over and gave me a high five to 
celebrate.  Yes, we had a good reason to celebrate: the Steelers won Super Bowl XL.  
Reflecting on my experience of the Super Bowl game, my Steelers’ jersey clearly 
mattered, not because it was made in China, but because of the black and gold and the Steelers’ 
logo on it.  It signaled that I was “one of us.”  Should I have worn a Seahawks’ jersey, no matter 
where it was made, my experience in the restaurant/bar would be conceivably very different.  
This brings out the point that the context in which I wear the shirt and the symbolic meanings of 
the shirt are separate from its place of origin or production.  Indeed, the symbolic contents of the 
shirt including the “black and gold,” the Steelers’ and the NFL logo, and the Reebok brand all 
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belong to organizations located in the United States.  Reebok is the OBM manufacturer, while 
the Chinese supplier that makes the shirt is the OEM manufacturer who is only responsible for 
the production of the shirt.  But that does not mean the Steelers’ shirt is meaningless to the 
Chinese workers who made it; it only suggests that what the shirt means to them is different from 
what it means to me in the sports bar watching a Steelers’ game.    
To say that the NFL garments provide a means of survival and empowerment for the 
Chinese workers who made them is not really an exaggeration.  The majority of Chinese garment 
workers are migrant workers from China’s vast countryside where opportunities are sparse for 
non-agricultural jobs and at the same time working in small family farms allotted by the 
government is not sufficient to make a living.  By contrast, working in the garment factories, 
though not exactly high-paying jobs with good working conditions, the migrant workers (mostly 
young girls) can live off of their work and frequently feel empowered while being exploited.  
Sociologist Ching Kwan Lee records many examples of migrant workers in Shenzhen that 
illustrate this point (Lee 1998).  Among Lee’s research subjects, Chi-Ying is a young woman 
from Hubei province.  The money Chi-Ying makes, although several times what her father earns 
at home, was not her primary reason for leaving home.  Her work in the factory, which is far 
away from home, allowed her to break an engagement that her parents arranged for her and to 
repay the gifts from the young man.  Moreover, the experience of living in the city and the ability 
to consume modern commodities empowered her in a way that her mother and grandmother 
never experienced. 80  As Lee describes, Chi-Ying felt that her horizon was expanded 
tremendously from those of her mother and grandmother who never left the village or saw a 
paved road.   
                                                 
80 Mary Beth Mills (2001) also sees similar patterns of empowerment among rural workers in Thailand. 
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During my research in Zhejiang province in 2004, I learned about a phenomenon of 
young migrant workers “traveling while working” (lüyou dagong); they would work in one city 
for a year or two and then move onto the next city to look for work.  One worker from a garment 
factory I visited in Zhejiang, who was originally from the countryside of Anhui, had traveled half 
of China from the north to Zhejiang by engaging this type of “lüyou dagong,” and he planned to 
travel further to the south after working in Zhejiang.  Like Chi-Ying, these “traveler-workers” 
were able to use the flexible nature of their work and the low status of “migrant workers” to their 
advantage.  This of course does not mean that these workers are so empowered that they are free 
from exploitation at work.  On the contrary, sweatshop conditions, such as long working hours, 
low pay or back pay, unsafe and/or unclean working conditions, have plagued the garment 
industry both in the developing countries such as China and even the developed countries 
including the United Kingdom and the United States (e.g., Phizacklea 1990; Bao 2001; Su 1997; 
Chan 2001; Lee 1998).  But the point I am trying to make here is that although making the 
export-oriented garments contributes to the exploitation of the Chinese migrant workers, it also 
provides them the opportunity to make a living and achieve empowerment they probably would 
not be able to otherwise.   
From a means of survival and empowerment to a symbol of loyalty to a football team, my 
Steelers’ jersey clearly means different things for the Chinese garment workers and for the U.S. 
consumers like me.  In other words, the meanings of the Chinese made garments are transpired 
locally at the site of production and the site of consumption; they do not flow from one site to the 
other, following the movement of the goods from China to the United States.  The disconnection 
of the meanings associated with the garments at different sites, however, does not undermine the 
strong connection established through the movement of the garments, which in economic terms 
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forms the “supply chains” of the U.S. based corporate buyers (often the OBMs).  The fact that 
those garments made in China are able to cross the borders and enter the U.S. market in a timely 
and efficient manner indicates the concerted efforts of the major parties involved this supply 
chain network.  The strong control of the U.S. OBMs over their supply chains and their OEM 
suppliers in China is in fact the reason why the meanings of the garments constructed at the sites 
of production in China, being it empowerment or exploitation, are filtered out when the garments 
reach the shelves in the malls or department stores in the United States.  Instead, new and 
intended meanings are carefully packaged and marketed to the U.S. consumers by the U.S. 
OBMs and retailers.  Equally effective, when many U.S. corporate buyers felt the uncertainty of 
the U.S.-China trade environment in 2005, they quickly shifted many of their orders from China 
to India and South East Asia.   
6.7 GLOBALIZATION: A CLOTHING PERSPECTIVE 
As reviewed earlier, recent anthropological studies of the transnational flow of goods have 
primarily focused on those that flow from the West to the rest, such as McDonald’s and Coca-
Cola.  While popular views have often equated the increasing presence of Western goods in non-
Western societies with Westernization or Americanization, anthropologists counter these views 
by pointing out that the “de-territorialization” of the Western goods must be “re-territorialized” 
in non-Western societies, in the sense that non-Western consumers always appropriate or 
integrate the Western goods into their local ways of consumption (Inda and Rosaldo 2002).  
James Watson and his colleagues’ study of McDonald’s in East Asia provides excellent 
examples of appropriation and integration of McDonald’s into the local ways of life (Watson 
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1997).  In this respect, there is little difference between the consumption of Western goods such 
as McDonald’s in non-Western societies and the consumption of the Chinese made garments in 
the United States.  In both instances, the meanings of the goods at the site of production (or 
origination) do not automatically transfer to their site of consumption following the movement of 
the goods.  Thus, my study of the transnational flow of the Chinese made garments joins the 
anthropological critique of Westernization or global homogenization thesis in the study of 
globalization.   
However, there is more to the global connection established through the movement of 
clothing, in this case, clothing made in China and consumed in the United States.  It ties the 
Chinese producers and the U.S. corporate buyers into a network of supply chains in which the 
U.S. corporate buyers enjoy primary control.  Furthermore, the Chinese made garments also link 
the supply chain network to a broader network composed of not just the Chinese producers and 
the U.S. corporate buyers, but also the U.S.-based textile and garment manufacturers, their 
workers, and the U.S. consumers.  This global network, or more precisely the “network of 
networks,” constituted through the movement of the Chinese made garments is critical to further 
our understanding of globalization in two ways.   
For one, it connects various persons and groups both in China and the United States, and 
because of that the interested persons and groups become each other’s context when they act on 
their own interests and/or react to others who are also linked to the network.  The global network 
formed by Chinese made garments works in the same way that Coca-Cola connects the 
company’s executives in the United States and the consumers like Elizabeth Solomon in Papua 
New Guinea studied by Foster (2002).  As a result of the connection, the two parties become 
each other’s context to construct their own meanings of the commodity which guide their 
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actions.  The point that the network provides the context for action is especially evident during 
the U.S.-China textile and apparel trade dispute in 2005.   
The U.S.-based textile and apparel manufacturers’ and workers’ interests clashed with 
those of the U.S. corporate buyers on the issue of more or less garment imports from China.  
Subsequently, they each constructed their “meanings” of the Chinese made garments from the 
vantage point of their own positions and interests: while the U.S.-based manufacturers and 
workers perceived those commodities as a “flood” and “threat,” the U.S. corporate buyers saw 
them as “quality products with cheap prices.”  Each side lobbied hard and tried to convince the 
U.S. policy makers of their version of the meanings of the Chinese made garments.  The Chinese 
producers, on their part, also tried to do whatever they could to preserve their interest and the 
meaning they mapped onto the products—a means of livelihood.  Many cried out to the Chinese 
government for help, more acted, to be more exact, reacted on their own.  For fear of heavy 
losses, many Chinese manufacturers were afraid to take new orders from the United States 
during the prolonged negotiation period between the U.S. and Chinese governments.  For those 
who did, they tried to beat others at the “finish line,” that is, trying to get their products to the 
U.S. Customs before others and before the quota limits were filled.  To do so, many of them did 
the otherwise unimaginable: shipping their “cheap” products in the safeguarded categories by air 
instead of by sea, which resulted in steep climb of costs (Nanfang Daily, 07/04/05).   
The connections between the actions of the interested parties such as the U.S.-based 
manufacturers and workers, the U.S. corporate buyers, and the Chinese producers are what I call 
the “network effect”: those who are connected to the network act by reacting to others who are 
also connected to the network, which creates an effect of chain reactions throughout the network.  
Thus, although various interested parties connected to the network construct their meanings of 
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the goods from their own positions, which results in a disconnection between meanings of the 
goods at different sites, these disconnected meanings are connected in the sense that they 
become each other’s context in which those who hold one meaning act by reacting to the others 
who hold a different meaning.  In this sense, what we can learn from the global network of the 
Chinese made garments is not just that the meanings of the goods are always constructed 
“locally” at different sites, but also that the various “local” meanings are connected into a global 
network, here the network constituted through the movement of the Chinese made garments.  
Differently put, this global network becomes the mechanism that perpetuates “local” 
heterogeneity of meanings of the goods.  
For another, we can further understand globalization by examining the way in which 
power is vested in the global network of the Chinese made garments.  Clearly, power is not 
evenly distributed in this network.  As a whole, the United States has more power over China, as 
reflected in the unfair trade regimes.  This of course is not a novel point (e.g., Krishna and Tan 
1998).  What is more nuanced is the way in which power is embodied and manifested through 
the global network of the Chinese made garments.  That is to say, power is not an abstract entity, 
but is vested, enacted, and channeled through the network of the garments.  Once again, I use the 
example of the 2005 U.S.-China trade dispute to illustrate my point.   
The U.S. corporate buyers had more power over the Chinese producers precisely because 
they could provide (as well as deny) access of the Chinese made garments to the U.S. market.  
Protected by international trade regimes, the U.S.-based manufacturers’ and workers also have 
power to deny market access of the Chinese made garments.  While in a position vested with less 
power, the Chinese producers had fewer options at their disposal to counter an unfavorable trade 
environment.  Thus, power is unevenly vested among the interested parties that are connected to 
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the global network of the Chinese made garments, which is reflected by what each of them can 
do regarding those garments.  By the same token, power is only enacted or exercised through 
what the various interested parties do with regard to the garments.  When the U.S.-based 
manufacturers and workers exercised, through the U.S. government, their power to deny access 
of certain categories of Chinese made garments in 2005, the impact on those who were also 
connected to the network was uneven.  U.S. corporate buyers shifted their orders from China to 
other Third World countries.  The Chinese producers, on the other hand, faced with fewer 
options but greater impact.  The example of 2005 U.S.-China trade dispute suggests that power 
in general terms circumscribes the context in which the involved persons and groups act and 
react.  
6.8 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I try to explore the global connections of the Chinese clothing industry by 
looking at the exportation of Chinese made garments to the United States.  Upon further 
examination, as we would expect, my China-made Steelers’ jersey to me means something 
completely different from what it means to the Chinese workers who made it.  In this way, the 
apparent material connection between me and the Chinese workers only translates into a 
disconnection between the meanings of the shirt that are constructed at different sites.  This 
observation supports the anthropological critique of the global homogenization thesis in the 
study of globalization.   
However, this chapter proposes a clothing perspective to the study of globalization, 
which goes beyond a mere rejection of the global homogenization thesis.  By focusing on the 
 183 
U.S.-China textile and apparel trade dispute in 2005, I suggest that the various parties involved, 
such as the U.S.-based manufacturers and workers, the U.S. corporate buyers, and the Chinese 
producers, tried to map their own versions of the meanings onto the garments from their 
particular vantage point.  That is to say, they do not construct meanings of the garments at a 
whim, but do so out of their own specifically located interests.  Moreover, the various interested 
parties are connected because they are all linked to a common network of the garments in which 
one acts by reacting to the others.  Such a network analysis not only helps us understand how the 
different meanings are constructed at different sites or positions globally, but also how the 
differences are connected and perpetuated.  This network analysis should not be only applicable 
to the Chinese made clothing; it has a much wider application.  The broad application of this 
approach is eloquently illustrated by Elf Hannerz: 
In a more complex situation, it becomes increasingly obvious that the individual’s 
perspective, the individual’s share or version of socially organized meaning, is in 
large part a product of his network experience...Individuals’ perspectives, then, 
come to consist of the conceptions which they have come to construct or 
appropriate for their own use, as it were, but also of their perspectives on other 
perspectives—their approximate mappings of other people’s meanings (Hannerz 
1992a: 42-3). 
As illustrated by the example of the 2005 U.S.-China trade dispute, the way in which the various 
interested parties acted by reacting to others was exactly based on their “approximate mappings” 
of other parties’ meanings of the Chinese made garments.   
In addition to the global connectedness of the different meanings mapped onto the 
Chinese made clothing in different locations, I also argue that the various interested persons and 
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groups are not connected to the network in the same way.  Because of their particular locations 
(or positions) in the network, some are vested with more power than others.  The specific power 
of providing or denying access to the U.S. market, places those interested parties who reside in 
the Untied States in a more advantageous position than those involved parties in China.  Because 
of the unevenness of power between the U.S. OBM buyers and the Chinese OEM producers, the 
meanings of the garments in their place of origin are filtered out, and new meanings are created 
and marketed in their place of consumption.  Furthermore, because of unevenness of power in 
the global network of the Chinese made garments, those involved parties in China have fewer 
options than others in the United States to act and react to any disturbances in the network.  On 
that note, I conclude this chapter with the story of Mr. Zeng in 2005.  
Mr. Zeng, the friend who sent me the Steelers’ jersey, shipped the order of the NFL 
jerseys when the quota of that category was over 90 percent filled, and he was worried sick and 
prayed for ten days that his shipment would not be rejected by U.S. Customs.  Mr. Zeng’s 
example challenges any proposition that globalization entails unfettered flows of goods across 
the borders of nation-states.  On the contrary, it serves as a reminder that the global political 
economy continues to shape and condition the transnational flow of goods. 
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7.0  CONCLUSION 
7.1 “SOCIALIST MARKET ECONOMY WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS”  
When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) decided to reform China’s economy in 1978, it 
started a fundamental shift in China’s economic structure from a state-owned and state-run 
planned economy to one that is composed of increasing shares of privately-owned and foreign-
owned elements.  China’s apparel industry is particularly illustrative of this trend.  Since the 
early 1990s, China’s apparel industry is dominated by non-state-owned sectors.  Such a shift in 
China’s economic structure has created a paradox for the CCP: On the one hand, the CCP still 
insists on a Marxist ideology that asserts that the economic base determines the superstructure, a 
concept that every Chinese high school student can recite, and on the other hand, the Chinese 
economy today is no longer state-owned and the “socialist” share has shrunk to a dismal 
minority.  How then can the CCP and the state justify within the Marxist framework that China is 
still a socialist economy and should maintain a socialist ideology and superstructure?   
Emboldened by Deng’s comments during his famous tour to South China in the Spring of 
1992 (see Chapter 2), former president Jiang Zemin came up with a solution during his speech at 
the 14th Party Congress in October 1992, which established that the goal for China’s economic 
reform was “to construct socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics.”  Evidently, 
Jiang intended to integrate or to enforce a compromise between the Chinese economy and the 
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ruling ideology with the notion of a socialist market economy.  Of course, not everyone agrees 
with Jiang’s new definition of the state of the Chinese economy; for example, British political 
economist Shaun Breslin (2004) calls the Chinese economy “capitalism with Chinese 
characteristics.”  Be it capitalism or socialism, the introduction of market forces into the Chinese 
economy simultaneously changed the structure of the Chinese economy and the socialist 
ideology, and consequently both were endowed with “Chinese characteristics.”  Alternatively, 
one may say that it was because of the specific context of China that the market economy and the 
socialist ideology, both of which came from outside China, had to be adapted to the 
characteristics of Chinese society.  Then the question arises: What are the “Chinese 
characteristics”?    
Once again, Deng Xiaoping was the first Chinese leader who used the phrase “socialism 
with Chinese characteristics” in his opening address at the 12th Party Congress in 1982, but the 
idea of the “Chinese characteristics” was only fully developed in the then Communist Party 
Secretary Zhao Ziyang’s speech at the 13th Party Congress in 1987, in which Zhao proclaimed 
that China was in the “primitive stage” (chuji jieduan) of a socialist society because of the “basic 
realities” (jiben guoqing) of Chinese economy, which included “a huge population, an economy 
with little accumulated wealth, uneven regional development, and underdeveloped means of 
production.”  According to Zhao, those characteristics of China determined that for a long time 
China would be in the primitive stage of socialism, and consequently China had to adapt 
socialism to the Chinese reality and build a socialist society with Chinese characteristics.   
Therefore, in a broad sense, the political economy of modern China is a case of 
syncretism between Marxism and the Chinese reality, and between market mechanisms and 
Chinese socialism and Chinese society.  In this light, the phenomenal changes that have taken 
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place in contemporary China are also the process in which both Marxism (or socialism) and 
market mechanisms become localized in the context of China and vested with “Chinese 
characteristics.”  This dissertation engages with the question of “Chinese characteristics” from 
the vantage point of Chinese clothing and the clothing industry. 
7.2 CLOTHING, MODERNIZATION, AND GLOBALIZATION 
The central question this dissertation has been concerned with is how clothing and the clothing 
industry are constituted by and constitutive of the phenomenal changes that have taken place in 
contemporary China, especially in the post-Mao, post-1978 reform period.  Among the changes, 
I have focused on two broad and related themes: modernization and globalization.  Throughout 
the dissertation, I try to address two major questions: 1) Are the changes in Chinese clothing and 
the clothing industry merely a part of China’s economic development or modernization? And 2) 
does China’s integration with the global economy translate into a Westernization of China?   
Chapters 2 and 3 mainly addressed the first question, although Chapters 4 and 5 also 
touch on the issue of China’s efforts to modernize its fashion industry.  The development of 
China’s textile and apparel industries, as discussed in Chapter 2, is a process of deregulation and 
liberalization in which the socialist state cultivates and encourages market competition in the 
Chinese economy.  In this sense, the development of China’s textile and clothing industries is a 
part of the state’s agenda to increase efficiency, upgrade the industries, and more broadly to 
modernize the Chinese economy.  However, the shift from a planned economy to a market 
economy does not mean a complete implementation of Western style free market in China.  On 
the contrary, the emergent Chinese market economy has “Chinese characteristics,” one of which 
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is that the Chinese state is not a democracy and the state remains the sole guardian of the 
operation of the market.  As a result, the power of the state can penetrate the market at will.  
Moreover, the state also attempts to vest meanings in the changes taking place in China’s 
clothing industry, which is apparent in the state’s discourse of building a modernized socialist 
China.  In this way, the economic modernization in China is not intended to be an imitation of 
the West, but a means to an end.  Similarly, the Chinese notion of modernity, which is reflected 
in the official narratives of the evolution of clothing styles in contemporary China (Chapter 3), is 
not modeled after the West; instead, it is a story the Chinese tell themselves about themselves 
(cf. Geertz 1973: 448) in relation to their own past (cf. Rofel 1999).  Therefore, modernization 
and modernity as reflected by the changes in Chinese clothing and the clothing industry are 
vested with Chinese meanings, and hence Chinese characteristics.    
Intertwined with the issues of modernization and modernity, this dissertation also 
examines the ways in which Western styles of clothing, Western design techniques and business 
models, and Western forms of fashion shows and fashion weeks become localized in China.  In 
various chapters, I argue that Western styles of clothing are rendered modern Chinese clothing 
(Chapter 3), Western design techniques and business models are adapted to the Chinese market 
(Chapter 4), and Western forms of fashion shows and fashion weeks contain subtle cultural 
logics that have to be understood in the context of China and its fashion industry (Chapter 5).  
Therefore, the opening up of China and the huge inflow of Western goods, practices, and 
institutions do not automatically translate into a Westernization of China or homogenization of 
the world.  On the contrary, things global (indeed Western), such as Western styles of clothing, 
business models, and fashion shows, are “re-territorialized” in China and endowed with Chinese 
meanings.  This study of China’s clothing and fashion industry thus challenges global 
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homogenization or Westernization thesis that permeates the popular imagination of the so called 
“global pop culture.”  In this respect, I find previous anthropological studies on foods very 
insightful (e.g., Watson 1997; Miller 1998b).  
In addition, this dissertation has also explored the “global connectedness” or integration 
of China’s clothing industry with the global clothing industry through the examination of the 
exportation of China-made garments to the United States (Chapter 6).  As a significant part of 
the development of China’s clothing industry, China has since the early 1990s become the 
largest exporter of garments in the world.  China today is also the largest supplier of garments for 
the U.S. clothing industry.  As such, Chinese made garments connect Chinese manufacturers 
(OEMs) that are responsible for the production of the garments to U.S. apparel companies 
(OBMs) that control the brands, the designs, and the marketing.  This particular pattern of the 
global connection between the Chinese OEM manufacturers and the U.S. OBM buyers not only 
reflects an international division of labor, but also a global inequality of power.  It explains on 
the one hand why the meanings of the garments do not move across the borders, and on the other 
hand why the inequality between the Chinese suppliers and the U.S. buyers is perpetuated.  
Therefore, this dissertation offers a clothing perspective on globalization that examines both 
meanings and power that are vested in clothing, which leads to another argument that I tried to 
make.    
Throughout this dissertation, I argue that clothing is not just a business, but a business 
that involves cultural logics, and that it is not just economics, but also is endowed with 
meanings.  Because clothing and fashion lie at the intersection of the fields of culture and 
economy, I argue that a cultural economic approach is needed to understand the internal 
dynamics of the Chinese field of clothing and fashion.  Moreover, by adopting a cultural 
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economic approach, the dissertation is informed by the insights from both interpretive 
anthropology and political economy.  
7.3 SOME AFTERTHOUGHTS  
Although I have tried to present this dissertation in a planned out and orderly fashion, the 
conception of the project, the field research, and the writing in some ways each took a life of 
their own.  At the stage of conception of the project, I was initially interested in the changes in 
Chinese clothing styles, particularly in the sharp contrast between the nearly ubiquitous uni-sex 
Mao suit in the radical socialist period and the diverse styles for both men and women today.  
My major concerns included how the Chinese state as well as the Chinese people reconciled the 
socialist egalitarian ideals and the diverse clothing styles today, which clearly indicated 
differences along class and gender lines, and how—if at all—the tensions between the two were 
played out.  Once I arrived in Shanghai in 2004, I conversed with professors at Donghua 
University about my ideas, but they appeared to have no interest in ideology.  Worse yet, I got a 
strong sense that they were wary of me asking them those questions.  Their assumption was, as I 
interpreted them, that I was Chinese and I should know all the answers myself.  In a strange way 
(maybe not so strange), my advantage of being a cultural insider worked against me in this 
instance.81   
                                                 
81 Being a cultural insider worked against me in this particular instance because the “naïve” questions that I asked 
were assumed to be known to me.  But overall, being a cultural insider facilitated my research in significant ways.  
For example, I was able to get to know a large number of people in the clothing industry quickly utilizing my 
existing networks through friends, former classmates, and hometown fellows, etc.    
 191 
While I was still researching archival materials at Donghua University, I started to look 
for contacts in the clothing and fashion business.  Through friends, I met with a few trade agents 
working in the business of international garment trade.  Perhaps because of my friends or 
perhaps because they thought I could be a potential business partner in the United States, they 
were very friendly and open with me with regard to their “trade secrets.”  I followed them to 
their meetings with clients and to the factories that produced the garments for them.  Through 
them I learned for the first time how a pair of jeans was made from a piece of fabric through the 
complex processes of cutting, assembling, sandblasting, stonewashing, ironing, and packaging.  
The assembly line gave me a strong impression that a piece of garment required concerted efforts 
from lots of people and through many processes.  I began to think of the clothing industry as a 
whole in which all the players involved were connected, though they might have different roles.    
This sense of connectedness was not only found in the export sector, but also the 
domestic sector.  Through the contacts I established in 2002, I was also able to conduct one 
month of participant observation in a fashion company in Shanghai.  There (as well as in other 
companies I visited later), I observed that the designers’ office was the nexus of all the activities 
and operations taking place in the company.  People from various departments constantly came 
in and out of the designers’ office, asking questions to ensure the right fabric, the right stitching, 
the correct button, and the best image to be put up in the store, and so on.  Later in the year, 
when I went to Shanghai Fashion Week and China Fashion Week, the connectedness within the 
industry became even more evident during those events, because they were the converging points 
of the various agents in the industry, including fashion designers, models, journalists, 
photographers, buyers, consumers (usually VIP customers or interested consumers), corporate 
sponsors, and officials of the organizations in the industry and even local government officials.  
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It was because of the strong sense of the “connectedness” of the industry that I was compelled to 
learn each piece of the puzzle (I also felt that one year of funded research was a rare opportunity 
in my professional career and that I should use it to learn as much as I could about the industry), 
and subsequently I interviewed a wide range of individuals in the industry during my field 
research, instead of focusing more narrowly on one particular group or one particular aspect of 
clothing and the clothing industry. 
After I came back from the field, I started to reevaluate my original research plan and 
seriously consider ways to integrate my initial interest in change and conveying a sense of 
“connectedness” of the Chinese clothing and fashion industry.  I came to the realization that the 
clothing industry is also “connected” to (in fact embedded in) the broad changes taking place in 
China.  The thinking and writing process also forced me to bring together my knowledge of 
Chinese clothing and the clothing industry with my theoretical concerns in anthropology, 
particularly regarding the ways to incorporate the insights of both interpretive anthropology and 
political economy (e.g. Schneider 1994; Comaroff 1997; Bestor 2001), two important traditions 
in anthropology that tend to go in different directions (Marcus and Fischer 1986).        
After long periods of deliberation, writing, and revising, I came up with this dissertation 
which takes an unconventional anthropological approach—a cultural economic approach—to 
examine an unconventional anthropological subject—Chinese clothing and the clothing industry, 
which I consider a field in itself (per Bourdieu 1993).  However, I believe that my central 
concern of how Chinese clothing and the clothing industry are constituted by and constitutive of 
the remarkable changes that have taken place in contemporary China is of profound importance 
in the anthropology of China.  As the main subject of my research, Chinese clothing and the 
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clothing industry are at the intersection of culture and economy, of the local and the global, and 
thus serve as a perfect site to engage a wide range of issues and theoretical debates.     
While this dissertation has focused on the interconnections of clothing and the clothing 
industry as a field and the relationship between the changes in clothing and the clothing industry 
and the broad processes of modernization and globalization, it leaves unanswered many 
questions about particular groups of people located in specific positions in the field of China’s 
clothing industry.  For example, intensive ethnographic research on the garment workers would 
address questions about how the structural changes in China’s textile and apparel industries 
impacted the lives of the workers.  Chapter 2 noted that over one million Chinese textile and 
garment workers lost their jobs during the restructuring of the state-owned enterprises in the late 
1990s.  In fact, that was only part of the story.  Because of China’s dual “household registration 
system” (hukou), workers with urban residence registration (chengshi hukou) were better 
protected by the state than workers with rural residence registration (nongcun hukou).  Thus, 
future research on Chinese garment workers should examine not just the relationship between 
labor and management, between workers and the state, but also the distinctions among the 
workers themselves and the uneven impact on them due to the changes in Chinese clothing and 
the clothing industry.82  Future research can also exclusively focus on the Chinese consumers 
and examine the ways through which clothing is related to the issues of class and social 
stratification (Davis 2000; Goodman 1999).   
Aside from locally focused research, future research can further expand the network 
analysis explored in Chapter 6 and examine the global connections and/or disconnections of the 
                                                 
82 Workers with rural residence registration can work in urban areas, but they are considered migrant workers.  In 
addition, there are other factors than household registration that differentiate workers.  For example, gender is also 
an important dimension in the lives of the workers.   
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network resulted from the transnational movement of clothing, which is also called by some 
scholars the global commodity chains (e.g. Hopkins and Wallerstein 1986; Gereffi and 
Korzeniewicz 1994; Bestor 2001).  The global commodity chains are useful tools to study how 
the meanings of commodities are locally constructed and at the same time how political economy 
shapes and conditions the commodity chains.  
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